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This gloss discusses the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union taken in the judgment passed on 20 March 2018 in the case of Luca Menci (C-524/15) in reference to the restrictions of ne bis in idem principle. The main thesis of the Court concerned the admissibility of restrictions of ne bis in idem based on the principle of proportionality as a limitation clause and its accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The analysis of the right not to be tried or punished twice in Article 4 Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms allows us to formulate opposite conclusions. The application of the balancing test as a limitation clause for ne bis in idem, finds no support in the case-law of the ECtHR too. According to the Author, the position taken in Menci infringes Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which the meaning and scope of the rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall be at least be the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has not yet been paid much attention to the right to information on the judicial decision-making process and its limitations in the literature. Yet it is an issue that concerns a major clash of a fundamental right and the public interest. This article aims to analyze this topic and, in particular, interpret Sec. 11 para. 4 letter b) of the Act on the Free Access to Information, which is the most important statutory limitation, taking into account the purpose of the right to information and its constitutional roots. Apart from many partial conclusions, this article concludes that the grounds on which the right to information can be limited must either be found in Art. 17 para. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms or it must be the case of the so-called implied limitations that can be justified, in accordance with the case law of the Constitutional Court, by the public interest in maintaining either authority, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has not yet been paid much attention to the right to information on the judicial decision-making process and its limitations in the legal literature. Yet it is an issue that concerns a major clash of a fundamental right and the public interest. This article aims to analyze this topic and, in particular, interpret Sec. 11 para. 4 letter b) of the Act on the Free Access to Information, which is the most important statutory limitation, taking into account the purpose of the right to information and its constitutional roots. Apart from many partial conclusions, this article concludes that the grounds on which the right to information can be limited must either be found in Art. 17 para. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms or it must be the case of the so-called implied limitations that can be justified, in accordance with the case law of the Constitutional Court, by the public interest in maintaining either authority, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]