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The article explores the 1958 “Harvard” conception of legal reasoning presented by the British philosopher and jurist Herbert Hart, within the context of a contemporary reinterpretation by American jurist and historian of legal thought, Gerald Postema. Postema’s interpretation, labeling Hart’s view as “settled-meaning positivism”, posits it as a unity that encompasses both the delineation of distinct types of argumentation in the realms of “core” and “penumbra” (linguistically mediated clear and controversial cases of law enforcement) and the reduction of law and legal reasoning to the “core” of rules and their established linguistic meanings. The article aims to analyze Postema’s perspective in the broader context of the evolution of Hart’s views on legal indeterminacy and judicial decision-making. The relevance of this topic lies in the necessity for a more comprehensive and balanced reconstruction of Hart’s theory, which is paradigmatic for modern positivism and Anglophone jurisprudence, in the light of the contentious and narrow character of its assessments. The authority of the Postema’s interpretation, seen as providing new insights into the work of the British jurist, adds to the relevance of this analysis. The research uses diverse, primarily hermeneutical, methods, drawing from Postema’s paper and the available body of Hart’s writings, as well as the representative biographical and scientific literature. The article examines the historical context of the 1958 essay’s creation and the doctrine of judicial reasoning contained within it. Ultimately, while recognizing the stimulating role of Postema’s re-description of the 1958 doctrine, the article finds some of its key assertions (including Hart’s understanding of the nature of legal indeterminacy and judicial choice, the attribution of “settle-meaning positivism”, and a doctrine of the rule of law) to be contentious or unwarranted.

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This article explores the limitations of Islamic law within the broader intellectual tradition of Islam. While law is typically designed to enforce coercive justice, Miskawayh’s perspective attempts to integrate this conception through a reassessment of the concept of justice. Specifically, this article examines, first, the overarching view of Islam as a nomothetic religion; and second, the ethical concepts and vision of justice offered by Miskawayh. By contextualizing Miskawayh’s ideas within the broader cultural and intellectual traditions of Islam, this research reveals a contrasting view of legal mechanisms. For Miskawayh, the vision of justice is not necessarily derived from external mechanisms of divine revelation, but rather hinges on the internal mechanisms of the individual. Miskawayh emphasizes a reversal of mechanisms from external to internal by advocating for a greater role of ethical-philosophical thought in Islamic legal discourse. Miskawayh, like many Muslim philosophers, navigates the relationship between revealed law and reason in his conception of justice. He rejects the notion of inherent conflict, arguing that both reason and divine law originate from God.

This paper discusses the "positivistic" idea of the limits of law in various contexts: the conceptual problem of the "limits of law", the limits of legal interpretation and the limits of theoretical disagreements in jurisprudence. In the latter case, we briefly show how contemporary "reflective" or "critical" positivist theories approach the possibility and limits of disagreements over the "grounds" of law. In what follows, we argue that these theories, which argue for a form of an "institutional" limit for admissible "legal" reasons as built upon theories of basic concepts or normative theories of interpretation, are themselves actually underdetermined by "legal culture" or, so to speak, a "folk theory of law". In the final section, we outline how a folk theory of law constrains both conceptual and interpretive enterprises in jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Retos: Nuevas Perspectivas de Educación Física, Deporte y Recreación is the property of Federacion Espanola de Asociaciones de Docentes de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I consider to what extent, if at all, rights – or to take it wider, law – can contribute or even respond to what is referred to as the ‘current crisis’ in higher education. To what extent does rights discourse still enable radical political claims that could engage with the complexity of the moment and support a politics of resistance? I recall arguments on the limits of law, in particular the inability of law to be self-reflexive, and also some critical responses to rights as such. Could these critical responses disclose possibilities for a radically different conception of right, of a ‘Right’ – particularly the Right to the university – that emerges from a place of anxiety, disruption and ‘unselfing’ rather than preservation? What could be at stake in thinking about a ‘Right’ to the university against the background of the notion of the Right to the city? The potential relevance of the Right to the city, linked to the notion of ‘inhabitance’, is that it challenges the modern, technical and functional notion of ‘habitat’. Habitat is devoid of any notion of politics, most pertinently political resistance. A contemplation of a Right to the university will have to have at its core the notion of ‘inhabitance’ that will resonate with Lefebvre’s notion of “lived space”.

I consider to what extent, if at all, rights - or to take it wider, law - can contribute or even respond to what is referred to as the 'current crisis' in higher education. To what extent does rights discourse still enable radical political claims that could engage with the complexity of the moment and support a politics of resistance? I recall arguments on the limits of law, in particular the inability of law to be self-reflexive, and also some critical responses to rights as such. Could these critical responses disclose possibilities for a radically different conception of right, of a 'Right' - particularly the Right to the university - that emerges from a place of anxiety, disruption and 'unselfing' rather than preservation? What could be at stake in thinking about a 'Right' to the university against the background of the notion of the Right to the city? The potential relevance of the Right to the city, linked to the notion of 'inhabitance', is that it challenges the modern, technical and functional notion of 'habitat'. Habitat is devoid of any notion of politics, most pertinently political resistance. A contemplation of a Right to the university will have to have at its core the notion of 'inhabitance' that will resonate with Lefebvre's notion of "lived space". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara Barosu Dergileri is the property of Ankara Bar Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The legal example is used in large part to dress the rule. A naked norm, for common lawyers, is simply an abstraction, an umbrageous nebulosity that needs its particulars, its cases, to have meaning, impact and thought. Using the paradoxical example of nakedness the essay examines the inability of British and European courts candidly to address the undressed. Nakedness is here examined as an instance of undressing the law, of stripping and streaking the norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal positivists often claim that law is a limited normative domain. Understanding the limits of law requires an answer to two related problems. On the one hand, the problem of unregulated cases and, on the other hand, the problem of the alien norms. The first problem refers to the distinction between legal gaps and unregulated cases. Many legal philosophers claim that the identification of legal gaps presupposes an evaluative judgment. Thus, contrary to legal positivism, the determination of the content and limits of law (i.e., the domain of regulated cases) does not only depend on the cognition of certain social facts, but it actually also requires an evaluation of such facts. The second problem refers to the fact that judges often recognize as legally binding norms that are not issued by competent authorities of their systems. Therefore, a positivistic theory would not provide a satisfactory account of law if it failed to explain the legal force of this kind of norms. In this paper I analyze some solutions to such problems that can be found in three well-known positivistic theories (Kelsen, Raz and Bulygin). I show that none of them offers a sound answer to the problem of the unregulated cases and the alien norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2012 Oñati Workshop on Human Rights and the Environment sought to begin the important task of developing a new framework that could contribute to re-imagining the relationship between human rights and the environment. Doing full justice to the vibrant and sustained discussion that took place in response to the papers delivered in the Workshop is near impossible in an ex post facto account that can only convey the merest flavour of the richness and complexity of what took place. Nonetheless, the following sections briefly recollect common themes and valuable insights that emerged during the workshop discussions and attempt to reflect the energy and creativity that accompanied them, with a view to setting out the general context within which the various individual papers in this volume should be considered. We have arranged the subsequent discussion to centre on the core discrete yet interrelated themes that emerged and developed during our workshop deliberations, namely: vulnerability; the limits of the law; the limits of rights; responsibility; interconnection; and thinking ecologically. El seminario sobre Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente celebrado en Oñati en 2012, buscó iniciar la importante tarea de desarrollar un nuevo marco que podría contribuir a re-imaginar la relación entre los derechos humanos y el medio ambiente. Haciendo justicia a la discusión vibrante y prolongada que tuvo lugar en respuesta a las ponencias presentadas en el taller, es casi imposible en un recuento ex post facto que sólo puede transmitir una mínima parte de la riqueza y complejidad de lo acontecido en Oñati. No obstante, las siguientes secciones recogen brevemente temas comunes y valiosas ideas que surgieron durante las discusiones del taller y tratan de reflejar la energía y creatividad que los acompañaba, con el fin de establecer el marco general dentro del cual las diversas ponencias individuales de este volumen deberían ser consideradas. Hemos organizado el debate posterior para centrarnos en el discreto núcleo aún interrelacionado con temas que surgieron y se desarrollaron durante nuestras deliberaciones de los talleres, a saber: la vulnerabilidad, los límites de la ley, los límites de los derechos, la responsabilidad, la interconexión, y el pensamiento ecológico.

Copyright of Kriminologisches Journal is the property of Julius Beltz GmbH & Co. KG Beltz Juventa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Should we conceive of corporations as entities to which moral responsibility can be attributed? This contribution presents what we will call a political account of corporate moral responsibility. We argue that in modern, liberal democratic societies, there is an underlying political need to attribute greater levels of moral responsibility to corporations. Corporate moral responsibility is essential to the maintenance of social coordination that both advances social welfare and protects citizens' moral entitlements. This political account posits a special capacity of self-governance that corporations can intelligibly be said to possess. Corporations can be said to be 'administrators of duty' in that they can voluntarily incorporate moral principles into their decision-making processes about how to conduct business. This account supplements and partly transforms earlier pragmatic accounts of corporate moral responsibility by disentangling responsibility from its conventional linkages with accountability, blame and punishment. It thereby represents a distinctive way to defend corporate moral responsibility and shows how Kantian thinking can be helpful in disentangling the problems surrounding the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]