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This article studies the connection between Dante’s Vita nuova and Convivio and focuses on the relation between Beatrice and the donna gentile. The Convivio is used as a starting point to understand Beatrice’s nature and her role in the entire Dantesque corpus. The article outlines the questions arising from the comparison of the two texts (especially regarding the diff erent endings of the love aff air with the donna gentile, and her allegorical or non-allegorical status) and examines the hypothesis proposed by L. Pietrobono about the existence of a lost “fi rst redaction” of the Vita nuova. Admitting the impossibility to solve the incongruities, the author argues that a comparison between the texts is not only reasonable but also necessary, as Dante himself in the Convivio urges his reader to attempt it. Following this, the article moves on to analyse the interconnections between Beatrice and the donna gentile of Convivio, presented by Dante as a “better friend” for him. The study identifi es the common role which Dante assigns to both women in his journey to contemplation and beatitude as the source of contrast between the female fi gures; this assumption is illustrated with textual references. The fi nal section of the paper provides examples of how this thesis can shed light on links and diff erences between the two texts. It is also describes how these examples show how Beatrice and the donna gentile not only embody different ways to attain contemplation and beatitude but also represent two different understandings of contemplation and beatitude, the former focusing on love, the latter on knowledge.

In this paper, I explore some consequences of Hilan Bensusan's arguments in favour of an indexicalist metaphysics and, in particular, of his discussions of the metaphysics of the others and of the paradoxical character of metaphysics. I suggest that, looking at the issue from an epistemological and moral perspective, the role that others play regarding our thought and, in particular, regarding our capacity for self-knowledge, opens up the possibility of embracing a paradoxical view of knowledge of oneself according to which I am, in some sense, at the same time an other to myself and not an other to myself. This paradox may be behind what sets apart self-knowledge from knowledge of what is external. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]