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Using the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey data for Niger, this study examined the determinants of support for military intervention with particular focus on political instability, perceived corruption in the democratic government, and socioeconomic deprivation. The descriptive results showed that Nigeriens generally do not have a strong aversion towards military rule. In fact, about 70 percent of them agreed that the military should intervene when the democratic government is corrupt. The regression results showed that political instability, which was measured using the total number of violent conflict incidents in the region where respondents resided, was positively correlated with support for military intervention. This might be because people who are exposed to violence feel that a military government would do a better job at providing security. Perceived corruption in government was also positively correlated with support for military intervention. This might be because corruption engenders discontent with democratic institutions, prompting people to see military intervention as a way of curtailing the democratic government's excesses. Socioeconomic deprivation was negatively correlated with support for military intervention, which suggests that the poor prefer democracy to a military government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1998 following a bitterly contested election in Lesotho, post-apartheid South Africa deployed its army to ostensibly restore peace within the tiny neighbouring country. Yet the intervention did not proceed smoothly, and the resulting public backlash has long tainted the operation. The analysis from academia on the operation has been no less critical. However, the longer period of stabilisation which followed the intervention has not yet been examined to date, which this article attempts to rectify. It will show that while a peace of sorts was restored to the nation, the ill-conduct of some South African soldiers, coupled with the limited mandate emplaced upon the South African army to address crime and the deeper political issues within Lesotho, had left a bitter aftertaste amongst some Basotho towards the intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some national leaders more likely to intervene in a civil war than others? In this paper, I suggest that prior military service and combat experience can influence leaders' risk perception by altering what they expect the result of their (in)action to be, as well as making militaristic means more mentally accessible, creating a militaristic heuristic for judgments. Analyzing national leaders from 1875 to 2004, I find that 1) leaders who have a military service background are about 3.86 percent more likely to engage in third-party intervention compared to those without; 2) leaders who were deployed in combat are around 4.53 percent more likely to intervene than those who either do not have any military experience at all or have military service experience but were never deployed; and 3) leaders' military service experience without deployment in combat shows almost no impact especially when the standard error was taken into consideration. By examining how individual leaders' experiences impact third-party intervention, this study aims to contribute to the agent-structure debate in IR and the debate on political decision-makers and their personal backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do governments use interventions to shape the internal political composition of other states? Many explanations focus on intervention's strategic utility, which can include a wider sphere of influence and enhanced state security. Alternatively, this article argues that how regimes view the internal political conditions of other states in relation to their own political spheres dictates the utility that they assign to intervention. Drawing on archival content related to Saudi Arabia's intervention in the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1967), the article tests this political-threat explanation of intervention against the strategic-threat alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nations militarily intervene in other countries for a variety of reasons—strategic, economic, humanitarian, and more. Not all interventions are equal, and publics do not endorse the risk and expenditure of blood and treasure evenly across instances. Knowing this, democratic leaders are both constrained by and attempt to shape public attitudes. One way that executives can lead the public is in framing the reasons for military action. I argue that executives justify the international use of force in popular schemas even when they do not apply and censor less popular ones even when they do, to strategically maximize public support. Using quantitative text analysis and regression techniques, this article examines the congruence between military objectives and communication frames employed in US presidential speeches, remarks, and congressional announcements to justify international militarized interventions. Results show that presidents carefully craft rhetoric to bolster public buy-in for international uses of force, even at risk of electoral costs for dishonesty if discovered down the line. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how foreign policy decisions shape US public support for military intervention on behalf of a state that is under attack. In particular, we consider two key questions. First, does a defender's foreign policy behavior shape the public's willingness to defend it? Second, what impact do US "hands-tying" policies, including alliance treaties, public threats, and tripwire forces, have on public support? We use a survey experiment to shed new light on these questions. Our experiment indicates that defender foreign policy matters; the public is more likely to support defenders that have contributed to previous US military operations, and less likely to support defenders that provoked their attackers. We also find that US hands-tying policies have a significant effect on public opinion. Interestingly, these impacts are statistically indistinguishable from one another; no one hands-tying policy is superior as a means of bolstering public demand for war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the withdrawal of troops after a military intervention supporting the government affect the number of rebel groups in the long term? This study argues that the withdrawal of foreign support for the government affects the number of rebels by directly provoking a nationalist backlash in the short term and threatening government legitimacy in the long term. Whether or not nationalism is provoked and whether legitimacy is enhanced or eroded depend on whether or not it was a humanitarian intervention. If rebels win, the intervention withdrawals also indirectly affect the number of rebel groups in the long term through the militias' presence. Using interrupted time-series estimates between 1961 and 2005, this study found that humanitarian intervention withdrawals decrease the number of rebel groups in the long term, whereas nonhumanitarian intervention withdrawals promote the growth of militias and increase the number of rebel groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Journal of History / Tarih Dergisi is the property of Istanbul University, Department of History and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When do negotiations occur in civil war? How does military intervention alter this process? While the existing literature presents models of the onset of negotiations – both mediated and unassisted – they are incomplete if they do not consider third-party states involved in the conflict prior to negotiations. I argue that military intervention impacts negotiation onset by adjusting barriers to negotiation through three pathways: the likelihood of military victory, the risk of signaling weakness, and the presence of additional veto players. I examine these mechanisms using logistic random effects models on a dataset of African civil wars. An extension of the argument addresses how expectations of intervention shape conflict behavior. Rebel-supporting interventions, interventions with independent interests, and asymmetric interventions lead to an increase in the likelihood of negotiations occurring. Models controlling for expectations of intervention also suggest that third parties can impact belligerents' behavior through both expectations and follow-through. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has western foreign policy exhibited a record of sustained strategic failure, from Afghanistan to Ukraine? Why is it that despite the intellectual attention devoted to identifying the foundations of good strategy, outcomes remain so poor? This study seeks to bring a process of academic rigour to these questions. It pinpoints an inability to relate to problems proportionately as the major factor that accounts for bad strategic results and the growth of an anti-strategic predilection in policy-making. This lack of proportionality arises largely from a liberal-elite commitment to moral missions that undermine exit plans and bounded objectives. This sets in train an escalatory dynamic that inexorably spirals towards failure. Furthermore, rarely is there any accountability for predictive ineptitude or reckless advocacy, which merely entrenches the propensity towards poor strategic performance. The argument contends that these factors can all be captured within an enduring paradigm of total war, which exerts an overdetermining influence on western policy-making, pushing the formulation of strategy towards abstract goals and the unrestrained application of resources. While there are no easy answers to overcome these deep-seated problems in western strategic formulation, this article suggests that an attempt to move the idea of strategy away from 'problem-solving' to 'problem-framing' can offer the prospect of more considered policy reflection and facilitate a process of learning from mistakes rather than repeating them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the geopolitical shifts in Mali following its rejection of western intervention and subsequent partnerships with Russia. Mali is used as a case-study to explore the role of digital connectivity within global crisis ecologies. It challenges the narrative attributing Mali's coup solely to external influences, emphasizing the agency of local actors and new digital practices. Focusing on the role of 'videomen' in disseminating the narratives of Yèrèwolo, Mali's foremost anti-French and pro-Russian political movement, it examines how these actors shape public perceptions of Mali's new military leaders and their international partners. Using an assemblage framework to analyse smartphones' affordances, the nuanced dynamics shaping political legitimacy are elucidated, emphasizing the performative nature of authority in the digital age. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and quantitative analysis of online content, the article highlights how smartphones empower users like videomen to influence political dynamics amid crisis and geopolitical tensions. By reconstructing past events and reclaiming patriotism, videomen strategically use the political transition to outcompete traditional media professionals. The study underscores the need for understanding how localized dynamics shape broader political developments and international relations, offering insights into similar trends in other west African nations facing military coups and increased Russian involvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article critically reviews the issues of the failure of democratic and political transition in Egypt and Libya in the post-Arab Spring Revolution. Several factors have been identified as the main contributors to the failed democratic process. The first one is the clash of ideology and political approach, as well as the adaptation of different patterns of administration, and the lack of compromise between the Islamists and the Secularists. The Islamist actors in Egypt that started to become politically dominant after the 2011–2012 election until the middle of 2013 is seen to have been lacking experience in governmental affairs, foreign policy formulation and economic management, owing to the old regimes’ restrictions that permitted them to freely involved in politics. There is also an external factor, such as the intervention from foreign and regional state actors on the internal politics of Egypt (against the Freedom and Justice Party’s rule under Morsi) and Libya (the effort to thwart Gaddafi’s regime by NATO and Western-led coalition). Thirdly, the factor of an internal fragmentation, such as the role of the military institution in Egypt that has always been active in the government’s policy-making process. In Libya, the social structure based on the competitive influence of the local tribes over politics also affect the effort for peace-building and democratisation. This study concludes that the Arab Spring Revolution in Egypt dan Libya has successfully stymied the old regime’s dictatorship, and yet it fails to translate the people’s hopes for political reform and economic changes via democratisation.

This paper scrutinizes the role of the principal policy objective of military intervention in conditioning citizen attitudes for the use of force. Extending the scope of analysis beyond the independent effects, it next assesses how the effects of two core variables of intervention, namely international organizations' approval of the operation and the regime type of the target country, vary for interventions with differing mandates. The results of the conjoint experiment in two dissimilar cases, the US and Turkey, show that despite substantial changes in relative support for different types of operations, policy objective is still a highly potent determinant of individual attitudes. The results also concur that compared to foreign policy restraint and humanitarian missions, individuals are more sensitive to international organizations' endorsements of the use of force for peace and internal political change operations. Finally, individuals are significantly disapproving of operations that seek internal political changes in democratic targets, though in contrast to the democratic peace theory, for other types of interventions, they are indifferent to the regime type of the opponent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As European radical right parties grow in influence, and as foreign and security policy becomes more politicised, these parties have increasing potential to shape national debates on international affairs. This paper shows how radical right opposition parties seek to exploit policy dilemmas surrounding military intervention according to the nature of the political opportunity these dilemmas present in specific national settings. Its findings are based on qualitative comparative case studies of Front National, AfD and UKIP responses to intervention debates surrounding the Syrian civil war in France, Germany and the UK. I find that non-intervention is not an absolute value for radical right parties. Whilst liberal-humanitarian interventions are uniformly rejected, interventions on national security grounds, whether to combat Jihadist threats or prevent uncontrolled migration, prompt a range of responses shaped by the domestic political context. Yet even where these parties back intervention in votes, their discourse focuses on fitting the issue to the populist dimensions of their political agenda, especially attacking mainstream rivals for incompetence, duplicity or incoherence, and failing to protect the sovereignty and ethnic integrity of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does how intervener airpower affect civil war parties' ability to take and hold territory? I argue that airpower can have both short- and long-term effects on an actor's ability to take and hold territory, by reducing its ability to effectively fight its adversary. Using novel, disaggregated data, I conduct a quantitative within-case study of 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. I find that the NATO air campaign made the Libyan government less likely to capture territory in the short term, and that airstrikes reduced its ability to capture territory in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains how and why limited use of force contributed to the surprising elimination of Somali piracy that no-one had expected. It proposes an analytical framework identifying four conditions for limited force success derived from the existing literature: (1) great power leadership, (2) Support at the international, regional and local levels, (3) Effective military forces capable of establishing escalation dominance, and (4) Limited use of force minimising collateral damage and adversary casualties. The analysis demonstrates that these four factors apply in the Somali case and explains how and why they were created even though implementation was costly and incentives for free-riding high. Although the Somali success will be hard to replicate, this case remains important because it improves our understanding of the conditions under which limited use of force can contribute to sustainable outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research article examines the complex factors that have led to the persistent involvement of Pakistan’s military in political affairs of the state. This intrusion, which has shaped Pakistan's history since its independence in 1947, cannot be solely attributed to the ambitions of power-hungry generals. Instead, the article argues that it stems from a combination of structural and historical factors. This paper employed a qualitative research methodology while utilizing a critical analysis of historical documents and political discourse. However, the study suggests that there are factors behind military intrusion including Pakistan's weak and fragmented civilian institutions, the military's dominant role in national security, and the country's tumultuous political landscape. The article also highlights the impact of external factors, such as regional conflicts and Cold War dynamics, in shaping the relationship between the military and civilian authorities in Pakistan. By providing a nuanced analysis of the underlying causes of military intervention, the study offer recommendations to reduce the risk of military intrusion in Pakistani politics by strengthening democratic institutions, reforming the military for increased accountability, educating the populace on the risks of military intervention, fostering a culture of tolerance and dialogue while discouraging extremism, and establishing a national consensus on the military's role in a democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how the Point News Media portrayed the ECOWAS military intervention in The Gambia. ECOWAS intervened when former President Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after losing the 2016 election. Scholars and the media world wide discussed the intervention's legality and legitimacy in promoting the democratic transfer of power in the region. Initially, the intervention was praised for successfully promoting democratic change in a region that is prone to coups. However, the public later requested the withdrawal of the intervention force. The study analyzed 64 news articles published between 2017 and 2023. Ten frames were identified: dissatisfaction, ECOMIG mandate, ECOMIG success, instability, legitimacy, reassurance, social service, support, uncertainty, and confrontation. The Point news media portrayed the intervention negatively, characterized by dissatisfaction and confrontation in implementing the intervention's mandate. This negative depiction may have contributed to the shift in public discourse towards requesting the ECOWAS military withdrawal. The study used qualitative content analysis as a data gathering and analysis method to explore the portrayal of the intervention. This method allowed the researchers to identify the different frames used to depict the intervention. By presenting the findings in simple language, the study increases accessibility and understanding of the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database provides data on the voting behaviour of 301 political parties in 1,022 parliamentary votes on military missions between 1990 and 2019 in 21 countries of the Global North. This special data feature introduces the database and presents descriptive statistics and basic patterns on some of its key variables: general, political, and regional characteristics of missions and votes themselves; the level of agreement; and party-political contestation. The number of deployment votes has increased over the course of the 1990s and then fluctuated around a stable annual average of 40 to 50 votes. At the same time, legislative–executive relations in security and defence policy and, as a consequence, the number of deployment votes, continue to differ substantially between countries. Whereas support for military missions has increased over time, the degree of contestation, as measured by an agreement index, differs considerably across the countries under study. Whether a political party supports a military mission depends not only on it being part of a governing coalition or in opposition but also on its political ideology: support is lowest among parties of the Radical Left, increases among green and social-democratic parties and peaks among liberal, conservative and Christian-democratic parties. Radical-right parties are less supportive than centrist parties but more supportive than radical-left parties. Regional peculiarities notwithstanding, this pattern can be found in Western and Eastern Europe, East Asia and North America. The database will be interesting for scholars of the democratic politics of military missions and particularly legislative–executive relations and political parties in security and defence policy, providing the foundations for a comparative analysis of different missions, the ideological foundations of contestation, government–opposition dynamics and legislative–executive relations in security and defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of politics, states have viewed military intervention as one of their tools of foreign policy. However, many scholars have not agreed on the effectiveness of military means in achieving the foreign policy objectives of states. Like other states, Ethiopia and Kenya have used the military as a means of foreign policy and tested their tools in Somalia practically. However, the effectiveness of their foreign policy tool has not been studied. That is why this article's main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of Ethiopian and Kenyan foreign policies that used military interventions to achieve their foreign policy goals in terms of outcomes. In doing so, the article used a comparative case study methodology. Besides, the 'good enough' approach is the proper theoretical lens that is used in this article to comprehend Ethiopia's and Kenya's operational outcomes. The analysis comes to the conclusion that both Kenya's and Ethiopia's military deployments in Somalia generally failed to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the findings reveal that using hard power as a tool of foreign policy without combining soft power is largely unsuccessful, as indicated by Ethiopia's and Kenya's military engagement in Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to place the issue of economic benefits obtained by Russia by military intervention in Syria in the larger perspective of its role as a global player shaping Middle East affairs. The essay aims to answer the following question: How much have Russia's economic interests been impacted by its military involvement in Syria? Russian objectives in Syria extend beyond its geostrategic location to encompass national interests in various strategic areas, particularly maintaining its economic power and bolstering its worldwide influence in Middle Eastern politics. The article will explore the additional advantages that contributed to the expansion of Russian commercial ties in the region, beyond Syria's geostrategic location. This article assumes that Russia is steadily investing in building its influence and creating geo-economic dynamics to boost its economic national interests. The study examines how Russia has been translating its military participation into economic benefits across several sectors, including arms transactions, oil businesses, economic networking, trade facilitation, and resilience. The paper will rely on signed contracts, official papers, reports, menus, speeches, press releases, declaratory statements, and reports on official visits as primary data. This article focuses on the political economy of Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis to provide detailed insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that there is a distinct regional international organization law which derives from that law's concern with the institution, management and cultivation of qualities identified with regions. This concern gives this law four qualities. First, it seeks to institute the region into being, with the region identified as somewhere that combines a place and a mission-based association. Secondly, it characterises regions as fissile so that the provision of trust and security are central features of this law. Thirdly, it sees emancipation and solidarity as central ideals of both the region and its Member States. Fourly, this law contains an account of national inadequacy. This essay concludes by arguing for inclusion of a fifth quality, an account of regional inadequacy. This would problematise more extensively both what the regional international organization does and the concentrations of power it often facilitates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the legality of Turkey's military action in Syria in 2019, codenamed OPS, and whether it can be considered an act of aggression against Syria under international law. Unlike similar papers, which discuss the military action in terms of politics and foreign policy and link it to Turkey's refugee problem, this paper will focus on the military action's compliance with international law principles such as the use of armed force, right of self-defence, and international crimes This paper is normative legal research that draws its conclusion using the deductive syllogism method. This paper concludes that OPS does not meet the criteria of international law's right to self-defence and is a clear violation of the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of armed force. More research is needed to investigate the legal ramifications of Turkey's military action, such as whether OPS fulfilled the elements of the crime of aggression in the 1998 Rome Statute, how much damage Syria has suffered as a result of this military action and how Turkey is liable for these losses under international law.

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Anbar University for Law & Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Why was the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and thereafter unsuccessful? Many writers, such as Brendan R. Gallagher, have rightly pointed to the poor US planning and the prior conditions in Iraq. I suggest a third aspect--nationalist resistance to the idea of foreign forces controlling Iraq and denying Iraqis full decision-making autonomy. The heavy US application of military force sparked a backlash which manifested itself in three ways. First, US military intervention in Iraq created or facilitated the growth of actors who are or later become US adversaries. Second, it changed the balance of power in favor of US adversaries and against the United States and its allies. Third, it made the United States government central to the war narratives of some actors. Demonizing or fighting the United States became a rallying cry and a source of recruitment and fundraising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze the role of the Italian Armed Forces in implementing the country’s foreign policy priorities in the Greater Mediterranean. Traditionally, Russian and Italian studies have focused on Italy’s diplomacy and «soft power», although in recent years the country’s leadership has paid increasing attention to the involvement of armed forces abroad as part of various missions. The scientific relevance of this article is determined by the need for scientific understanding of this trend. The purpose of this article is to define the normative framework for these missions, typologize them, analyze them on certain examples, and determine their outcomes. The author notes that among foreign missions, the participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations and military interventions prevails. Italy strives to play a high role in them, but is almost never the main sponsor. Bilateral «military diplomacy» programs tend to be limited. As a result, Italy fails to transform military involvement into political influence and to become in reality a «protagonist» in the Greater Mediterranean. The results of the study conclude that Italy has sufficient capacity to pursue national interests and strengthen its influence in the key points of the Mediterranean basin, while larger bids for leadership will not be realized.

The cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were in the period 1992-1995. were under siege or surrounded by Serbian forces, were exposed to continuous mortar and artillery attacks from positions controlled by the VRS. Locations that were regarded as mass gathering places for people, such as markets, squares, schools, kindergartens, children's parks, hospitals, city transport vehicles were very often the targets of sudden shelling, which resulted in mass killings of civilians. Exactly the same methods were applied by the Serbian forces in all the cities that were declared safe zones by the United Nations. In this paper, applying a historical approach, the massacre at the Tuzla Gate was analyzed on May 25, 1995, which was one of the saddest days in the history of the city of Tuzla, when 71 civilians were killed and 173 civilians were wounded by shrapnel from a grenade fired from the direction of Ozren. , which represents the largest number of victims and the most massive crime from a single shell during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the indispensable interpretation of the political and military context at the time of the crime at the Tuzla Gate, and the then-current NATO attacks on the positions of the VRS, the work also deals with the analysis of the minutes of the investigation of the Prosecutor's Office and the Security Service Center of the MUP of RBiH, the investigative actions of the United Nations carried out on the ground the places immediately after the crime, the daily reports of UNPROFOR, as well as the reactions that followed this crime. Immediately after the massacre, representatives of investigative bodies, the Municipality of Tuzla, archival institutions, journalists, intellectuals and citizens of Tuzla made a significant contribution in documenting the facts of the crime committed. On the first anniversary of the massacre, 5/25/1996. In the book The Dawn Murder, photographs and short biographical data with a lot of emotional content about each victim, their occupation, an exact description of the circumstances of the crime, as well as the exact place where they were at the time of the crime were published. The smiles in the photos full of liveliness are forever stopped in their interrupted youth, but through the mentioned book, as well as through the permanent exhibition of the Kapija Memorial Center, they continue to live permanently in the memories of their fellow citizens of Tuzla, Bosnians and Herzegovina, with a message to future generations: You don't just live here to live, one does not live here only to die, one dies here to live. Respecting everything that the people of Tuzla have done in terms of memorialization of crimes, collective memory and memory, the mentioned activities can certainly serve as an example to other cities, where civilians were killed in the same or similar way. The Archives of the Tuzla Canton have important materials about the massacre, such as the “Tuzlanska Kapija” Collection of documents, and I am extremely grateful to the management and collaborators of the Archives for allowing me access to the said documentation. The judgment in the Đukić case (2009, 2010 and 2014) also offered very significant answers to crucial questions regarding the direction of the shelling, as well as the responsibility of Novak Đukić and TG Ozren for the aforementioned criminal offense, in which the aforementioned issues are discussed in an argumentative manner, with plenty of evidence. . Without major ambitions to enter into a discussion about the complexity of the mentioned case in relation to the question of how Đukić, even without having served his prison sentence, found himself free, we note that there was a lot of discussion about the incorrect application of the law (CZ BiH 2003-CZ SFRY 1976) regarding the height punishments, while the facts established in the Judgment were not called into question. The documentation that was used in the Đukić case was also available to me for research. It was extremely important to analyze the aforementioned material from the point of view of historians, and I am also very grateful to the associates of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina for providing it. A special research focus in this paper relates to the contextualization of the mentioned crime, the clarification of what preceded the massacre itself, as well as the reactions that followed. The paper is structured into five chapters, which deal with the circumstances that preceded the massacre at the Tuzla Gate, the killing of youth on Youth Day, investigations after the massacre, reactions and military intervention, while the final chapter discusses the revision of historical facts and the denial of the court verdict in the case. Novak Djukic.

What are the different ways in which an intervener can use airpower to enhance a rebel organization's ability to capture government-held territory? Multiple studies have analyzed how foreign airpower can be employed as a counterinsurgency tool, intended to reduce the frequency and lethality of insurgent attacks. However, many civil wars are fought conventionally, and non-state actors can benefit from military interventions that helps them to overcome the advantage in capabilities often enjoyed by their government adversaries. I analyze how airpower can be used in support of a rebel organization engaged in a conventional civil war, contributing to its ability to produce salient battlefield information. I argue that that an intervener can employ direct attack against heavy weapons and anti-aircraft assets, and interdiction of command and control capabilities and logistics, in order to diminish the government's advantage in conventional capabilities. In doing so, foreign airpower contributes to the rebels' ability to capture territory, a crucial intermediary goal and source of battlefield information when attempting to impose defeat on the government. Through a quantitative case study of Operation Unified Protector and the 2011 Libyan Civil War, I find that coalition airstrikes against the Libyan government's heavy weapons, logistics, and anti-aircraft assets contributed to the Libyan rebels' ability to capture territory. By contrast, strikes against the government's command and control capabilities had no effect. ¿Cuáles son las diferentes formas en las que una parte interviniente puede usar el poder aéreo con el fin de mejorar la capacidad de una organización rebelde para ganar territorios controlados por el Gobierno? Existen múltiples estudios que han analizado cómo puede emplearse el poder aéreo extranjero como una herramienta de contrainsurgencia, destinada a reducir la frecuencia y la letalidad de los ataques insurgentes. Sin embargo, muchas guerras civiles se libran convencionalmente, y los agentes no estatales pueden salir beneficiados de intervenciones militares que les ayuden a superar la ventaja a nivel de capacidades que, a menudo, disfrutan sus adversarios gubernamentales. Analizamos cómo se puede usar el poder aéreo en apoyo de una organización rebelde que esté involucrada en una guerra civil convencional, contribuyendo a su capacidad para producir información importante acerca del campo de batalla. Argumentamos que una de las partes intervinientes podría emplear un ataque directo contra armas pesadas y medios antiaéreos, así como la interdicción de las capacidades de mando y control y de la logística, con el fin de disminuir la ventaja del Gobierno en lo referente a las capacidades convencionales. Al hacer esto, el poder aéreo extranjero contribuye a la capacidad de los rebeldes para ganar territorio, lo cual resulta no solo un objetivo intermedio crucial sino también una fuente de información sobre el campo de batalla cuando se intenta imponer la derrota al Gobierno. Concluimos, a partir de un estudio de caso cuantitativo de la Operación Protector Unificado (Operación enmarcada dentro de la intervención militar en Libia de 2011) y de la Guerra Civil Libia de 2011, que los ataques aéreos de la coalición contra las armas pesadas, la logística y los medios antiaéreos del Gobierno libio contribuyeron a la capacidad de los rebeldes libios para ganar territorio. Por el contrario, los ataques contra las capacidades de mando y control del Gobierno no tuvieron ningún efecto. Comment un intervenant peut-il employer les forces aériennes pour améliorer la capacité d'une organisation rebelle de s'emparer de territoires détenus par le gouvernement ? De nombreuses études ont analysé l'emploi des forces aériennes en tant qu'outil de lutte contre l'insurrection, dont le but est de réduire la fréquence et la létalité des attaques des insurgés. Cependant, nombre de guerres civiles se sont déroulées de façon conventionnelle, et les acteurs non étatiques peuvent bénéficier d'interventions militaires qui les aident à contrer l'avantage en matière de capacité que les adversaires gouvernementaux possèdent souvent. J'analyse comment les forces aériennes peuvent être utilisées pour soutenir une organisation rebelle impliquée dans une guerre civile conventionnelle, en contribuant à sa capacité de production d'informations cruciales sur le champ de bataille. J'affirme qu'un intervenant peut avoir recours à une attaque directe à l'encontre d'armes lourdes et d'actifs antiaériens, ainsi qu'à l'interception des capacités logistiques, de commande et de contrôle, afin de réduire l'avantage du gouvernement en matière de capacités conventionnelles. Ce faisant, les forces aériennes étrangères contribuent à la capacité rebelle de capturer des territoires, un objectif intermédiaire et une source d'informations sur le champ de bataille qui s'avèrent déterminants quand on essaie de l'emporter face à un gouvernement. Grâce à une étude de cas quantitative de l'opération Unified Protector et de la guerre civile de 2011 en Libye, j'observe que les frappes aériennes de la coalition à l'encontre des armes lourdes, des capacités logistiques et des actifs antiaériens du gouvernement libyen ont contribué à la capacité des rebelles libyens de capturer des territoires. En revanche, les frappes visant les capacités de commande et de contrôle du gouvernement n'ont eu aucun effet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The heterogeneity of foreign policy preferences has hampered a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. We examine the dimensionality of the EU foreign policy space by analyzing foreign policy votes in the European Parliament (1999–2019). As it contains the EU's full geographical and ideological diversity, it is an important laboratory for testing expectations about what predicts foreign policy positions. Party ideologies structure voting on foreign policy: party-political disagreements over the CFSP and military interventions matter more on foreign policy votes than others. The left-right dimension and the EU integration dimension still explain a considerable share of voting patterns, although they matter less on foreign policy votes than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the influence of status-aspiration in Russia's military involvement in Syria. By leveraging the literature on status and empirical evidence, I posit that Russia's ambition for prestigious power recognition, rooted in its search for ontological security, has played a significant role in shaping its involvement in Syria. The existing scholarly discourse has considered the status impact on Russia's foreign policies; however, this article differentiates itself by scrutinizing Russia's strategic objectives, rhetoric, and maneuvers throughout its Syrian intervention, while investigating the degree to which status-aspiration motivations coalesce with other elements to mold its participation in the conflict. By spotlighting the historical continuum, I further propose that military interventions have functioned as a vehicle for Russia to affirm its prestigious power status following the failure of nonmilitary strategies to secure recognition of a great power status in the 1990s. Aside from its contribution to the literature, this study also carries pragmatic implications for policymakers in forecasting and reacting to Russia's moves, thereby enriching the nuanced comprehension of its foreign policy conduct and its consequential effects on regional and global stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on strategies and force employment in modern warfare is prolific, but siloed. While some examine boots on the ground, others focus on aerial bombing or unpiloted platforms. Consequently, most studies focus on the effects of one approach, seldom considering it in lieu of or conjunction with others. Furthermore, there is less knowledge on the origins and implementations of these strategic choices analyzed in isolation. The primary reason for these gaps lies in data limitations. This paper introduces a comprehensive dataset on the universe of United States military operations from 1989 to 2021 from a single source: Wikipedia. Using automated extraction techniques on its two structured knowledge databases–Wikidata and DBpedia–we uncover information about individual operations within nearly every post-1989 military intervention described in existing academic datasets. The data we introduce offers unprecedented coverage and granularity that enables analysis of myriad factors associated with when, where, and how the United States employs military force. We describe the data collection process, demonstrate its contents and validity, and discuss its potential applications to existing theories about force employment and strategy in war. La investigación en materia de estrategias y estructuras de fuerza en la guerra moderna es prolífica, pero se realiza de forma aislada. Mientras que algunos se centran en las tropas terrestres, otros se centran más en los bombardeos aéreos o las plataformas no pilotadas. En consecuencia, la mayoría de los estudios se centran en los efectos de un solo enfoque, y rara vez lo consideran en lugar de otros enfoques o la posibilidad de considerarlo junto con otros enfoques. Además, existe un menor conocimiento sobre los orígenes y las formas de llevar a cabo estas opciones estratégicas si se analizan de forma aislada. La razón principal de estas brechas radica en las limitaciones de los datos. Este artículo presenta un conjunto de datos exhaustivo acerca del universo de las intervenciones militares de los Estados Unidos entre 1989 y 2021 obtenidas de una sola fuente: Wikipedia. Utilizando técnicas de extracción automatizada sobre sus dos bases de datos de conocimiento estructurado, Wikidata y DBpedia, obtenemos información sobre casi todas las intervenciones militares posteriores a 1989 descritas en conjuntos de datos académicos existentes, además de sobre 425 operaciones adicionales. Los datos que presentamos ofrecen una cobertura y un nivel de detalle sin precedentes, de forma que permiten el análisis de innumerables factores asociados con el cómo, el cuándo y el dónde lleva a cabo Estados Unidos intervenciones militares. Describimos el proceso de recopilación de datos, demostramos su contenido y su validez, y debatimos sus posibles aplicaciones a las teorías existentes sobre el diseño de la estructura de la fuerza y sobre la estrategia en la guerra. La recherche sur les stratégies et les structures des forces de la guerre moderne est prolifique, mais cloisonnée. Quand certains travaux s'intéressent aux militaires sur le terrain, d'autres se concentrent sur les bombardements aériens ou les plateformes sans pilote. Par conséquent, la plupart des études se focalisent sur les effets d'une approche, mais la conjuguent ou la confrontent rarement à d'autres. En outre, nous en savons moins sur les origines et les mises en œuvre de ces choix stratégiques analysés séparément. Ces lacunes s'expliquent principalement par la limitation des données. Cet article présente un ensemble de données exhaustif sur l'univers des interventions militaires des États-Unis de 1989 à 2021 à partir d'une seule source: Wikipédia. À l'aide de techniques d'extraction automatique appliquées à ses deux bases de données de connaissances structurées (Wikidata et DBpedia), nous découvrons des informations concernant pratiquement toutes les interventions militaires postérieures à 1989 décrites dans des ensembles de données académiques existants, mais aussi 425 opérations supplémentaires. Les données que nous présentons proposent une couverture et une granularité sans précédent qui permettent d'analyser une myriade de facteurs relatifs à la manière, le moment et le lieu des interventions militaires américaines. Nous décrivons le processus de collecte de données, démontrons son contenu et sa validité, avant de discuter des applications potentielles aux théories existantes concernant la conception de la structure des forces et la stratégie militaire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of force in foreign territories has been contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, with the authorisation of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in 'cases deemed legitimate by international law' and where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party. Yet Turkey's extraterritorial use of force against armed non-state actors lead to the most important question of identifying the circumstances under which the Turkish authorities have long justified military intervention in foreign territories. This article aims to assess whether Turkey's use of force and alleged extraterritorial self-defence contravenes international law. In order to address how Turkey interprets the right to use armed force and the right of self-defence, and to bring clarity to the state's approach to international law on the use of force (jus ad bellum), the article explores Turkey's practice based on the assessment of the Turkish military intervention in Syria, in line with both bilateral security or defence treaties to which Turkey is a party and the use of force in self-defence. The aim is to determine whether Turkey's justifications are compatible with the jus ad bellum criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although populist radical right (PRR) parties have been studied intensively for the last few decades, only very few comparative studies on the parliamentary behavior of PRR parties have been conducted. This article aims to fill this gap in academic research by examining the pattern of PRR voting on military deployments. More specifically, it examines under what conditions PRR parties support military deployment decisions in national parliaments. The results of our analysis indicate that PRR parties are more inclined to vote in favor of contributions to operations that are deployed to balance the threat of Jihadi terrorism. However, the majority of PRR party votes on military deployments is not determined by factors related to the operation in which forces are deployed, but is driven by the expected impact of the parliamentary vote on the PRR parties' broader vote-, office- and policy-seeking objectives. This expected impact, in turn, is determined by a complex interplay between party size, government experience, the party's level of anti-elitism and the ideological composition of the government. A pesar de que los partidos de la derecha radical populista (DRP) se han estudiado intensamente durante las últimas décadas, se han realizado muy pocos estudios comparativos sobre el comportamiento parlamentario de los partidos de la DRP. Este artículo tiene como objetivo llenar este vacío en la investigación académica mediante el estudio del patrón de votación de los partidos de la DRP en materia de despliegues militares. De manera más específica, el artículo estudia en qué condiciones los partidos de la DRP apoyan, en los parlamentos nacionales, las decisiones de despliegue militar. Los resultados de nuestro análisis indican que los partidos de la DRP se decantan más a votar a favor de las contribuciones a las operaciones que se despliegan con el fin de equilibrar la amenaza del terrorismo yihadista. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los votos de los partidos de la DRP en materia de despliegues militares no se encuentra determinada por factores relacionados con la operación en la que se despliegan las fuerzas, sino que está impulsada por el impacto esperado de la votación parlamentaria en los objetivos más amplios de búsqueda de los votos, de búsqueda de los cargos públicos y de búsqueda de las políticas por parte los partidos de la DRP. Este impacto esperado está determinado, a su vez, por una compleja interacción entre el tamaño del partido, la experiencia a nivel de gobierno, el nivel de antielitismo del partido y la composición ideológica del gobierno. Bien que les partis de droite radicale populiste (DRP) aient fait l'objet de nombreuses études ces dernières décennies, seules quelques études comparatives sur le comportement parlementaire de ces partis ont été menées. Cet article vise à combler cette lacune de la recherche académique en analysant les schémas de vote DRP sur les déploiements militaires. Plus précisément, il s'intéresse aux conditions qui poussent les partis DRP à soutenir les décisions de déploiement militaire au sein des parlements nationaux. Selon les résultats de notre analyse, les partis DRP sont plus enclins à voter en faveur de contributions aux opérations déployées pour faire face à la menace terroriste djihadiste. Néanmoins, la majorité des votes de partis DRP concernant les déploiements militaires ne sont pas déterminés par des facteurs relatifs à l'opération où les forces sont déployées. Ils sont plutôt motivés par les conséquences attendues de ce vote pour les objectifs plus larges poursuivis par les partis DRP, que ce soit en termes d'élection, de fonction ou de politique. À leur tour, ces conséquences attendues se décident à l'aide d'un ensemble compliqué de facteurs : la taille du parti, son niveau d'anti-élitisme, l'expérience du gouvernement et sa composition idéologique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we present the most up-to-date, fine-grained, global dataset on external support in armed conflicts: the UCDP External Support Dataset (ESD). The dataset encompasses data on states and non-state actors as both supporters and recipients and provides detailed information on the type of support provided to warring parties in armed conflicts between 1975 and 2017. We use it to highlight three broader trends in the provision of external support: (1) a dramatic increase in the number of external supporters, (2) a larger share of pro-government interventions, and (3) the rise of direct military intervention as the predominant mode of external support. In conclusion, we identify several avenues worthy of future inquiry that could significantly improve our understanding of external support in armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars have made many claims about US military interventions, they have not come to a consensus on main trends and consequences. This article introduces a new, comprehensive dataset of all US military interventions since the country's founding, alongside over 200 variables that allow scholars to evaluate theoretical propositions on drivers and outcomes of intervention. It compares the new Military Intervention Project (MIP) dataset to the current leading dataset, the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID). In sum, MIP doubles the universe of cases, integrates a range of military intervention definitions and sources, expands the timeline of analysis, and offers more transparency of sourcing through historically-documented case narratives of every US military intervention included in the dataset. According to MIP, the US has undertaken almost 400 military interventions since 1776, with half of these operations undertaken between 1950 and 2019. Over 25% of them have occurred in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While emigration and population displacements have long been a feature of Iraqi history, this article argues that the 2003 Anglo-American intervention in Iraq and its legacy has contributed to the gradual disappearance of many non-Muslim Iraqi minorities from Iraq. Though the legacy of 2003 can be attributed to a confluence of domestic and geopolitical factors, it is argued here that the 2003 intervention set in motion a process of nation-destroying instead of nation-building, as Iraqi nationhood was divided along primordial lines. Caught between competing ethnic and sectarian nationalisms, Iraqi non-Muslim minorities became targets in the quest for territorial gain and political power heralding an unprecedented and steady level of emigration. This has changed the ethnic and religious demographic of Iraq, the identity of the Iraqi nation-state, as well as fragmented Iraq's multiple ethnic and religious nations both inside and outside the country. Indeed, the effects of nation-destroying have also been transported to the diaspora, strengthening communal identities, altering attachments and creating distance between Iraqi communities abroad. This has led to distanced transnational ethnic and religious Iraqi nations in diaspora who must now also contend with assimilation, a loss of culture and language in the absence of physical links to Iraq. The article offers the first comprehensive and scholarly treatment of the effects of emigration of Iraq's non-Muslim minorities on Iraqi nationhood within the new Iraqi nation-state. It therefore contributes conceptually and empirically to advancing our understanding of the role of nation-destroying and emigration in nationalizing processes, a neglected area in current migration and nationalism scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies / Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi (CTAD) is the property of Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The decade-long search for Osama bin Laden—in which a manhunt was conducted as part of a full-scale war—was a watershed moment for US foreign policy in the twenty-first Century. Bin Laden was not simply elusive, but ephemerally ghost-like. Similar Militarized Interstate Manhunts (MIMs) are also deeply ingrained in the security politics of the US at its Southwestern border. Specifically, the militarized cross-border pursuits of Pancho Villa in the 1910s and The Apache Kid in the 1890s, serve as analogs to the "War on Terror," especially regarding the allegedly-novel chasing of "ghostly" targets. Building on Jacques Derrida, we explore the role of an "absent/presence" by analyzing the claims of the ghostliness of the target in the context of concurrent claims about the unprecedented nature of events. These cases highlight the importance of the "absent/presence" in making military manhunts thinkable, and explain how the pursuit of "spectral" bodies authorizes exceptional military acts that would otherwise be violations of state sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose that state A attacks state D without warrant. The ensuing military conflict threatens international peace and security. State D (I assume) has a justification for defending itself by means of military force. Do third parties have a justification for intervening in that conflict by such means? To international public lawyers, the well-rehearsed and obvious answer is "yes." Threats to international peace and security provide one of two exceptions to the legal and moral prohibition (as set out in Article 2[4] of the UN Charter) on using force as a means for resolving interstate disputes. Just war theorists are not as verdictive. Compared to the ethics of humanitarian intervention and the ethics of national self-defense, the ethics of third-party military involvement in interstate conflicts remains underdeveloped in contemporary just war theory. This essay begins to fill that gap. I argue that to defend such interventions is tantamount to defending preventive military force, deterrent military force, and the resort to force in more cases than standardly thought. I then provide an account and limited defense of the deterrence argument. I show that deterrence is morally justified in relatively few cases and examine two problems with the argument: deterrence failures and the level of uncertainty under which leaders who use deterrent force operate. I conclude that we should take seriously the possibility that nonintervention, construed as the rejection of the direct use of military force, is the morally correct response to the most serious threats to international peace and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais is the property of Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)