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Researchers in psychology and neuroscience want to know whether conflict and control scale up. Conflict and control mechanisms share many similarities across different levels of analysis. However, empirical evidence does currently not support a unified perspective on action control. We identify two major challenges for theoretical integration: a vertical challenge that requires conflict at different levels of abstraction to be linked, and a horizontal challenge that requires control of conflict at different points in time to be linked. We present a new integrative framework in which we propose that the difference between conflicts can best be understood along the dimension of complexity (i.e., amount of information). We propose that differences in conflict complexity go together with specific costs and benefits and that a normative account of hierarchical conflict control needs to take into account both. People regularly encounter various types of conflict. Here, we ask if, and, if so, how, different types of conflict, from lab-based Stroop conflicts to everyday-life self-control or moral conflicts, are related to one other. We present a framework that assumes that action–goal representations are hierarchically organized, ranging from concrete actions to abstract goals. The framework's key assumption is that conflicts involving more abstract goals (e.g., self-control/moral conflict) are embedded in a more complex action space; thus, to resolve such conflicts, people need to consider more associated goals and actions. We discuss how differences in complexity impact conflict resolution mechanisms and the costs/benefits of resolving conflicts. Altogether, we offer a new way to conceptualize and analyze conflict regulation across different domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-driving car research can effectively reduce the occurrence of traffic accidents, but when encountering sudden people or obstacles cutting into the lane, how to reduce the damage hazard to traffic participants and make ethical decisions is the key point that the development of self-driving technology must break through. When faced with sudden traffic participants, self-driving vehicles need to make ethical decisions between ramming into the traffic participants or other obstacles. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a model decision planning method based on multi-objective evaluation function path evaluation of local path planning. This method addresses the ethical model disagreement problem of self-driving vehicles encountering traffic participants and other obstacles. The aim is to ensure the safety of the lives of the traffic participants and achieve the vehicle's reasonable ethical decision planning. Firstly, when anticipating traffic participants and other obstacles, the vehicle's planning intention decisions are obtained through fuzzy algorithms. Different sets of curves for various positions are generated based on dynamic programming algorithms. These curves are then fitted using B-spline curves, incorporating obstacle collision costs, and classifying obstacles into different types with varying cost weights. Secondly, factors such as path length and average path curvature are considered for path total cost calculations. Finally, a local path that avoids traffic participants is obtained. This path is then tracked using a pure pursuit algorithm. The proposed algorithm's effectiveness is verified through simulation experiments and comparative analyses conducted on the MATLAB platform. In conclusion, this research promotes a safer and more sustainable transport system in line with the principles of sustainable development by addressing the challenges associated with safety and ethical decision making in self-driving cars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotional attenuation in a second language is believed to be one of the main causes of the Moral Foreign Language effect (MFLe). However, evidence on the mediating role of emotion in the relationship between language and moral judgements is limited and mainly derives from unrealistic moral dilemmas. We conducted two studies to investigate (1) whether the MFLe is present in both unrealistic (Study 1) and realistic (Study 2) moral dilemmas, and (2) whether this effect can be attributed to reduced emotionality. In Study 1, the MFLe was found in the moral judgements made by Spanish-English bilinguals. However, the same pattern was not observed in Greek Cypriot-English bilinguals' moral judgements, and this result was attributed to the prominent role of English in Cyprus. In Study 2, the MFLe extended to realistic moral dilemmas when the outcome of the action entailed the violation of a social norm. Study 1 and Study 2 also revealed that these bilinguals experienced a wide range of emotions in their L1 and L2, which did not differ significantly across languages. Mediation analyses further indicated that the MFLe was not mediated by emotional blunting, which made us consider alternative explanations for the MFLe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The editorial "Behavioural spillovers" published in Frontiers in Behavioral Economics explores the concept of how our actions in one situation can influence our behavior in another situation. The research presented in the editorial focuses on behavioral spillovers in pro-environmental and prosocial domains, as well as cross-domain interactions. The studies highlight the complexity and variability of behavioral spillovers, showing that they can be both positive and negative depending on factors such as similarity between behaviors, context, and individual psychological processes. The findings emphasize the importance of considering individual identity, external incentives, and cognitive connections between behaviors when designing interventions for sustainable behavioral change. [Extracted from the article]

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Alexithymia is a personality trait characterized by difficulties in identifying feelings and expressing emotion verbally. Recent evidence has shown the influence of alexithymia on moral judgments/decisions, however, the underlying cognitive processes associated with the influence remain largely unknown. Here, we addressed this issue by bridging literatures from personality psychology, experimental economics, and computational modeling. Participants were confronted with real moral conflicts involving a tradeoff between equity and efficiency, with the equity option anchored as the default. Our findings demonstrated that participants' moral decisions pertaining to resource distribution were subject to both response biases toward the anchor and inequity aversion. These distinct computational components exhibit dissociable relationship with personal attributes, such that anchoring effect scales with alexithymia, whereas inequity aversion increases with altruistic propensity. Together, susceptibility to the anchor accidentally creates a deontological moral image for people high in alexithymia. These findings advance our understanding on the mechanisms navigating moral decisions and gain insights for individual differences in moral behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When making consumption choices, people often fail to meet their own standards of both ethics and frugality. People also generally tend to demand more of others than they do of themselves. But little is known about how these different types of hypocrisy interact, particularly in relation to attitudes toward ethical consumption. In three experiments, we integrate research methods using anchoring and hypocrisy within the context of ethical consumption. Across three experiments, we find a default expectation that people (particularly people other than ourselves) should spend less on consumer items than they actually do. This default position can be inverted by making the ethical context of consumption salient, whereby the expectation is then that people (particularly other people) should spend more on consumer items than they actually do. Experiments 2 and 3 show that a moderate price anchor for ethical consumption is sufficient to shift expected standards for other people, but a higher price anchor is required to shift expected standards in personal behaviour. We discuss the countervailing roles of frugality and ethical consumption in understanding hypocrisy and ethical decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and size of seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominance effect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect and gender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separate evaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equal efficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one, or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocated resources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. The results show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1) Evaluability – e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate in separate evaluation. (2) Justifiability – e.g., people prefer to save fewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identified lives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence – e.g., people express a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose.

When making consumption choices, people often fail to meet their own standards of both ethics and frugality. People also generally tend to demand more of others than they do of themselves. But little is known about how these different types of hypocrisy interact, particularly in relation to attitudes toward ethical consumption. In three experiments, we integrate research methods using anchoring and hypocrisy within the context of ethical consumption. Across three experiments, we find a default expectation that people (particularly people other than ourselves) should spend less on consumer items than they actually do. This default position can be inverted by making the ethical context of consumption salient, whereby the expectation is then that people (particularly other people) should spend more on consumer items than they actually do. Experiments 2 and 3 show that a moderate price anchor for ethical consumption is sufficient to shift expected standards for other people, but a higher price anchor is required to shift expected standards in personal behaviour. We discuss the countervailing roles of frugality and ethical consumption in understanding hypocrisy and ethical decision-making.

The CNI model generates C, N, and I parameters to measure people's mental processes—consequence sensitivity (C), norm sensitivity (N), and generalized inaction/action preferences (I)—in moral decision making. Given the limitations of the CNI model, the CAN algorithm was developed to depict the consequence sensitivity (C), overall action versus inaction preferences (A), norm sensitivity (N), and perverse responses with the other three parameters. However, no studies have clarified whether and how the CAN algorithm can solve the limitations of the CNI model. The present study systematically uncovers the limitations of the CNI model and the solutions provided by the CAN algorithm: (a) the CNI model does not consider negative values of the parameters, but the CAN algorithm does; (b) the sequential processing assumption of the CNI model is biased, the CAN algorithm proposes a parallel calculation strategy to fix this problem; (c) the calculation of the I parameter of the CNI model is inaccurate, so the CAN algorithm proposes the A parameter to replace it; (d) the CNI model has a problem measuring perverse responses, while the CAN algorithm develops three parameters to measure these. We examined some of our points on the basis of a reanalysis of the foreign language effect (FLE) by comparing the parameters from the CAN algorithm with those from the CNI model. We found that consequence and norm sensitivity were estimated to be greater using the CNI model than with the CAN algorithm. Consequently, these overestimations significantly (consequence sensitivity) and marginally (norm sensitivity) interfered with the FLE, making the FLE more likely to return a false positive result. In addition, the CAN algorithm was able to measure the extent of perverse responses, indicating that foreign language (compared to a native language) leads to more perverse responses. The present study demonstrates that the CNI model magnifies the Type I error of conclusions and that the CAN algorithm (compared to the CNI model) provides more insights regarding moral decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the domain ofmoral decisionmaking, models in which emotion and deliberation constitute competing dual-systems have become increasingly popular. Currently, the favored explanation of this interaction is what Evans (2008) termed a “default-interventionist” (DI) process where moral decisions are the result of a prepotent emotional response, which can be overridden with substantial deliberative effort. Although this “emotion-then-deliberation” sequence is often assumed, existing methods have lacked the requisite process resolution to clearly depict the nature of this interaction. The present work utilized continuous mouse tracking, or response dynamics, to develop and test predictions of these DI models of moral decision making. Study 1 utilized previously published moral dilemmas to validate the method for use with such complex stimuli. Although the data replicated typical choice and RT patterns, the process metrics provided by the response trajectories did not demonstrate the online preference reversals predicted by DI models. Study 2 utilized more rigorously constructed stimuli and an alternative presentation format to provide the strongest possible test of DI predictions, but again failed to show the predicted reversals. In summary, neither experiment provided data in accordance with the predictions of popular DI dual-systems models, which suggests that researchers should consider models allowing for concurrent activation of deliberative and emotional systems, or reconceptualize moral decisions within the typical multiattribute decision framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on moral theory to advance digital citizenship education and explore how adolescents aged 13–16 make decisions when confronted with incivility, such as cyberbullying, on social media. Given the extent to which digital citizenship education may be approached in line with deontological (rules), utilitarian (consequences) and/or virtue ethical (character) theories, we argue that it is important to know which of these underpin adolescents' moral decision making online. To address this question, this article reports findings from a survey completed by 1947 13–16 year olds in England. Chi-square tests, binary logistic regressions and other exploratory analysis showed that most 13–16 year-olds use virtue ethical reasons to justify moral actions. We conclude that if online incivility is to be reduced, policymakers, educators and parents should focus more on virtue- and character-based approaches to digital citizenship education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand (rather than place judgment on) the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents' preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound model for the PPIMT using a combined sample of college students from a southeastern university in U.S. and MTurk respondents. The PPIMT model fit was acceptable (χ2 = 84.125, df = 40, p = 0.001; RMSEA = 0.052, 90%CI = 0.037 to 0.068; CFI = 0.980; SRMR = 0.035) with four items for Virtue, four items for Deontology, and three items for Consequentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Moral decision making is complex and depends on individuals and their environment (Kimhi & Kasher, 2015), and what is morally permissible in warfare differs from what is morally permissible in everyday life (Watkins, 2020). Across 2 studies (N, 511), we assessed how masculine honor beliefs (MHBs), beliefs in pure good (BPGs) and evil (BPEs), and the dark triad (DT) relate to decision making in military and nonmilitary moral dilemmas. We hypothesized MHBs, BPEs, and DT would predict more confidence, wanting to be the hero, and less guilt with BPEs and DT also predicting more distrust of others and BPGs predicting more guilt. Our findings were largely consistent with these hypotheses. Our findings suggest nonmilitary dilemmas were easier to resolve than military dilemmas, given higher reported confidence and more utilitarian decisions. Overall, individual differences in MHBs, BPGs, BPEs, and DT relate to different motivations in decision making (e.g., to be the hero). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim. The issue of specific cognitive deficits in psychopathy is still open for debate. Much evidence points to problems with affective empathy. The current study aims to verify the hypothesis about the correlation between psychopathic traits, difficulties in complex affect expression recognition and making moral decisions without taking into account the aspect of potential harm. Methods. 58 males were studied (student and inmate groups). Psychopathy was assessed with the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). Recognition of complex emotional expressions was assessed with the Faces subset of the Emotional Intelligence Scale and moral inclinations to avoid harm ("deontological") and maximize consequences ("utilitarian") were measured via the process dissociation method. Results. Inmates generally showed deficiencies in correct expression recognition, for both positive and negative stimuli. Inmates with high psychopathy additionally showed high rate of false positive perceptions of negative emotions. High psychopathy inmates showed lower, than low psychopathy inmates and students, inclination to avoid harm. High psychopathy was related to declarations that the presented moral dilemmas were "easy decisions". Group differences in the inclination to maximize consequences in moral decisions were not significant. Conclusions. Results support the hypothesis that psychopathy is related to a general deficiency in affective processing. Psychopathic traits are related to worse recognition of complex emotional expressions which does not manifest itself as uncertainty, but as high rate of false positives. Inmates with psychopathic traits also declare that the presented moral sacrificial dilemmas require "easy decisions" and show reduced responsivity to harm. An important and problematic element of psychopathy seems to be the dysfunctional affective empathy with a simultaneous unawareness of these dysfunctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral rules are a cornerstone of many societies. Most moral rules are concerned with the welfare of other individuals, reflecting individuals’ innate aversion against harming other individuals. Harming others is associated with aversive experiences, implying that individuals who are sensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences are more likely to follow moral rules than individuals who are insensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences. Individuals’ sensitivity for aversive experiences depends on individuals’ ability to integrate the underlying neural and physiological processes: Individuals who are more efficient in integrating these processes are more sensitive to the aversiveness that is associated with moral rule violations than individuals who are less efficient in integrating these processes. Individuals who differ in their ability to integrate these processes may, thus, also differ in their inclination to follow moral rules. We tested this assumption in a sample of healthy individuals (67 males) who completed measures of moral rule adherence and integration abilities. Moral rule adherence was assessed with self-report measure and integration abilities were assessed with a resting state measure of heart rate variability (HRV), which reflects prefrontal–(para-)limbic engagement during the integration of physical and neural processes. We found a positive association between individuals’ HRV and individuals’ moral rule adherence, implying that individuals with efficient integration abilities were more inclined to follow moral rules than individuals with inefficient integration abilities. Our findings support the assumption that individuals with different integration abilities also differ in moral rule adherence, presumably because of differences in aversiveness sensitivity.

Moral rules are a cornerstone of many societies. Most moral rules are concerned with the welfare of other individuals, reflecting individuals' innate aversion against harming other individuals. Harming others is associated with aversive experiences, implying that individuals who are sensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences are more likely to follow moral rules than individuals who are insensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences. Individuals' sensitivity for aversive experiences depends on individuals' ability to integrate the underlying neural and physiological processes: Individuals who are more efficient in integrating these processes are more sensitive to the aversiveness that is associated with moral rule violations than individuals who are less efficient in integrating these processes. Individuals who differ in their ability to integrate these processes may, thus, also differ in their inclination to follow moral rules. We tested this assumption in a sample of healthy individuals (67 males) who completed measures of moral rule adherence and integration abilities. Moral rule adherence was assessed with self-report measure and integration abilities were assessed with a resting state measure of heart rate variability (HRV), which reflects prefrontal–(para-)limbic engagement during the integration of physical and neural processes. We found a positive association between individuals' HRV and individuals' moral rule adherence, implying that individuals with efficient integration abilities were more inclined to follow moral rules than individuals with inefficient integration abilities. Our findings support the assumption that individuals with different integration abilities also differ in moral rule adherence, presumably because of differences in aversiveness sensitivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and size of seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominance effect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect and gender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separate evaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equal efficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one, or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocated resources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. The results show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1) Evaluability - e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate in separate evaluation. (2) Justifiability - e.g., people prefer to save fewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identified lives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence - e.g., people express a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The role of probabilistic reasoning in moral decision makinghas seen relatively little research, despite having potentiallyprofound consequences for our models of moral cognition. Torectify this, two experiments were undertaken in whichparticipants were presented with moral dilemmas withadditional information designed to anchor judgements abouthow likely the dilemma’s outcomes were. It was found thatthese anchoring values significantly altered how permissiblethe dilemmas were found when they were presented bothexplicitly and implicitly. This was the case even for dilemmastypically seen as eliciting deontological judgements.Implications of this finding for cognitive models of moraldecision making are discussed.

Utilitarian judgments maximize benefit for the most people, whereas deontological judgments are based on moral norms. Previous work shows that people tend to make more utilitarian judgments in their second compared to their native language, whereas higher religiosity is associated with more deontological judgments. However, it is not known whether the effect of language context is moderated by the religiosity of the individual. We hypothesized that more religious participants from all three languages would favor deontological choices irrespective of language context. In order to investigate this, we studied native speakers of Persian who either had Arabic or English as their second language, and all participants were given a standard measure of religiosity. Decision making was measured by the classic trolley trilemma in which a participant could "push" a person to save the lives of more people which is considered a utilitarian judgment. Alternatively, they could "switch" a track to save the lives of more people ("indirect"), or do nothing ("inaction"), both of which are considered deontological. Consistent with the literature showing more utilitarian judgments in the second language, English participants preferred the push option, whereas Persian participants favored the inaction option. L2 Arabic participants more often chose the indirect option. However, participants' religiosity moderated this effect of language context. Although L2 Arabic participants' choices were not influenced by religiosity, higher religiosity in the L2 English and L1 Persian groups was associated with more deontological choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine whether it would be advantageous to introduce knowledge norms instead of the currently assumed rational credence norms into the debate about decision making under normative uncertainty. There is reason to think that this could help us better accommodate cases in which agents are rationally highly confident in false moral views. I show how Moss' (Probabilistic knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) view of probabilistic knowledge can be fruitfully employed to develop a decision theory that delivers plausible verdicts in these cases. I also argue that, for this new view to be better than existing alternatives, it must adopt a particular solution to the new evil demon problem, which asks whether agents and their BIV-counterparts are equally justified. In order to get an attractive decision theory for cases of moral uncertainty, we must reject the claim that agents and their BIV-counterparts are equally justified. Moreover, the resulting view must be supplemented with a moral epistemology that explains how it is possible to be rationally morally uncertain. This is especially challenging if we assume that moral truths are knowable a priori. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The CNI model generates C, N, and I parameters to measure people’s mental processes—consequence sensitivity (C), norm sensitivity (N), and generalized inaction/action preferences (I)—in moral decision making. Given the limitations of the CNI model, the CAN algorithm was developed to depict the consequence sensitivity (C), overall action versus inaction preferences (A), norm sensitivity (N), and perverse responses with the other three parameters. However, no studies have clarified whether and how the CAN algorithm can solve the limitations of the CNI model. The present study systematically uncovers the limitations of the CNI model and the solutions provided by the CAN algorithm: (a) the CNI model does not consider negative values of the parameters, but the CAN algorithm does; (b) the sequential processing assumption of the CNI model is biased, the CAN algorithm proposes a parallel calculation strategy to fix this problem; (c) the calculation of the I parameter of the CNI model is inaccurate, so the CAN algorithm proposes the A parameter to replace it; (d) the CNI model has a problem measuring perverse responses, while the CAN algorithm develops three parameters to measure these. We examined some of our points on the basis of a reanalysis of the foreign language effect (FLE) by comparing the parameters from the CAN algorithm with those from the CNI model. We found that consequence and norm sensitivity were estimated to be greater using the CNI model than with the CAN algorithm. Consequently, these overestimations significantly (consequence sensitivity) and marginally (norm sensitivity) interfered with the FLE, making the FLE more likely to return a false positive result. In addition, the CAN algorithm was able to measure the extent of perverse responses, indicating that foreign language (compared to a native language) leads to more perverse responses. The present study demonstrates that the CNI model magnifies the Type I error of conclusions and that the CAN algorithm (compared to the CNI model) provides more insights regarding moral decision making.

People frequently engage in dishonest behavior at a cost to others, and it is therefore beneficial to study interventions promoting honest behavior. We implemented a novel intervention that gave participants a choice to promise to be truthful or not to promise. To measure cheating behavior, we developed a novel variant of the mind game—the dice‐box game—as well as a child‐friendly sender–receiver game. Across three studies with adolescents aged 10 to 14 years (N = 640) from schools in India, we found that promises systematically lowered cheating rates compared with no‐promise control conditions. Adolescents who sent truthful messages in the sender–receiver game cheated less in the dice‐box game and promises reduced cheating in both tasks (Study 1). Promises in the dice‐box game remained effective when negative externalities (Study 2) or incentives for competition (Study 3) were added. A joint analysis of data from all three studies revealed demographic variables that influenced cheating. Our findings confirm that promises have a strong, binding effect on behavior and can be an effective intervention to reduce cheating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined whether the Foreign-Language effect, an increase in bilinguals' rate of rational decisions to moral dilemmas in their foreign versus their native language, is influenced by emotion and the modality in which the dilemmas are presented. 154 Dutch–English bilinguals were asked to read and listen to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas in Dutch or in English. Importantly, the reading task had the character of a self-paced reading task to resemble the listening task as closely as possible. In both modalities, participants' task was to indicate whether the proposed action was appropriate or not. Results showed that the Foreign-Language effect was present for personal dilemmas only. In addition, an effect of modality demonstrated that participants took overall more rational decisions during the listening than the reading task. These findings give insight in the interplay between language, emotion and task demands, revealing that moral decision making is context-dependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We live in a world and a time full of challenges. Social inequality, discrimination, global political instability, wars, genocides, terrorism, nuclear and biological weapons, climate change, waste disposal, and species extinction, among others, are constant threats. These pressing issues require attention and solution. Wisdom rises as the overarching construct to holistically address complex human phenomena. Using the Polyhedron Model of Wisdom as a framework to analyze crises, the authors address the current COVID-19 pandemic. People's and leaders' reactions to the crisis are evaluated using seven Wisdom components: knowledge, intelligence, creativity, self-regulation, openness and tolerance, altruism and moral maturity, and sound judgment. Implications of the implementation and promotion of wisdom for ethical problem-solving are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision‐making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) found across two studies (N = 72 for each) that time pressure increased cheating. These findings suggest that dishonesty comes naturally, whereas honesty requires overcoming the initial tendency to cheat. Although the study's results were statistically significant, a Bayesian reanalysis indicates that they had low evidential strength. In a direct replication attempt of Shalvi et al.'s Experiment 2, we found that time pressure did not increase cheating, N = 428, point biserial correlation (rpb) =.05, Bayes factor (BF)01 = 16.06. One important deviation from the original procedure, however, was the use of mass testing. In a second direct replication with small groups of participants, we found that time pressure also did not increase cheating, N = 297, rpb =.03, BF01 = 9.59. These findings indicate that the original study may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating and the generality of the effect beyond the original context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Complex moral decision making may share certain cognitive mechanisms with economic decision making under risk situations. However, it is little known how people weigh gains and losses between self and others during moral decision making under risk situations. The current study adopted the dilemma scenario-priming paradigm to examine how self-relevance and reputational concerns influenced moral decision making. Participants were asked to decide whether they were willing to sacrifice their own interests to help the protagonist (friend, acquaintance, or stranger) under the dilemmas of reputational loss risk, while the helping choices, decision times and emotional responses were recorded. In Study 1, participants showed a differential altruistic tendency, indicating that participants took less time to make more helping choices and subsequently reported weaker unpleasant experience toward friends compared to acquaintances and strangers. In Study 2, participants still made these egoistically biased altruistic choices under the low reputational loss risk conditions. However, such an effect was weakened by the high reputational loss risks. Results suggested that moral principle guiding interpersonal moral decision making observed in our study is best described as an egoistically biased altruism, and that reputational concerns can play a key role in restraining selfish tendency.

Previous research has shown that people make systematically different decisions when faced with a moral dilemma in a native than in a foreign language [e.g. Costa, A., A. Foucart, S. Hayakawa, M. Aparici, J. Apesteguia, J. Heafner, and B. Keysar. 2014. "Your Morals Depend on Language." PLoS One 9 (4): e94842]. The aim of the current study is to test the limits of this so-called Foreign-Language Effect by examining (1) whether it holds for highly proficient bilinguals of a closely related language pair (i.e. Dutch-English), and (2) whether it can be replicated in an auditory setting. In Experiment 1, 60 Dutch-English bilinguals read moral dilemmas in Dutch or in English, whereas in Experiment 2, a different sample of 60 Dutch-English bilinguals listened to the same dilemmas. After reading or listening, participants' task was to indicate whether the proposed action was appropriate or not. The results showed that the Foreign-Language Effect was absent in Experiment 1, but present in Experiment 2. These findings aid in understanding the robustness of the Foreign-Language Effect, revealing that in some contexts it may be overcome and/or inhibited, whereas in others it may be enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emotional experience can have different effects on the performance of college emerging adults in risky, moral and empathic contexts decision making. The objective was to compare the performance in risk taking, dishonesty and theory of mind in college emerging adults under different dimensional and discrete emotional states. A sample of 153 students from 18 to 26 years old performed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Dots Task and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task after being exposed to emotions-inducing film clips. The risky and moral decision making was worse under emotional states of sadness and fear, respectively. In addition, greater difficulties in emotional regulation were associated with a worse performance in theory of mind. These results imply an initial contribution to the knowledge of emotion-cognition interactions, relevant aspects for the application of intervention policies in the college student community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complex moral decision making may share certain cognitive mechanisms with economic decision making under risk situations. However, it is little known how people weigh gains and losses between self and others during moral decision making under risk situations. The current study adopted the dilemma scenario-priming paradigm to examine how self-relevance and reputational concerns influenced moral decision making. Participants were asked to decide whether they were willing to sacrifice their own interests to help the protagonist (friend, acquaintance, or stranger) under the dilemmas of reputational loss risk, while the helping choices, decision times and emotional responses were recorded. In Study 1, participants showed a differential altruistic tendency, indicating that participants took less time to make more helping choices and subsequently reported weaker unpleasant experience toward friends compared to acquaintances and strangers. In Study 2, participants still made these egoistically biased altruistic choices under the low reputational loss risk conditions. However, such an effect was weakened by the high reputational loss risks. Results suggested that moral principle guiding interpersonal moral decision making observed in our study is best described as an egoistically biased altruism, and that reputational concerns can play a key role in restraining selfish tendency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to research studying the processes underlying decisions, a two-channel mechanism connects attention and choices: top-down and bottom-up processes. To identify the magnitude of each channel, we exogenously varied information intake by systematically interrupting participants’ decision processes in Study 1 (N = 116). Results showed that participants were more likely to choose a predetermined target option. Because selection effects limited the interpretation of the results, we used a sequential-presentation paradigm in Study 2 (preregistered, N = 100). To partial out bottom-up effects of attention on choices, in particular, we presented alternatives by mirroring the gaze patterns of autonomous decision makers. Results revealed that final fixations successfully predicted choices when experimentally manipulated (bottom up). Specifically, up to 11.32% of the link between attention and choices is driven by exogenously guided attention (1.19% change in choices overall), while the remaining variance is explained by top-down preference formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists have long noted that people's moral circles have expanded over the course of history, with modern people extending moral concern to entities--both human and nonhuman--that our ancestors would never have considered including within their moral boundaries. In recent decades, researchers have sought a comprehensive understanding of the psychology of moral expansiveness. We first review the history of conceptual and methodological approaches in understanding our moral boundaries, with a particular focus on the recently developed Moral Expansiveness Scale. We then explore individual differences in moral expansiveness, attributes of entities that predict their inclusion in moral circles, and cognitive and motivational factors that help explain what we include within our moral boundaries and why they may shrink or expand. Throughout, we highlight the consequences of these psychological effects for real-world ethical decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]