Search

In the context of developing the digital platform economy, trade-in programs have become an effective strategy for e-commerce platforms to stimulate consumption. Many head e-commerce platforms have launched their own trade-in programs. However, the existing research on trade-in programs is still stuck in the traditional trade-in model. The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a new and more beneficial trade-in program. In this paper, we construct the Stackelberg game model between a brand owner and a B2C e-commerce platform under two trade-in programs and use optimization theory to obtain the equilibrium results of the model. The results indicate that the performance improvement of the new-generation product will promote the increase in two-generation products’ price under traditional trade-in programs, the price of the new-generation product will increase, and the price of the previous-generation product will decrease under new trade-in programs. The brand owner always prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in. However, the e-commerce platform prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in just when the previous-generation product is durable enough and the performance improvement of a new-generation product is small enough; otherwise, it prefers new trade-in to traditional trade-in. These findings are beneficial to the operational practices of e-commerce platforms and brand owners.

In the context of developing the digital platform economy, trade-in programs have become an effective strategy for e-commerce platforms to stimulate consumption. Many head e-commerce platforms have launched their own trade-in programs. However, the existing research on trade-in programs is still stuck in the traditional trade-in model. The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a new and more beneficial trade-in program. In this paper, we construct the Stackelberg game model between a brand owner and a B2C e-commerce platform under two trade-in programs and use optimization theory to obtain the equilibrium results of the model. The results indicate that the performance improvement of the new-generation product will promote the increase in two-generation products' price under traditional trade-in programs, the price of the new-generation product will increase, and the price of the previous-generation product will decrease under new trade-in programs. The brand owner always prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in. However, the e-commerce platform prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in just when the previous-generation product is durable enough and the performance improvement of a new-generation product is small enough; otherwise, it prefers new trade-in to traditional trade-in. These findings are beneficial to the operational practices of e-commerce platforms and brand owners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green crowdfunding is developing as a novel and popular transaction method, which can largely improve the efficiency of raising initial funds and selling innovative green products or services. In this paper, we explore the creator's joint decisions regarding green crowdfunding products of different quality levels that can sufficiently satisfy consumer preferences. Firstly, considering the characteristics of a green crowdfunding product, we present four pricing strategies when substitutes exist. Then we propose the optimal pricing strategies to maximize the total profit for the creator under different circumstances, facing strategic and myopic consumers. Finally, for the heterogeneity of consumer valuations, we compare the total profits of the four pricing strategies under different values of the substitution coefficient to obtain the optimal pricing and product strategies under the coexistence of strategic and myopic consumers. According to the result, we find that when the fraction of high-type consumers and the gap between high and low valuations is big, or when they are both small, traditional single pricing shows its benefit. However, when the green crowdfunding products are better than their substitute, a line of green products is more likely to be optimal., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest. The founding sponsors had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results.