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Insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which Newtonian conceptualizations of time encourage the view in contemporary psychology that only efficient causal explanations are viable, explanations that ultimately render meaningful, purposive, morally rich human actions and relationships illusory. In short, psychology's pervasive adoption of Newtonian assumptions about time and causation renders the discipline incapable of understanding human behavior, its primary focus of study, in any but fundamentally inhuman ways. This paper aims (1) to provide a critique of the Newtonian conception of time and its commitment to efficient causality, particularly as commonly present in contemporary psychological theory and practice, and (2) to examine the phenomenological account of time provided in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Specifically, we will explore some of the ways in which Levinas' account of time as fundamentally intersubjective provides an alternative conceptual grounding for understanding the therapeutic relationship as one of infinite ethical responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant’s ‘Newtonianism’ has been rightly highlighted by figures like Friedman. The follow-up debates led to a more adequate view on Kant’s natural philosophy and in particular his relation towards Newton. But the discussion that evolved did not point to the asynchronicity that takes place in Kant’s struggle with the central Newtonian concepts. Newtonian space and gravity, in revised form, are of central concern to Kant’s critical philosophy. But Kant adapted and re-evaluated these two concepts in an asynchronous way. While Kant tries to integrate a notion of gravity into his theory of matter in his very first published writing, he has at this stage no adequate notion of space. At this time, as in regard to space, he can neither be called a Newtonian nor a proper Leibnizian and misconceives the necessity of an independent space for the foundations of physics. This perspective changes under the influence of Euler at the end of the fifties of the eighteenth century and finally leads to his writing of 1768 and the adoption of transcendental idealism in 1770. In the following, I depict this asynchronicity by taking central pre-critical writings into account while discussing Kant’s concept of space and gravity. This sharpens the picture of Kant’s work and the different stages his philosophy of nature went through. Further, it helps to understand the influence of Euler on Kant’s development in natural philosophy and his critical philosophy in general, as Kant under the influence of Euler formed deeper-going reflections on Newton’s theory of space and these mark turning points of his development.

For Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is "the foundational document of cognitive science" whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor's lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume's science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor's understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume's science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor's contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume's theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Daniel Philpott's scholarship embeds the Newtonian study of world politics in a broader perspective that is compatible with Post-Newtonian thinking. His scholarship has successfully tracked the entanglement of the religious and secular in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges the scholarly consensus on Willem Jacob 's Gravesande's philosophy, namely the view that it was predominantly influenced by Newton, Locke, and Descartes. More generally, it opposes the tendency to read the work of eighteenth-century natural philosophers as being part of well-defined strands of Newtonianism. I argue that we will understand the intellectual history of the early eighteenth century better if we let go of essentialist taxonomic views and instead pay attention to the historical trajectories of various actors and ideas. In the case of 's Gravesande (1688–1742), it has often been assumed that he used a particular form of Newtonianism to combat rationalist metaphysics, particularly Spinozism. Here I show that this view is not tenable when we take account of 's Gravesande's metaphysical writings. On topics such as liberty, necessity, and theodicy, these writings deviate from what Newtonianism is usually taken to stand for. Instead, 's Gravesande's views on such matters correspond more closely to certain interpretations of Leibniz's Théodicée. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like most Enlightenment philosophers, Priestley acknowledges his debt to Newton. However, despite his mentor's prohibition against "making hypotheses", in the 1770s, he embarked on a surprising metaphysical epic that led him, the theologian and scientist, to develop in his Disquisitions a bold system that articulated materialism, necessity and Socinianism. This synthesis constitutes the originality of a thinker who wanted to reapprehend science, metaphysics and theology together at the very moment when their dispersion seemed inevitable (and to give them an educational and political extension). It is based on a monistic ontology to which Priestley did not hesitate to give the unexpected name of materialism, at the risk of a number of misunderstandings, while he claims, much to the dismay of Reid, to closely follow the method of Newton. This paper will focus on the relation between Priestley and Newton's ambiguous inheritance. What is Priestley's "science" made of? What is its relationship to Newton and his "rules", to mathematics, to the theory of language, to the so-called "analysis and synthesis method", to Boscovich? How important is his claim for hypotheses and metaphysics? If Priestley indeed was a Newtonian, he surely was an unorthodox one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an opportunity to ponder the way the Catholic Church and its methods of information control reshaped, and paradoxically even enabled, the dissemination and practice of science in early modern Italy. Focusing on the activities of Newtonian scholars operating in Rome in the First half of the eighteenth century – especially the Celestine monk Celestino Galiani (1681–1753) and prelate Francesco Bianchini (1662–1729) – I will argue that major contributions to the spread of Newtonianism in Italy came from individuals operating within the Church, acting more-or-less independently from the Church's oversight. These scholars realized they were witnessing an inexorable transition and that the medieval scholastic cosmology and physics could not survive. In order to rescue the Church – and to avoid further embarrassment, especially after the Galileo Affair – renewal was needed. Counterintuitively, the dissemination of Italian Newtonianism was largely a Catholic effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper characterizes José Celestino Mutis' (1732–1808) appropriation of Newton in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. First, we examine critically traditional accounts of Mutis' works highlighting, on the one hand, their inadequacy for directing their claims toward the nineteenth-century independence from Spain and, on the other, for not differentiating between Newtonianism and Enlightenment. Next, we portray Mutis' complex Newtonianism from his own statements and from printed sources, including a variety of works and translations from British, Dutch, and French authors, in addition to a wide range of Newton's writings, unusual for an eighteenth-century reader in the Americas. Finally, we analyze a salient claim of Mutis' Newtonianism in order to depict his appropriation and transformation of Newton's ideas: the characterization of Newtonian experimental physics as a useful science. In so doing, Mutis further developed metaphysical and methodological positions not present in Newton's works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the epistemological paradigms that underpin the current trends in comparative legal research, by assessing them within the framework of the law-and-literature movement. In particular, it examines the scientific state of mind and the veering towards quantitative approaches which now percolate through legal comparative studies. The article argues that such state of mind is not merely confined to the ambit of comparative law. It has indeed several traits in common with the scientific mentality which has been saturating the knowledge system in Western culture since the seventeenth century. This scientific state of mind was one of Jonathan Swift's main targets. In Gulliver's Travels, A Tale of a Tub, and A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, Swift satirised the seventeenth-century scientific program, which had reduced the advancement of knowledge into a system that is very similar to twenty-first century information systems. This reduction was influenced by Cartesian philosophy and was achieved through methodological innovation. But it was also a consequence of the debate on ancient and modern learning, which had originated in France, but had immediate resonance in England. Swift rejected absolute reliance on quantitative methods: not only does this make it possible to set an equation between law and literature, but it also allows us to bring humanities into the debate about quantification in comparative law – and, as a consequence, to reappraise through literature some common assumptions we usually make about the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• In 1733 an automaton theater dubbed the "Microcosm" debuted in London and purported to show the entire Newtonian universe. • Throughout its 40-year career, its proprietors claimed that it promoted virtue, patriotism and religious orthodoxy. • However, evidence shows that middling audiences were eager to reinterpret their lowly position within this elite cosmology. How did ordinary people – artisans, laborers, servants, and children – come to know the Newtonian universe? And what effects did this knowledge have on how they contextualized their place in society? When it appeared in 1733, Henry Bridges' "Modern Microcosm" promised to give paying customers a view of the entire universe ingeniously recreated in a ten-foot-tall automaton theater. A hit with audiences, this clockwork wonder was displayed in Britain and the American colonies until disappearing mysteriously in the 1770s. This paper attempts to recover non-elite understandings of public science by examining the career of an astronomical wonder in the rowdy marketplace of ideas that was the London show scene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deism as a substitute to revealed religion started as a strictly intellectualist system. Its aim was to banish superstition, miracles, and secrets from religion and to expose religion to the light of reason. The philosophic meaning of deism consists primarily in that it maintains a new principle in the formulation of its problem. It found its justification in the basic and principles of Locke’s theory of knowledge, and Bacon’s new method based on induction rather than deduction, and the triumph of Newton’s science based on analysis and mathematics. Kant at last tried to find a compromise between faith and reason.

The aim of this article is to unveil the ways of teaching new philosophical paradigms in Dutch Universities between Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century, by means of an analysis of the uses of illustrations in Cartesian and Newtonian natural-philosophical textbooks. This analysis allows to understand the overall functions of philosophical textbooks, where illustrations act as (a) conceptual means, filling the gap between the premise of a theory and its actual contents; (b) didactic means, aiming to help the reader in understanding scientific models fully explained in texts; (c) promoting or propagandistic instruments, useful to present theories in a fascinating way. Eventually, I argue for a positive correlation of the use of illustrations and the introduction of new philosophies, and for the existence of non-philosophical reasons for such use: as to the propagandistic function of illustrations intended as decorative means.

This article, the second in a series about the Russian scientist Mikhail Lomonosov (1711-1765), traces his education from his arrival in Moscow in 1731 to study at the Slavic-Greco-Latin Academy, through his admission to the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1736, to his trip abroad to complete his educational studies from 1736 to 1741. Lomonosov’s story during this time opens a vista on the introduction of modern physics and modern science into Russia. Michael D. Gordin has argued that Peter the Great’s plans to Westernize Russia were more broadly conceived than he is usually credited, with ambitions that exceeded mere utilitarian and pragmatic goals. Lomonosov’s career trajectory is a good example, illustrating how different aspects of the Petrine vision intersected with and reinforced each other. The article ends with Lomonosov’s return to Russia from Germany in 1741, an important landmark in the growth of the Academy and of Russian science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the eighteenth century, several towns located in what is known today as the Suisse romande were extremely receptive toward scientific culture, and most notably Newtonianism. In this paper I deal with a nine-volume publication of Newton’s Opera Omnia that was planned in Geneva and Lausanne during the late 1730s and 1740s. This publication has not received the attention it deserves. To the best of my knowledge, even an awareness of its existence is lacking in the literature devoted to the reception of Newtonianism. This paper examines the circumstances of the publication of a complete set of all of Newton’s works known at the time, and the motivations of the editors, mathematicians, and publishers who were involved in this editorial enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper distinguishes four perspectives in the process of reception of Copernicanism in colonial Rio de la Plata: (1) the discussion of the systems of the world in the University of Córdoba by the Jesuits until 1767, (2) the treatment of this topic by the Franciscans in Córdoba and in their convent school in Buenos Aires, (3) the teaching by the secular clergy in the Colegio de San Carlos in the same city, and (4) the celebration of Copernicus by the enlightened naval engineer Pedro Cerviño in the Nautical School of the Consulado de Buenos Aires. The examination of these cases on the basis of manuscript sources and colonial printings shows that the reception of Copernican theory was an erratic process rich in incidences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This prosopographical study of the chaplains of Frederick Louis, prince of Wales (1707-51), explores their political, cultural, theological and intellectual significance. It examines their dual allegiance to George II (as the Supreme Governor of the Church of England) and to Leicester House. It advances Frederick's credentials as a significant patron of the British Enlightenment and demonstrates that his clerical patronage made an important contribution to the cultural and intellectual dynamism of his rival court and to his conscious self-fashioning as a connoisseur of the arts and as an enlightened Patriot Prince. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following student contribution concerns Thomas Paine’s Newtonian concepts of society and government in the context of the Age of Enlightenment. Its aim is to demonstrate how Thomas Paine reinterpreted Enlightenment political thought as proposed by the empiricist theorist, John Locke, by using the principles of Newtonianism. Paine’s Newtonian politics is closely connected with his deistic faith. His political theory is devoted to the vision of a free society as a manifestation of the benevolent The Watchmaker. With this mission in mind, Paine attempted to devalue the contemporary models of the state of nature and social contract theory as interpreted by John Locke and to offer a more democratic version of these concepts. Paine’s key ideas in this respect are expressed in his most famous works Common Sense, The Rights of Man and The Age of Reason.

For the last forty years, Hume's Newtonianism has been a debated topic in Hume scholarship. The crux of the matter can be formulated by the following question: Is Hume a Newtonian philosopher? Debates concerning this question have produced two lines of interpretation. I shall call them 'traditional' and 'critical' interpretations. The traditional interpretation asserts that there are many Newtonian elements in Hume, whereas the critical interpretation seriously questions this. In this article, I consider the main points made by both lines of interpretations and offer further arguments that contribute to this debate. I shall first argue, in favor of the traditional interpretation, that Hume is sympathetic to many prominently Newtonian themes in natural philosophy such as experimentalism, criticality of hypotheses, inductive proof, and criticality of Leibnizian principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility. Second, I shall argue, in accordance with the critical interpretation, that in many cases Hume is not a Newtonian philosopher: His conceptions regarding space and time, vacuum, reality of forces, specifics about causation, and the status of mechanism differ markedly from Newton's related conceptions. The outcome of the article is that there are both Newtonian and non/anti-Newtonian elements in Hume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Newton's ideas didn't prevail over Carthesianism quickly or easily and there was a long dispute between the supporters of both sides, motivated not only scientifically, but nationally and emotionally as well. French Newtonianism was not identical to Newton's own ideas and had many specific attributes. It often overstepped the purview of science and became a part of popular culture. The essay concludes with an assessment of the particular contribution of French Enlightenment researchers to the application of Newton's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]