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In this article I examine why Vietnam, a state possessing neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear power plants, adopted nuclear security purely as a preventive measure against nuclear terrorism. Although nuclear security emerged as a norm specifically related to countering nuclear terrorism following 9/11, it has received diverse responses from states. Nuclear weapon states, and states that possess nuclear materials (encompassing the United States, Japan and Canada) have actively advanced nuclear security as they face the threat of nuclear terrorism. In contrast, states without nuclear power plants have been unwilling to do so as they do not identify nuclear terrorism as a national threat. However, among these states, Vietnam began to adhere to the norm in 2012, and by 2014 was even recognized as one of the most progressive states in the nuclear security field. Drawing on Vietnamese regulations, elite statements and interviews conducted with Vietnamese officials, I endeavour to show that Vietnam actively changed its stance after nuclear security began to be diffused as an independent norm, in isolation from the other nuclear norms it had previously been grafted onto. Further, I discuss the merits of these strategies as barriers and facilitators for norm adoption in the case of Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Age dating a sample of nuclear material is a key part of predetonation technical nuclear forensics. As plutonium stockpiles age, they are more likely to require repurification and mixing to remove in-grown daughter products and maintain a consistent product. Existing age-dating techniques do not adequately address this problem. Four models were trained using machine learning techniques to determine (1) if a sample of weapons-grade plutonium had been repurified, (2) the elapsed time after repurification, and (3) the minimum and maximum elapsed times between repurification and its initial separation/purification/fabrication. The trained models predicted the repurification status with 99% accuracy, the age after repurification with a root-mean-square error (RMSE) of 0.34 years, and the minimum and maximum ages before repurification with RMSEs of 4.66 and 9.34 years, respectively. Age dating plutonium provides valuable insight into the country and possibly the facility of origin of the material, which is one tool to deter state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the issue of legal regulation of the fight against nuclear terrorism. The purpose of the article is to highlight the problems of legal regulation of the fight against nuclear terrorism. The authors of the article conducted a retrospective review and analyzed the state of development of Ukrainian legislation in the field of legal regulation of the fight against nuclear terrorism. As a result of such consideration, it was determined that the last decades of the 20th century, as well as the 21st century, showed that the greatest threat is terrorist organizations that have an international (transnational) character and are connected to organized criminal societies. Terrorist organizations have largely reoriented themselves from single murders or serious explosions of conventional explosives to active attempts to acquire or manufacture means of mass destruction with the subsequent threat of use. The level of risk of using nuclear weapons and radioactive materials can be pre-estimated by threats of committing acts of nuclear terrorism and theft of nuclear materials. The authors of the article provide separate data related to terrorist acts, as well as the most dangerous cases of their abduction. The article analyzes the basis of the provisions of the International Convention on Combating Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The authors concluded that the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism plays a key role in ensuring nuclear security. Before the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Ukraine was considered to be an example of a consistent and balanced policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The events that have been going on in Ukraine for almost three years have shown that nuclear legislation, both international and domestic, in the sphere related to the use of nuclear energy is imperfect and does not provide adequate answers to many questions. Externally, the political activity of states that possess nuclear weapons is decisive for the future of humanity, for the survival of human civilization. To prevent the unthinkable - the destruction of life on earth, to defend peace - there is no more important task for all peoples of our planet today. According to the authors, it is expedient to develop and adopt an international act on the norms of relations between nuclear states, which would be of great importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Arab Journal for Scientific Publishing is the property of Research & Development of Human Recourses Center (REMAH) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The response of the brain to radiation is important for cancer patients receiving whole or partial brain irradiation or total body irradiation, those exposed to irradiation as part of a nuclear accident or a nuclear war or terrorism event, and for astronauts during and following space missions. The mechanisms mediating the effects of irradiation on the hippocampus might be associated with alterations in hippocampal DNA methylation. Changes in cytosine methylation involving the addition of a methyl group to cytosine (5 mC) and especially those involving the addition of a hydroxy group to 5 mC (hydroxymethylcytosine or 5 hmC) play a key role in regulating the expression of genes required for hippocampal function. In this review article, we will discuss the effects of radiation on hippocampal DNA methylation and whether these effects are associated with hippocampus-dependent cognitive measures and molecular measures in the hippocampus involved in cognitive measures. We will also discuss whether the radiation-induced changes in hippocampal DNA methylation show an overlap across different doses of heavy ion irradiation and across irradiation with different ions. We will also discuss whether the DNA methylation changes show a tissue-dependent response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Anthropocene denotes an era of accelerated human impact on the environment. Although discourses of the Anthropocene are often criticized for representing colonial and specifically capitalist interests of economic growth, this paper examines, in the case of Ukraine, how these discourses can be applied to uncover and address social (post)colonial impacts of non-capitalist regimes (those also not classified as "Global North"). In particular, the analysis focuses on the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant accident on local communities in Ukraine. As academics of Ukrainian background, authors share their first-hand experiences of such impact on their lives and wellbeing of their families, communities, and land. The narrative research framework is used to engage with the modern Ukrainian community and discuss the implications of geopolitical and cultural proximity of the coloniser, with a particular focus on displacement and forced migration. This is especially relevant as it is reflected in the current refugee crisis and tactics of nuclear terrorism used by the Russian government in the war against Ukraine. This paper is a valuable resource for promoting and giving a voice to the Ukrainian people and potentially other peoples in post-Soviet space to unveil their colonial legacy and utilise the discourses of the Anthropocene to aid more effective decolonisation processes in the future of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is dedicated to the analysis of new nuclear challenges resulting from Russia’s nuclear blackmail and attacks at civic nuclear facilities in Ukraine. It is shown that Russia’s actions concerning civic nuclear facilities correspond to the criteria of nuclear terrorism and demonstrate the violation of the internationally accepted principles of non-proliferation and nuclear taboo. This attitude to potentially dangerous objects and behavior is rooted in the non-acceptance of the post-Chornobyl safety culture. For the Russian Federation, it is the exploitation of human fears of new nuclear disasters and radiation pollution. European and global communities in close cooperation with the Ukrainian authority, scientists, and civic society urgently need to work out efficient instruments to translate and convert nuclear fear and concern into efficient actions for the enforcement of international legislation in the sphere of nuclear safety and terrorism prevention and the empowerment of international institutions and organizations. Translated article was published for Czech readers in Ekolist (with small changes): https://ekolist.cz/cz/publicistika/eseje/jaderne-vyzvy-a-ignorovani-zkusenosti-z-cernobylu

Nuclear forensics is an essential activity in support of national counter-nuclear smuggling operations, as it can be used to provide unique and useful data to law enforcement for the prosecution of criminal nuclear smugglers and traffickers. Nuclear forensics can also be used to determine the origin of nuclear materials that have fallen out of regulatory control, allowing for the identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the safeguarding of nuclear materials, while also generating a deterrent effect through attribution to the legal and responsible owners of nuclear materials out of regulatory control. This article describes the benefits of a nuclear forensics capability to any country in possession of nuclear materials and describes how nuclear forensics can support an investigation into the origin of interdicted nuclear materials, using a case study of a nuclear materials interdiction in Australia to describe how nuclear forensics works in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current global approach to securing potentially dangerous radioactive material needs to be strengthened. Highly radioactive sources have multiple uses globally in medicine, industry, and academic research, but terrorist and other violent groups could also use them to make a "dirty bomb," in which highly radioactive material is dispersed with conventional explosives. While global radiological security arrangements have improved since 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national regulators still report regular incidents of highly radioactive materials that are stolen, lost, or missing. Currently, global radiological security is largely based on the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which countries are under no obligation to follow or implement. The time has come to make the code of conduct a legally binding agreement that would promote national accountability and help prevent radiological terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine has challenged the nuclear safety of Ukraine, Europe and the world. This article examines the problems of nuclear safety in Ukraine and outlines some solutions to this ongoing crisis, as well as improvements to international norms where required. In addressing these issues, there is a critical need to revise the existing standards of nuclear safety to prevent nuclear terrorism, create and authorise a special United Nations (UN) Commission to mediate between the warring parties, and hold an international summit on nuclear security to oversee the fulfilment of obligations by member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The four-month experience of russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already shown the failure of the world security system, primarily the system of nuclear safety and security. And although this is a future subject of research for decades, preliminary conclusions and urgent issues can already be drawn today. Ukraine is a nuclear state having most of constituents of the nuclear fuel cycle. Half of the electricity produced in Ukraine comes from nuclear power plants. During the wartime russian troops permanently bombarded, shelled and occupied nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The largest in Europe Zaporizhzhia NPP and the most worldwide dangerous radioactive contaminated Chornobyl Exclusion Zone were occupied in the very beginning of the russia’s invasion. Russia’s nuclear terrorism led to the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, fire at the nuclear facilities sites and within radioactive contaminated areas. From all sources of man-made radioactivity, the main amount of artificial radioisotopes (more than 90 %) is concentrated in the spent nuclear fuel (SNF). SNF “wet” and “dry” storage facilities built from concrete are considerably more vulnerable than nuclear reactors designed to withstand high pressure, aircraft, and ballistic missile hits. The amount of radioactivity in SNF facilities in Chornobyl and Energodar corresponds to about 1,000,000 nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima. Russia’s terrorists and looters do not need to fire nuclear missiles. A radioactive cloud that could form from the thousands of Chornobyl emissions released from occupied SNF facilities may destroy the Earth’s Biosphere. The international organizations aimed to provide security for nuclear facilities in wartime were impotent to fulfill statutory functions. The modern system of military defense in the World is not able to provide Global Safety and Security. To prevent the global nuclear catastrophe the system of nuclear safety and security requires cardinal overhaul by urgent solution of a number of engineering, technical, environmental and socio-political problems.

Taking into account the deficit in nuclear security governance, the threat of nuclear terrorism, the global trend of low-carbon transition, and the strategic significance of nuclear security, President Xi Jinping has innovatively proposed the concept of building a community with a shared future for nuclear security. With a goal of constructing an international nuclear security system characterized by fairness, cooperation, and mutual benefit, building such a community is guided by the concept of rational, coordinated and balanced nuclear security, and requires strengthened political investment, national responsibility, international cooperation, and nuclear security culture. This idea demonstrates the Chinese wisdom and Chinese approach to global governance, promotes the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Chinese path to modernization, and serves the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China insists on enhancing its nuclear security capabilities, participating in the international nuclear security system, promoting international cooperation in nuclear security, and eliminating the root causes of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, thus making important contributions to global nuclear security governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear technology. . . embodies a nearly unbelievable power to destroy, but at the same time an extraordinary power to create—to enrich our lives, to provide the electric power by which we may read at night, to produce potable water from the ocean’s brine, to help cure deadly diseases, and to enable science and industry to advance in innumerable ways that can improve the quality of life for people in all societies [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the release of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States (US) in 2022, which is part of the National Defense Review (NDR) and The Missile Defense Review (MDR). The NPR highlights the US response to the changing nuclear strategic environment, particularly in relation to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. It emphasizes the need for the US to address nuclear coercion by Russia in a responsible manner and calls for a sense of urgency for a nuclear disarmament security environment. The NPR also discusses the challenges posed by China's nuclear capabilities and the importance of extended deterrence for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. It rules out Iran as a nuclear threat to the US but acknowledges the possibility of nuclear terrorism. The NPR recommends a comprehensive approach that includes arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction measures to address nuclear dangers. [Extracted from the article]

We live in a world where thousands of nuclear weapons exist. Many countries and even terrorist organizations want to acquire nuclear weapons. The ambiguous and transnational nature of terrorist organizations challenges the national security of many states. Bangladesh is a small and densely populated country with a nuclear energy plant. Although Bangladesh has a nuclear energy policy, it has no atomic security policy or legal framework. The dearth of military capabilities, administrative facilities, and human resources with proper skills and experiences makes Bangladesh vulnerable to nuclear terrorist attacks. This research aims to build a framework that would be useful in assessing the security threats from the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in a country like Bangladesh. This nuclear security assessment framework could be useful in assessing security threats from nuclear terrorism in non-nuclear-weapon countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The on-going Russo-Ukrainian war has resulted in a renewed global interest in the safety and security of nuclear installations and the possibility of nuclear disasters caused by warfare and terrorism. The objective of this study was to identify and characterize all documented terrorist attacks against nuclear transport, nuclear facilities, and nuclear scientists as reported to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) over a 50-year period. Methods: The GTD was searched for all terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities, nuclear scientists, nuclear transport, and other nuclear industry-related targets in the period from 1970-2020. Analyses were performed on temporal factors, location, target type, attack and weapon type, perpetrator type, number of casualties, and property value loss. Results: Ninety-one incidents that occurred from 1970 through 2020 were included. Incidents took place in 25 countries and nine world regions, with most (42; 46.1%) occurring in Western Europe. During these 50 years, 91 incidents resulted in 19 fatalities and 117 injuries. One perpetrator was killed during an incident and one other assailant was injured. Bombings and explosions were the most frequently identified attack type (n = 40; 44.0%), followed by facility/infrastructure damage (n = 24; 26.4%) and armed assaults and assassinations (both n = 7; 7.7%). Nuclear power plants and reactors under construction were targeted in 13 (14.3%) and eight (8.8%) incidents, respectively. Most of the attacks took place on other nuclear industry-related sites. Conclusion: Terrorist attacks carried out by non-state perpetrators against nuclear facilities, nuclear scientists, nuclear transport, and other nuclear industry-related targets are rare, with only 91 incidents in a 50-year period. None of the attacks resulted in radioactive fallout or environmental contamination. Most of the attacks took place outside a nuclear power plant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Experimental measurements in SFCOMPO-2.0 are used for nuclear forensics analysis. • Various machine-learning techniques are explored and compared for source reactor-type discrimination. • Random Forest and Multilayer Perceptron are effective for source reactor-type discrimination. • Multilayer Perceptron achieves F1-scores greater than 0.8 for all 5 reactor types. • Factor analysis is not as satisfactory as the simulation-data-based research. In recent years, nuclear forensic analysis has become crucial due to the growing global threat of nuclear terrorism and smuggling. Since 2005, extensive research has been conducted on identifying the origin of spent nuclear fuel, focusing on the source reactor-type discrimination, 235U enrichment of the fresh fuel, and the fuel exposure in the reactor (known as burnup). However, the majority of research relies on computed databases, which may lead to tracing discrepancies compared with actual situations. The present study employs the isotopic measurements from the experimental SFCOMPO-2.0 database to predict nuclear reactor types using Factor Analysis (FA) and various machine learning classification algorithms. The results reveal that FA is an effective method for dimension reduction and visualization. The FA-KNN, Random Forest (RF), and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithms are applied using a consistent dataset partition to ensure unbiased comparisons. The prediction results based on 10-fold stratified cross-validation are quite promising and the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for multi-class classification confirm the excellent generalization ability of models. Therefore, the application of machine learning techniques is highly effective for reactor-type forensics analysis, especially for RF and MLP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we investigate the connection between geopolitical risk (GPR) and global financial cycle (GFCy) as well as whether the former has predictive value for the out‐of‐sample predictability of the latter. We utilize both the historical and recent GPR data and their variants, namely, GPR act covering all "acts" that constitute GPR such as war, nuclear invasion and terrorism, and GPR threat, which represents threats of these acts. We construct a predictive model that accommodates the salient features of the predicted and predictor series while the forecast evaluation is conducted for both in‐sample and out‐of‐sample periods. Our findings reveal that a rise in GPR discourages investments in risky assets and by implication worsens GFCy. The impact is more severe after the global financial crisis (gfc), and the GPR threat exerts more adverse effect on GFCy compared with GPR act regardless of whether historical GPR or recent GPR is used. Meanwhile, the predictive model of GFCy that accommodates the GPR data outperforms the benchmark model that ignores it both in the in‐sample and out‐of‐sample estimates albeit with improved forecast performance during the post‐gfc period and at a longer forecast horizon. However, the recent GPR data, which are broader in scope, offer better forecast accuracy than the historical GPR data. Additional analyses involving the vulnerability of global economic conditions reveal similar outcomes as GFCy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The smuggling of special nuclear materials (SNMs) through international borders could enable nuclear terrorism and constitutes a significant threat to global security. This paper presents the experimental demonstration of a novel radiographic technique for quantitatively reconstructing the density and type of material present in commercial cargo containers, as a means of detecting such threats. Unlike traditional techniques which use sources of bremsstrahlung photons with a continuous distribution of energies, multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography utilizes monoenergetic photons from nuclear reactions, specifically the 4.4 and 15.1 MeV photons from the 11B(d,nγ)12C reaction. By exploiting the Z-dependence of the photon interaction cross sections at these two specific energies, it is possible to simultaneously determine the areal density and the effective atomic number as a function of location for a 2D projection of a scanned object. The additional information gleaned from using and detecting photons of specific energies for radiography substantially increases the resolving power between different materials. This paper presents results from the imaging of mock cargo materials ranging from Z ≈ 5 − 92 , demonstrating accurate reconstruction of the effective atomic number and areal density of the materials over the full range. In particular, the system is capable of distinguishing pure materials with Z ≳ 70 , such as lead and uranium—a critical requirement of a system designed to detect SNM. This methodology could be used to screen commercial cargoes with high material specificity, to distinguish most benign materials from SNM, such as uranium and plutonium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As seen by recent events such as the bombing in Manchester, UK, terrorism can occur anywhere, at any time. So far, the terrorist incidents have been relatively low-tech - such as improvised explosive devices detonating inside pressure cookers, trucks driving down crowded sidewalks, or bombs exploding in backpacks containing metal bolts and screws. But what if terrorists were to build a dirty bomb that contained radioactive materials instead of bits of metal shrapnel, and set it off in a major city? Or, worse, what if they managed to build a fully functioning nuclear weapon, cart it to the downtown of a city, and then detonate it - even a small, rudimentary one that was much smaller than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima? What would the social, economic, and political impacts of the successful terrorist use of a nuclear weapon look like? What planning has the international community done for such an event? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nuclear Safety is the property of Nuclear & Radiation Safety Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When, in March 1940, two Jewish emigré physicists, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, composed a memorandum on the technical feasibility of an atomic weapon, few would have envisaged the significance of this six-page document. The technical blueprint for an atomic weapon, at the time assumed to be well beyond the realm of the possible, was to have a significant impact on the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, as it enabled British and American scientists to discuss at eye-level, the direction of nuclear weapons development, as it moved from theory to implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this part, von Hippel discusses how his focus shifted in the first decade of the 21st century to a set of new concerns evoked by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the G.W. Bush administration’s retrograde policies with regard to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. During this period, he co-founded the International Panel on Fissile Materials so that policy activists working in opposition to nuclear arms races and fissile material production in different countries could work together. He also focused on fostering another generation of activist scientists engaged with the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

The article presents a survey of U.S. citizens about their general attitudes toward global nuclear disarmament. The arguments commonly used by disarmament advocates to justice nuclear abolition include the behavior of nuclear-armed rogue states, the risk of nuclear terrorism and the prospect of catastrophic nuclear war. Topics discussed include a decline in the level of public interest in nuclear disarmament, and the critical role of public engagement in achieving nuclear arms control.