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High-profile instances of brands accused of cultural appropriation suggest that even the most prominent brands fail to fully understand the complexities of this phenomenon. This work experimentally unpacks consumer perceptions of cultural appropriation and its impact on brand attitudes and purchase interest. The authors begin by developing and validating a scale for measuring perceptions of cultural appropriation. Next, a series of studies demonstrates that viewing this phenomenon through a historical lens can help determine when and why the use of cultural elements is viewed as appropriative. Specifically, an emphasis on historical power imbalance explains why liberal consumers are more likely to recognize cultural appropriation and why commercializing disadvantaged cultures is considered appropriation, whereas using elements from advantaged cultures may be more acceptable. The conceptualization further identifies brand actions and interventions that influence perceptions of cultural appropriation, including externally emphasizing historical power imbalance, how brands obtain cultural elements, and how brands represent the culture in their product offerings and marketing. These findings help marketers (1) avoid launching products that can be damaging to the brand and offensive to consumers and (2) understand how to better promote products in a way that prevents rather than amplifies these negative perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conservatives are often blamed for spreading misinformation, but it is unclear whether certain situations trigger them and, if so, why. The authors examine situations that are politically polarized, meaning the topic and/or its framing conveys conflict, discord, or disagreement between the two main political parties (conservatives and liberals). The authors study whether conservatives react to polarized situations by spreading ingroup-skewed political misinformation that is objectively inaccurate but not necessarily understood to be false and whether liberals are less reactive. Using a multimethod approach, the authors conduct six studies, including analyses of statements by public figures and speeches by U.S. presidents, as well as controlled experiments. The results indicate that in polarized situations, conservatives’ need for ingroup dominance is elevated, so they convey more misinformation than liberals. In less polarized situations, conservatives’ need for ingroup dominance is tempered, reducing their misinformation conveyance. These findings suggest that misinformation should not be blamed solely on the individual trait of conservativism, as polarized situations exaggerate conservative motives and behaviors. While news media, social media, political figures, and others may be incentivized to emphasize political polarization to gain audiences and bolster engagement, the resulting misinformation harms truth, trust, and democracy. Possible remedies include improved fact-checking and media literacy education.

Who is likely to engage in Anti-Russian boycotts in China? While existing literature focuses on ethnocentrism and nationalism as drivers of political consumerism, this article explores political boycotts that contradict the dominant discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Drawing on original survey data, the article uses two ideological dimensions—social authoritarianism and attitudes to economic organisation – to delineate three distinct ideological leanings in China: liberalism, the New Left and neo-authoritarianism. The article demonstrates that liberals are more likely than others to support the boycott of Russian products. Additionally, all three groups are more willing to boycott Russian goods if they hold egalitarian attitudes. The findings shed light on the causes of anti-Russian sentiment in China and its likely implications for the Russian economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conducted a preregistered field experiment examining racial discrimination in tie formation on social media. We randomly assigned research accounts varying on race (Black, White) and politics (liberal/Democrat, conservative/Republican, neutral) to follow a politically balanced sample of Twitter (i.e., X) users (N = 5,951) who were unaware they were in a research study. We examined three predictions from the social and political psychology literatures: i) individuals favor White over Black targets, ii) this tendency is stronger for conservatives/Republicans than for liberals/Democrats, and iii) greater discrimination by conservatives/Republicans is explained by the assumption that racial minorities are liberal/Democrat. We found evidence that individuals were less likely to reciprocate social ties with Black accounts than White accounts. However, this tendency was not moderated by individuals' political orientation, shared partisanship, or partisan mismatch. In sum, this work provides field experimental evidence for racial discrimination in tie formation on social media by individuals across political backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasingly fringe and violent far-right ideologies have become a significant threat to national security in Western countries in the twenty-first century. Accelerationism is growing in far-right narratives while populism and ethnocentrism garnered public attention. This study presents an empirical study of Stormfront, the largest and oldest online white nationalist community in the world, to identify accelerationist themes in the ideological narratives used to discuss white nationalist philosophy over time. The study applied a Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm and a supervised learning AI model to a corpus of more than 66 m words collected from 367,000 posts across a 20-year period. This analysis identified two kinds of accelerationist sentiment in the dataset, an offensive form, which portrays violence as both an inevitable and desirable mechanism to pursue political change, and a defensive form, which portrays violence as a reactionary and protective means to prevent undesirable social changes. The study then used a thematic analysis on a subset of the data to support its findings that both offensive and defensive accelerationism are embedded in ideological narratives on Stormfront. This is an important consideration for further research on ways that accelerationism may be influencing popular white nationalist ideology, particularly fringe and violent narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that terrorism is omnipresent on social media, it is imperative to study how seeing terror content online is related to individuals' attitudes, behaviors, and emotions. This study investigates how exposure to terrorism on social media associates with terror-related online self-disclosure and how self-disclosure, in turn, relates to fear of terrorism. A quota-based survey of young social media users (16- to 25-year-olds; N = 864) in Germany revealed that exposure to Islamist and far-right terrorism is related to higher online self-disclosure. Political ideology moderated the relationship between exposure to far-right terrorism and online self-disclosure, but not when exposed to Islamist terrorism. Attitudinal differentiation was negatively associated with self-disclosure. Additionally, we found an interaction effect of exposure to Islamist terrorism and attitudinal differentiation on self-disclosure. Finally, the results showed that online self-disclosure was positively related to fear of terrorism. By and large, our findings highlight the relevance of social media for the levels of fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine impact of corporate governance on firm performance following the implementation of the changes to the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan in 2012. Our sample period from 2008 to 2022 include periods of political instability and shifts in Pakistan's political landscape, providing an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing accounting‐ and market‐based firm performance measures. We find significant improvements attributed to reforms in the regulatory framework surrounding corporate governance practices particularly from expanded scope and composition of boards and audit committees. This led to broader capabilities and effective controls, thus improving firm performance and investor confidence more so during periods of political instability and changes in political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies have been conducted to identify the factors that predict trust/distrust in science. However, most of these studies are based on closed-ended survey research, which does not allow researchers to gain a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. This study integrated survey analysis conducted within the United States with computational text analysis to reveal factors previously obscured by traditional survey methodologies. Even after controlling for political ideology—which has been the most significant explanatory factor in determining trust in science within a survey framework—we found those with concerns over boundary-crossing (i.e. concerns or perceptions that science overlaps with politics, the government, and funding) were less likely to trust science than their counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding television viewing behavior is highly relevant, as it remains an important source of political news for many. Nowadays, viewers can choose between a growing diversity of formats covering political news, varying from traditional news broadcasts to late-night talk shows and satire. Yet, we have little to no information about the specific political content provided by television programs; and much less how this can be connected to viewing behavior and audience characteristics (political interest, ideology). Moving forward, using unique Dutch audience-meter data (3,672 viewers from 1,761 different households) from July 2017 to July 2018, we explore who is exposed to which (political) topic in what type of television program. We use automated content analysis to analyze the subtitles of television programs (N = 21,480). Our results indicate that situational factors, such as lead-in and lead-out effects affect news exposure. We also found that political interest does not only shape the volume but also the composition of audiences’ political information diets. Results show that higher political interest was associated with television audiences receiving a greater proportion of their news from public affairs and opinion programs. There does not appear to be any difference in patterns for political ideology; similar proportions of each type of program make up the information diets for both left and right viewers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public Significance Statement The aim of the present study was to develop and validate the Immigration‐Related Political Ideology Scale (IRPIS), designed to measure diverse political perspectives on immigration among US voters. The IRPIS was developed following a series of focus groups and refined through a systematic item‐generation process involving expert panels. The scale was validated using a two‐step factor analysis with a nationally representative sample of 1292 US voters, divided into exploratory (n = 632) and confirmatory (n = 660) sub‐samples. The exploratory factor analysis identified seven distinct factors: conservative views, welcoming attitudes, world regions, flexibility, assimilationist expectations, multicultural expectations, and undocumented immigrant rights. Confirmatory factor analysis provided an acceptable fit (CFI = .901; RMSEA = .050), and the scale demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach's alphas ranging from .89 to .97). Inter‐factor correlations varied, with strong links observed among welcoming attitudes, flexibility, and multicultural expectations (r’s > .80), confirming a polarization between liberal and conservative stances on immigration. These findings suggest that the IRPIS is the first scale specifically designed to assess immigration‐related political orientations in a polarized US context. This tool has important implications for political strategy and policymaking, especially in the context of rising immigration rates and political polarization.The present study validates the Immigration‐Related Political Ideology Scale (IRPIS) using a nationally representative sample of 1292 US voters. Immigration remains a highly polarizing issue, with deeply entrenched ideological differences influencing policy preferences and public discourse. Exploratory factor analysis identified seven distinct factors and confirmed a clear polarization between liberal and conservative views on immigration. The IRPIS represents a critical tool for research, political strategy, and policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although controversial, numerous memorials venerating the Confederacy of the American Civil War remain standing across America, and removal efforts are met with backlash. Although research has investigated how racial bias and Southerner identification predict Confederate statue/symbol support, we investigated how conservatism and opposition to political correctness (anti-PC attitudes) explain attitudes toward controversial public statues. Across Studies 1a–5 (N = 885), results revealed that conservatives consistently reported greater anti-PC attitudes than liberals, and anti-PC attitudes predicted support for Confederate statues even after accounting for anti-Black bias. However, conservatives' anti-PC attitudes were not applied in a principled way. In Studies 2 to 5, conservatives and participants high in anti-PC attitudes opposed the removal of Confederate statues and statues of controversial right-wing figures. However, this pattern was reversed when participants considered statues of controversial left-wing figures. Furthermore, Study 5 investigated how participants' immediate negative reactions (e.g., moral outrage) predicted their attitudes toward removing controversial statues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article undertakes a critical examination of the paucity of political ideology within Nigeria's party system, with a particular focus on the 2023 presidential election. It further explores the ramifications of this deficiency on the political landscape and developmental trajectory of the country. In liberal democracies, political ideology plays a crucial role in shaping the political system and determining the course of a state's political and economic development, but Nigeria's political landscape currently suffers from a lack of ideology. Political parties in Nigeria are not driven by ideas, beliefs, and values. They are not groups of individuals who share a common ideology, but rather serve as platforms for patronage and wealth accumulation for the political elites. This article advances the argument that the lack of political ideology in Nigerian politics weakens the political system and creates a democratic deficit. These factors challenge the process of democratic development in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even when controlling for big versus small government philosophies, this paper reports quantitatively significant cleavages in the probabilities of supporting increased federal antipoverty efforts that persist between conservatives and liberals, and Republicans and Democrats. However, predicted conditional probabilities show that support for increased welfare spending or federal responsibility in raising the standard of living of the poor is not overwhelming, even among liberals and Democrats, although support for increased federal assistance to the poor is fairly strong, even among conservatives and Republicans. Hence, we consider assertions that conservatives and Republicans do not care about the poor to be extreme and unsupported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note draws from the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE), uncertainty-identity theory, and intergroup threat theory to investigate the conditions under which members of online political networks are likely to endorse extremism. Using a national survey of 717 U.S. adults who self-identify as members of an online group comprising politically like-minded others, we find that when perceived group threat is high, group cohesion relates to radicalism intentions. Moreover, additional analysis suggests this relationship was particularly concentrated among conservatives. We argue that this may relate to the different ways in which conservatives and liberals manage uncertainty and threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has become an increasingly polarizing issue in the United States and across the globe, a divide reflected in the sustainable behaviors of liberals and conservatives. Previous studies have investigated the psychological underpinnings of this polarization in the sustainability domain; however, findings have been fragmented across disciplines. The current work aims to integrate and synthesize academic research at the intersection of political ideology and sustainable behavior to propose a framework that explains polarized responses to climate change. This framework, represented by the acronym BREAK, suggests that several key factors can shed light on the underlying causes of the division regarding climate change. These factors include Balance, Reactance, Essence of the problem, Adherence to ingroup norms, and Knowledge. The author also employs this framework to propose strategies for reducing climate change polarization and outline potential avenues for future research. Overall, this review can help policy makers, practitioners, and academics in their endeavors to increase sustainable behavior across the political spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review provides a brief introduction and examination of Hou Li's book Building for Oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State. It highlights the historical background of the book, identifies its research questions and summarizes its key themes. The review concludes with a discussion of the book's distinctive contributions and critiques that may further enrich the analysis or inspire future book projects on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does right‐wing populism affect public preferences for foreign development aid spending across the liberal/conservative ideological spectrum? This research examines the complex interplay between exposure to right‐wing populist messages targeting aid and political ideology at the mass level in Germany, the United States (U.S.), and the United Kingdom (UK) with data from original survey experiments. First, the experiments indicate that populist rhetoric reduces public support for foreign aid across all countries albeit to varying degrees. Second, the moderating role of political ideology is variable and complex across the different countries. In Germany, populist anti‐aid messages reduce support among voters on the center of the ideological spectrum and among those without clear ideological preferences. In the U.S., anti‐aid messages affect those on the left. In the UK, the effect of populist anti‐aid rhetoric surprisingly does not vary cross ideological groups. Our results have implications for the prospects of public support for development cooperation in the shadow of populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the concept of participatory regulation, this study emphasizes recognizing the multidimensional character of citizens' risk regulation preferences. Using the case of autonomous vehicles, we specify six technology‐related risks: product safety, regulatory oversight, legal liability, ethical prioritization, data protection, and human supervision. We argue that differences in these multidimensional risk regulation preferences are shaped by citizens' political beliefs, technology attitudes, and national innovation cultures. To test these hypotheses, a conjoint experiment was conducted in the United States (1188 participants), Japan (1135 participants), and Germany (1174 participants) in which respondents compared hypothetical regulation regimes for self‐driving cars, varying alongside the six regulatory risk dimensions. The findings show a universal preference for increased legal responsibility of manufacturers and more stringent safety regulations for autonomous vehicles. Political beliefs and technological attitudes had minimal impact on these preferences. Although there were some cultural differences in privacy and ethical prioritization, no systematic differences were noted across countries, suggesting the possibility of finding common ground in standardizing risk regulations for self‐driving cars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 pandemic has divided societies, especially regarding vaccine mandates. While research suggests that political ideology plays a crucial role in whether people support or oppose COVID‐19 countermeasures, the relationship between these attitudes and political ideology remains unclear, with varying results across different countries. The present research focuses on right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) in Germany, examining its role as a predictor. Prior studies highlight that, conservatives and right‐wing authoritarians, particularly in the USA, tend to hold more negative attitudes toward COVID‐19 countermeasures despite RWA's usual association with unwavering support for state authorities. Therefore, the present survey study (N = 1063) investigated whether trust in politics and science moderates this relationship. Contrary to expectations, the findings revealed that RWA consistently predicted support for vaccine mandates independent of trust levels. Results are discussed about the specifics of the German case and more general relationships between political ideology and the support of state authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sovereignism is said to be on the rise: defending a nation's political autonomy, international borders, and cultural identity and protecting the domestic economy from the perils of globalisation are core demands. What about Latin America? To what extent are sovereignist claims a key component of Latin American parties' platforms and rhetoric? How do these vary according to national contexts and ideological foundations? Is sovereignism truly novel in the region? This article, relying on qualitative analyses of party manifestos from six different countries, as well as on data from the Manifesto Project, aims to map Latin American sovereignism in its different dimensions (political, economic, cultural, international) according to country and party families. As our data show, claims for defending or achieving ‘sovereignty’ are a key component of the (mostly left‐wing) populist idiolect in the region. The Latin American extreme right tends to adopt a sovereignist rhetoric to justify a traditional pro‐market agenda. The article overall calls for a problematisation of the concept of ‘sovereignism’ by proposing a stronger cross‐regional perspective. There are different ‘varieties of sovereignism’ depending on whether state sovereignty is primarily viewed as something to be restored or, alternatively, to be achieved (as is the case in South America). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of a diverse media landscape grappling with an increasingly stringent political climate, this study asks whether the Chinese government's media-control policies shape public opinion. Drawing on online survey data collected between 2014 and 2018 and using regression models and inverse probability weighting, I find that in 2017, as Xi Jinping began his second term as general secretary, there was a noticeable conservative shift in the political attitudes of the Chinese public. While foreign media might have reduced support for the Chinese Communist Party's stance and ideology among those with less exposure to the party-state media, state propaganda did shift public attitudes, offsetting the impact of foreign media. These findings underscore the Party's effectiveness in using media censorship and propaganda to consolidate its legitimacy in the ideological sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceived economic inequality is positively associated with public support for policies to reduce it. However, providing information about economic inequality does not necessarily motivate people to support redistributive policies. This inconsistency may be due to how people interpret the information about inequality. We argue that the interpretation of information about inequality differs between individuals as a function of the characteristics of the source and people's ideologies. We conducted two experiments using an exploratory (N = 239) and confirmatory (N = 707) strategy. We found that attitudes toward redistribution increased when a seemingly neutral international institution (as opposed to a left-wing political party) provided information about economic inequality due to the credibility attributed to the source—but not due to power and familiarity. Moreover, the effect of providing information about inequality on support for redistribution (via source credibility) depended on people's ideologies: it was positive and statistically significant for people who held more (vs. less) system-justifying beliefs. These findings contribute to understanding the interplay between social psychological processes, communication strategies, and attitudes toward redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined how potential job candidates react to a hiring organization that requests diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) statements, which conservatives in the United States and elsewhere have criticized as being unrelated to job function and inappropriately political or ideological. Across three studies (two of which were pre‐registered), we compared reactions to requests for DEI (vs. teamwork or conservative values) statements as a function of race (Black vs. White), political conservatism and symbolic racism (Total N = 1108). When a DEI (vs. teamwork or politically conservative values) statement was requested, participants who were more (vs. less) conservative perceived the organization as less just, expressed less interest in the job, and expected poorer person‐organization fit, even when a job‐related rationale was provided. Further, participants who were more (vs. less) conservative evaluated a request for a statement consistent with conservative values more favourably. Thus, criticisms that DEI statements are overly political are not applied to other statements that might elicit similar concerns. Moreover, an internal meta‐analysis suggested that the relationships of conservatism to justice and interest (but not person‐organization fit) in response to requests for DEI (vs. teamwork) statements were not independent of racism. Findings were consistent with social dominance theory; racism may underlie seemingly race‐neutral backlash to DEI statements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Adab / Al-ādāb is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines whether and how policy entrepreneurs and their interactions with state legislatures influence the adoption and diffusion of a child abuse prevention policy, that is, Erin's Law, across U.S. state legislatures. Employing 8 years of state-level data (2011–2018), we claim that a policy entrepreneur's impact on policy adoption is conditional on the degree of legislative professionalism and the state's political ideology. The event history analysis (EHA) and logistic regression (Logit) analyses reveal that policy entrepreneurs' speaking engagements decrease the time to adoption and increase the likelihood of adoption, and the effect becomes stronger when states' political ideology aligns with the political landscape surrounding the issue. However, our findings did not support the countervailing role of a policy entrepreneur in leveling gaps in the degree of legislative professionalism and ideological preferences across state legislatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the dynamics of public support for international development policies in the United States and South Korea, focusing on the distinctions between normative and substantial support. Normative support is based on agreement with the policy's importance due to shared values or beliefs, while substantial support involves a willingness to allocate resources for implementation. Utilizing surveys and logit analysis, the research highlights the complex interplay between universal factors like political ideology and self-interest and specific factors such as global citizenship. The study finds that a higher sense of global community significantly boosts normative and substantial support. This nuanced analysis offers valuable insights for enhancing public support for international policies, providing critical implications for policy-making and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self‐service technologies are widely used in business, and retailers and service firms invest significant resources to obtain and improve their Self‐Service Technology capabilities. To allocate resources efficiently, it is crucial for firms to predict Self‐Service Technology usage by their customers. However, predictors in the extant literature (e.g., customers' perceptions and personality traits) are not easy to objectively measure or obtain secondary data about. This research proposes and examines political ideology, for which fairly accurate and objective data can be obtained, as a novel predictor of customer Self‐Service Technology usage. In four studies in different contexts, the authors consistently find that political ideology is significantly related to customers' intention to use and actual use of Self‐Service Technologies; Liberals, on average, are found to be significantly more likely to use Self‐Service Technologies compared to conservatives. Moreover, process complexity is identified as a moderator of this effect. In addition, two mediators, customers' need for interaction and customers' perceived control, through which political ideology affects intention to use Self‐Service Technologies are uncovered. The manuscript concludes with a discussion of contributions and practical implications for managers and practitioners as well as avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos.info is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Facultad de Comunicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background In May 2020, news outlets reported misinformation about the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) related to COVID-19. Correcting misinformation about outbreaks and politics is particularly challenging. Affective belief echoes continue to influence audiences even after successful correction. Narrative and emotional flow scholarship suggest that a narrative corrective with a positive ending could reduce belief echoes. Therefore, this study investigated the efficacy of a narrative corrective with a relief ending for correcting misinformation about the CDC. Methods Between 29 May and 4 June 2020, we tested the effectiveness of a narrative to correct this misinformation. Participants in the United States (N  = 469) were enrolled via Qualtrics panels in an online message experiment and randomized to receive a narrative corrective, a didactic corrective or no corrective. Results The narrative corrective resulted in lower endorsement of the misinformation compared with the control and the didactic corrective. The narrative corrective had a positive indirect effect on perceived CDC competence and mask wearing intentions for politically moderate and conservative participants via relief. Conclusions Public health institutions, such as the CDC, should consider utilizing narrative messaging with positive emotion endings to correct misinformation. Narratives better address affective belief echoes, particularly for counter-attitudinal audiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although prior research attributes news media coverage of firms to the alignment of firm behavior with societal expectations of appropriateness, the appropriateness of firm behavior is judged through an ideological lens. Therefore, the influence of a firm's behavior on its news media coverage is likely to be contingent on news organizations' ideology. Focusing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) as the focal firm behavior, we argue that conservative news organizations are less likely to consider CSR an appropriate firm behavior because conservatives view CSR as privileging progressive ideals and as undermining shareholder interests. As such, we hypothesize that compared with other news organizations, conservative news organizations are less likely to cover socially responsible firms positively. This relationship is likely to be strengthened for firms led by conservative chief executive officers and for firms with poor stock market performance. We examined the coverage of the S&P 1500 firms from 2002 through 2011 in U.S. newspapers and found support for our hypotheses that compared with other newspapers, conservative newspapers report less positively about socially responsible firms and that this effect is strengthened for conservative-led firms. In contrast to what we expected, however, we found some evidence that socially responsible firms with a strong stock market performance are, in fact, covered less positively in conservative newspapers. Taken together, our theory and findings contribute to an understanding of how the news media's ideological heterogeneity shapes the relationship between firm behavior (in our case, CSR) and news media coverage of firms. Funding: Y. Dewan received funding from HEC Foundation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.17237. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to investigate how amplifiers are used in Twitter (now called " X ") during election campaigns. Specifically, the main purpose is to identify the role and engagement of Twitter amplifiers in the 2019 European elections, the visibility of political parties and leaders, and the way in which automated tools are used to manipulate public opinion by influencing voting decisions. The countries considered in the study are two economic powers of Western Europe, France and Germany, as well as two countries of the European South, which are affected by the economic and financial crisis, Greece and Italy. The countries from Southern Europe were included in the sample as they are often used by mass media as political campaign tools. This paper emphasizes the Twitter platform through which the data collection was implemented using the official API of the social networking tool, focusing on the 2019 European elections. We collected data on 88 party leaders and MEP candidates between 10 May and 30 May 2019, as well as on 44,651 accounts that retweeted them. We concluded using 237,813 election-related tweets and used network theory to analyze and visualize the data. The results demonstrate that all political parties use amplifiers to promote their tweets, and some use the same amplifiers between different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do life-course transitions in adulthood shape political orientations? One framework suggests that life events expose people to new information, allowing actors to assess their political beliefs and preferences in response to these social experiences. An alternative framework suggests that the link between one's life-course position and personal politics may be ambiguous, and early experiences should be more informative for political orientations. In this article, I use four household surveys across three countries and 40 items on political beliefs and preferences to test whether lifecourse transitions change one's political orientations. In doing this, I employ difference-in-differences models to identify the effects of six life transitions across family and work domains on a wide variety of propositional survey items. I find that life-course transitions have no substantive influence on political orientations, and the general findings are not sensitive to differences in political interest or the age at which individuals experience these life events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do life-course transitions in adulthood shape political orientations? One framework suggests that life events expose people to new information, allowing actors to assess their political beliefs and preferences in response to these social experiences. An alternative framework suggests that the link between one’s life-course position and personal politics may be ambiguous, and early experiences should be more informative for political orientations. In this article, I use four household surveys across three countries and 40 items on political beliefs and preferences to test whether lifecourse transitions change one’s political orientations. In doing this, I employ difference-in-differences models to identify the effects of six life transitions across family and work domains on a wide variety of propositional survey items. I find that life-course transitions have no substantive influence on political orientations, and the general findings are not sensitive to differences in political interest or the age at which individuals experience these life events.

Research Summary: This article examines the association between ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. In particular, it focuses on the ideological alignment between a firm's upper echelons and its general employees. We theorize that participation in progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both the top management team and general employees. By examining firm participation in letter campaigns supporting progressive causes, our findings indicate that ideological alignment between a top management teams and general employees' liberal political leanings is associated with a firm's participation in progressive corporate activism. The CEO's own ideological preferences do not have an independent association with this kind of activism. This article concludes with a discussion of implications for our understanding of corporate political action and nonmarket strategy. Managerial Summary: This article looks at the relationship between political ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. Although some have argued that firms' activism reflects a CEO's ideological preferences or employee activism, we find that neither explanation fully accounts for the kinds of companies that engage in this kind of activism. We find that progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both top management and general employees. Our findings suggest that companies that have ideological alignment on progressive issues are more likely to take public stands on those issues because the stands reinforce core values held by employees and the top management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While existing consumer research on political ideology often focuses on ideological differences in preferences for high-status, typically observably superior products, little is known about how political ideology may shape preferences for observably inferior products in non-status-signaling domains. Observably inferior products are product options that are dominated by alternatives along observable dimensions. We propose that, in non-status-signaling domains, conservatives are more interested in observably inferior products than liberals. This happens because conservatives (vs. liberals) have a stronger belief that things, including products, are in balance, whereby positives offset negatives. As a result, when presented with observably inferior products, conservatives (vs. liberals) are more likely to engage in compensatory reasoning and attribute positive qualities to these products, boosting their appeal. Activating belief in balance and preventing compensatory reasoning through cognitive load attenuate this effect. Salience of status-signaling motives serves as a boundary condition. Five studies and four follow-ups provide converging evidence using data collected in the laboratory and in the field, hypothetical and actual product choices, a variety of product categories and participant populations. These findings contribute to research on political ideology, compensatory inferences, and inferior products and provide insights with respect to managing product manufacturing, inventory, and waste. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seung Yeon Lee,1,2 Ji Hye Ham,3 Hyun-Kyung Park,4 Deok Hyun Jang,5 Won Mo Jang6,7 1Department of Administration, Seoul National University Hospital, Seoul, South Korea; 2Office of External Affairs, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 3Seoul Public Health Research Institute, Seoul Medical Center, Seoul, South Korea; 4Health Insurance Research Institute, National Health Insurance Service, Wonju, South Korea; 5Research Analytics & Communications, Gallup Korea, Seoul, South Korea; 6Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 7Department of Health Policy and Management, Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, South KoreaCorrespondence: Won Mo Jang, Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government – Seoul National University Boramae Medical Center, Seoul, 07061, South Korea, Tel +82-2-870-2165, Email thomasj@snu.ac.krPurpose: After the declaration by the World Health Organization signaling the conclusion of the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries lifted mandatory mask-wearing regulations. This study aimed to investigate factors such as risk perception and political ideology associated with continued adherence to mask-wearing among specific populations, particularly when it is no longer deemed necessary.Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study including a sample of 1001 respondents stratified by sex, age (≥ 18 years), and region from January 31 to February 2, 2023, after the mandatory mask regulation was lifted in South Korea. Multivariate logistic regression models were applied to estimate the relationships between risk perceptions, political ideology, and mask-wearing maintenance, adjusting for factors such as sex, age, occupation, and trust in the government.Results: Our results indicated significant associations between age, self-reported household economic status, political ideology, affective risk perception, and perceived effectiveness of the government’s COVID-related measures with indoor mask-wearing. Specifically, liberals were more likely to keep mask-wearing indoors than conservatives (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 2.19; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.33– 3.59); and those who perceived a greater affective risk of COVID-19 (aOR: 2.47; 95% CI: 1.96– 3.10), along with those who perceived the government’s countermeasures as inadequate, were more inclined to maintain the habit of wearing masks indoors (aOR: 1.90; 95% CI: 1.19– 3.03).Conclusion: Our study highlighted the multifaceted factors influencing mask-wearing behavior in the post-COVID-19 era. Even after adjusting for various confounding factors, such as age, sex, and trust in the government, an association remained between affective risk perception, political ideology, and mask-wearing behavior. However, further research for psychological mechanisms is needed to foster a culture of preventive behaviors proportional to the risk of infection.Keywords: risk perception, mask-wearing behaviors, political ideology

This multi-wave study examined associations between political left-right ideology and attitudes towards Israel in Germany measured at the end of October and beginning of November 2023, as well as at the end of April and beginning of May 2024. Consistent with horseshoe theory, a curvilinear ∩-shaped relation was hypothesised between political left-right ideology (coded based on party preferences) and attitudes towards Israel. Data came from a large sample of more than 600 employed individuals in Germany, and results supported the hypothesis. The findings provide support for horseshoe theory following the October 7 terrorist attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study expands previous research that explored why conservative jurors are more punitive towards criminal defendants than their liberal counterparts, by examining criminal justice orientations as another potential mediator between political ideology and punitiveness. An experiment was conducted based on a sample of 433 juror eligible adults recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After reading one of the two randomly assigned criminal trial scenarios that varied the strength of critical evidence, participants rendered a verdict and recommended a sentence. Results showed that individuals with more conservative attitudes were more likely to support a guilty verdict and harsher sentences for the defendant. Relationships were largely explained by individuals’ criminal justice orientations or value commitment regarding criminal justice operations. Results show that individuals’ endorsement of different criminal justice orientations may be an important mechanism underlying the link between conservatism and juror punitiveness. Findings, implications, and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does global integration affect environmental activism? I develop a theoretical argument which highlights that global integration’s effect is conditional on political ideology. Countries’ integration in the world society leads to diffusion of environmental attitudes. However, people’s political ideology restrains this positive effect. The assumed incompatibility between economic prosperity and environmental reform exerts a strong influence on attitudes of right-leaning individuals, who end up acting less for promoting environmental protection. I test this argument using multilevel model techniques on data from 35 European countries from 1980 to 2020. The results support my argument and show that global integration has an effect only on left-leaning individuals. In light of these results, the paper offers insights on the expansion of the environmental divide – ‘action gap’ – among individuals with different ideologies. The study also highlights how concerns about environmental consequences are still linked to an ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the role of political parties in policy accumulation. We study this relationship in the area of social policy. Our analysis builds on a large data set covering the size of policy portfolios (policy targets and instruments) in three subfields of social policy for 22 OECD countries over 30 years. We find that the probability of social policy accumulation is not affected by the government's ideological position. Left governments do not produce more extensive social policy portfolios than right ones. Yet, this striking result does not contradict governments' political ideologies, as left and right parties accumulate for different reasons. While left parties address new social policy targets to broaden the scope of the welfare state, right parties adopt new policy instruments to condition social benefits. These findings hold regardless of how we measure governments' ideological position and despite strong endogenous policy growth dynamics, that is, countries with greater policy portfolios also display higher levels of policy accumulation. Our findings indicate that party political considerations can explain the reasons for but not the level of policy accumulation. Changes in government are thus unlikely to stall or slow down the constant accumulation of public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the push and pull between pro-diversity advocates and conservative resistance, most organizations have implemented diversity initiatives in an effort to promote equitable and fair organizational practices. Past work has shown that these diversity initiatives may not be as effective as expected and may instead result in unintended negative consequences for the very individuals they are meant to support. In three novel experiments (total N = 3,664), we investigated whether and when the presence of pro-diversity messages in organizational job recruitment materials might facilitate versus hinder the hiring of underrepresented racial minorities. Participant race and political ideology were also investigated as predictors of hiring recommendations. Findings indicate that pro-diversity messages facilitate politically motivated hiring bias. Specifically, in the presence of pro-diversity messages, White and some Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC) conservatives tend to display a pro-White shift in their hiring recommendations, whereas liberals tend to display a pro-minority shift. The present research underscores the importance of organizational awareness regarding the potential for hiring managers to react, whether consciously or subconsciously, against pro-diversity efforts because of political ideology. The present research also highlights the need for organizations to move beyond just espousing pro-diversity values and actually investigate the impact diversity initiatives have on hiring, retention, and promotion of diverse employees. Public Significance Statement: The present research integrated theory from social, political, and industrial/organizational psychology to investigate the impact of pro-diversity messages on hiring decisions in the workplace. Findings revealed that the presence of diversity cues elicit politically motivated decision making, leading White and some BIPOC conservatives to make more pro-White hiring recommendations and leading liberals to make more pro-Black hiring recommendations. The findings highlight how diversity cues can ironically promote—rather than curtail—inequality, particularly among conservatives. The present research suggests that organizations should consider different approaches depending on the political climate and ideology of their managers, such as preventing demographic information from being disclosed during the hiring process or adding diversity-related metrics to performance evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular press and academic articles alike suggest that political orientation is a primary determinant of vaccination willingness, vaccination, and vaccine word-of-mouth (i.e., sharing of information regarding vaccines). In the current article, we test the validity of these suggestions, and we also assess the differential roles of political ideology (e.g., liberal-conservative) and party affiliation (e.g., Democrat-Republican) as well as the mediating effect of vaccine hesitancy's dimensions. To do so, we perform a four-wave survey study with 223 participants that completed all waves. Our results support that political orientation indeed relates to our outcomes of interest. Our results also show that political ideology has a more pronounced effect than party affiliation, and the vaccine hesitancy dimensions of Health Risks and Healthy mediate many of these relations. From these results, we suggest many directions for future research and practice, including the integration of political discourse theories in studies on political orientations and vaccination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We add depth and breadth to the study of the childhood personality–adult ideology link with additional data, measures, and measurement approaches. Background: Past research in (political) psychology has put forward that individual differences in psychological needs shape ideology. Most evidence supporting this claim is cross‐sectional. Two previous longitudinal studies showed preliminary evidence that childhood personality traits linked to negativity bias correlate with political ideology in adulthood, yet these studies have limitations. Methods: We report the results from two longitudinal studies (combined N = 13,822) conducted in the United Kingdom that measure childhood personality (5–11 years old) and political ideology from puberty (age 16) to early (age 26) and middle adulthood (age 42). Results: We find very weak and inconsistent evidence that childhood personality traits related to negativity bias are directly associated with general conservatism, social conservatism, or economic conservatism across different stages of adulthood. Across the board, Bayes Factors most often indicate strong evidence for the null hypothesis. Conclusion: We offer evidence that the results of previous research are not as robust or as consistent as scholars in the extant literature presume. Our findings call for more, not less, research on the link between childhood personality and political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how individual and situational factors within the social media environment influence different types of news sharing, namely, informative, relational, and expressive sharing. Methodologically, this study uses survey data collected from a representative sample of South Korean media users by Nielsen Company Korea. We found the differential role individual and situational factors play in different types of social media news sharing. Our results offer a clearer portrait of how and why people share news via social media where the characteristics of both news stories and audiences are just one piece of the puzzle that determines news sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worldwide, Likert scales are used to measure ideology of both public opinion and individual voters, with the utilization of a self-assessment numerical scale as the most widely accepted tool, despite the multifaceted nature of the concept. However, in contrast to this prevailing consensus, there is a lack of agreement regarding what particular scale should be used and about the benefits of the different scales. This paper seeks to provide insights into these questions by analysing Spanish public opinion ideology as measured by CIS surveys. In 1976, the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS), a leading public body for studies of Spanish society, defined the ideological self-placement scale as being from 1 to 10. Since then, a myriad of different scales has been applied by CIS in more than 1400 surveys (over 3.5 million interviews). In total, we identify 20 scales in studies with available microdata, with the number rising to 28 when all the CIS studies carried out are included. This research identifies which scale is used in each study and analyses whether this has an effect on the estimation of the ideological distribution of the population. After studying, from an empirical perspective, the relationship structures between the different scales, we conclude that the scale used does have an effect. We finish the paper by offering clear guidelines on how questionnaires related to ideology should be asked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that societal threats often increase ideological support for the social system, but the attitudinal effects of COVID‐19 seem to have varied greatly. Here we present the results of a natural experiment involving New York City college students (Total N = 1300 observations). One group (n = 835) completed questionnaires before the onset of COVID‐19, while another completed them afterward (n = 465). Shortly after COVID (within 3 months of the outbreak), students scored higher on general system justification than before; this effect was driven by political conservatives. At the same time, students scored lower on economic system justification and right‐wing authoritarianism after COVID (vs. before); these effects emerged later (4–5 months after the outbreak) and were driven by liberals. A subsample completed the same questionnaires both before and after COVID‐19 (n = 107), enabling us to investigate intraindividual change. The within‐participants analysis revealed that students exhibited an increase in general system justification and a decrease in economic system justification, which was driven by those who exhibited a liberal shift. Together, these results indicate that the ideological effects of the pandemic and the governmental response to it were complex and polarizing, with liberals and conservatives moving in opposite directions at different times and on different attitudinal dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research suggests that disease outbreaks drive prejudice towards minorities as they increase economic and disease threats. Based on an open-ended survey question distributed to 7,902 German residents over the course of one year of the Covid-19 pandemic (April 2020 to April 2021), we investigate the link between life-threatening events and ethno-racial prejudice. We find that pandemic-related threats only drive respondents' tendency to scapegoat ethno-racial groups if they hold left and center leaning ideologies. However, for far-right supporters who are the most likely to attribute the spread of Covid-19 to ethno-racial groups, pandemic-related threats do not affect that attribution. We further find that threat theories are of limited relevance for explaining which ethno-racial groups are targeted: respondents held Chinese accountable at the beginning of the pandemic but quickly shifted their attention to immigrants – a salient figure in pre-Covid-19 rightist rhetoric. We show that ideology, more than pandemic-induced threat, continues to drive prejudice and demonstrate the under-utilized advantages of using open-ended survey questions for understanding the dynamics of intergroup prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of chief executive officers (CEOs) speaking out on contested social issues is a recent one, as CEO sociopolitical activism was seen as overly risky, and even taboo, for most of American business history. Yet, CEOs are increasingly choosing sides in societal debates despite the inherent risk of alienating stakeholders who disagree with the CEO's stance. Even more puzzlingly, conservative CEOs sometimes espouse liberal stances in such debates, which runs counter to the otherwise consistent evidence in the upper echelons literature that CEOs are guided by their own values in their actions. Our study addresses this paradox by examining the antecedents of CEO liberal activism, with an emphasis on the interplay between the CEO's ideology and the prevailing ideological tilt of the employee population in driving CEOs' activism decisions. Drawing on the concept of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, we theorize that a pronounced organizational ideology constrains a CEO's ability to act in accordance with their own values—particularly in the highly symbolic domain of activism. We also argue that conservative CEOs are relatively more focused on instrumental rationales for activism, whereas liberal CEOs tend to prioritize more intrinsic rationales, a consequence of which is that conservative CEOs more heavily weight organizational ideology in their activism decisions. We test our theory in the context of a highly publicized letter signed by nearly 100 CEOs of public companies in opposition to North Carolina's controversial 2016 "bathroom bill." Relying on a variety of novel data sources, we find robust support for our theory. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.17160. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]