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The objective of this paper is to explore the political implications of the Covid-19 pandemic in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Studies displayed that although these governments varied in their initial response to the pandemic, all three underwent a uniform experience as to its broader effect of amplified authoritarianism. The public health crisis was utilized as a pretext to consolidate autocratic power, suppress regime criticism, and restrict the political rights and freedoms of citizens. Of particular concern were implications on media and civil society organizational efforts, statuses of detainees, ethnic minority rights, and freedoms of assembly and speech. This paper is an in-depth case analysis that uses policy analysis and process tracing to examine the Central Asian countries’ response to Covid-19 and its effects on human rights and political freedoms in the named countries. It concludes that despite the changes in leadership and relative progress towards democratization, authoritarian patterns ensued and changed form during the pandemic period in these Central Asian countries.

In the global hegemonic resilience discourse, green infrastructure is projected as a “win-win” approach to urban planning. Following the trend of adopting resilience as the new silver bullet for urban development, and in the midst of the recent financial crisis, Thessaloniki, Greece, joined the 100 Resilient Cities network of the Rockefeller Foundation in 2014. This event marked a shift in the city’s public space production and governance programme, introducing new private actors in decision-making processes, an emphasis on green space economic benefits, and an extensive regeneration programme heavily focused on the city centre. The article scrutinises these changes to uncover the policy implications of the turn to resilience in green public space production. Based on data on green public space spatial distribution; semi-structured interviews with municipal representatives and senior employees and representatives of the government, civil society, and local professional associations; policy document analysis; and comparative analysis of all relevant development and planning documents, and drawing on Brenner and Theodore’s (2005) conceptualisation of neoliberalism, the article argues that greening policies in Thessaloniki form an ongoing enclosing process of the urban green commons that articulates in a threefold manner: their discursive construction as “natural assets,” the implementation of spatially selective policies, and the post-politicisation of decision-making processes.

Bibliographie: Dietz, Kristina: Pandemie trifft Krise(n). COVID-19 in Lateinamerika (Zur Diskussion), PERIPHERIE – Politik • Okonomie • Kultur, 3+4-2020, S. 455-472. https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v40i3-4.14

Although populism does not dictate a coherent ideological or programmatic agenda, some of its elements still leave distinct marks on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This paper argues for the study of populism in its tangible policy impacts and scrutinizes the nexus of populism and foreign policy in contemporary Turkey under President Erdoğan's rule. Despite the abundant references to the 'people' in the populist rhetoric, it identifies personalization in foreign policy decision-making, nationalization in foreign policy implementation, and civilizationalization in the foreign policy discourse. Having established the patterns of populist foreign policy from a wider reading, this study then examines, generally, how populism has informed Turkish foreign policy and, specifically, Turkey's approach to the recent border disputes over the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The enormous growth in house prices in Europe since the 1990s has led to increasing concerns about the affordability of housing for ordinary citizens. This article explores the relationship between housing affordability – house prices relative to incomes – and the demand for redistributive and housing policy, using data drawn from European and British social surveys and an analysis of British elections. It shows that, as unaffordability rises, citizens appear in aggregate to become less supportive of redistribution, interventionist housing policy and left-wing parties. However, this aggregate rise, driven by the predominance of homeowners in most European countries, masks a growing polarization in preferences between renters and owners in less affordable regions.

Welche Folgen Corona für die internationale Ordnung haben könnte, hängt auch vom Zusammenspiel expertenfreundlicher und expertisefeindlicher Regime ab.

Brexit talks have entered extra time. If the UK is to leave the EU in an orderly manner, it needs a deal in the next four weeks. The trouble is that, as the prospect of leaving becomes more concrete, the government has finally recognized that it needs to honor the promises it has made to voters. Prime Minister Boris Johnson is struggling to reconcile his vague pledges with real world constraints - both internationally and domestically.

Es scheint, dass weniger die Frage Demokratie versus Autokratie, sondern der Grad der Staatlichkeit und die Kohäsion der Gesellschaft darüber entscheiden, wie gut ein Land aus der COVID-19 Krise herauskommt.

What to expect from the political fallout of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic? Three lessons learned from the Great Recession hit Europe in 2008.

Es braucht intelligente Digitalisierung, damit eine Demokratie in der Pandemie handlungsfähig bleiben kann.

Scholarship on US foreign policy regularly claims that US democracy promotion policy is informed by a coherent and harmonious set of basic premises. In this article, I first examine the validity of this claim for US post–Cold War administrations. I find operational in US foreign policy rhetoric three stable premises: that democracy is a universal(ly aspired to) principle, that external democracy promoters are legitimately involving themselves in another country's political affairs, and that this policy endeavor is in the best interest of all involved stakeholders. Following theoretical expectations that culture and cultural aspects are relatively stable and adaptable entities and promote stability in behavior, I then pursue the question of how these premises have fared in an environment particularly challenging to their validity, namely in the case of US democracy promotion in Egypt. I show how, even in light of contradictory evidence, the basic premises remain resilient and function as a discursive structure that enables and constrains policy options.

The worsening violence between Farmers and Nomadic herdsmen in Nigeria has remained an issue of concern on the laundry list of the Nigerian State, policy makers, security agencies, International bodies as well as Social science scholars. While conflict is considered a normal and inevitable outcome of human relationships, the concern here is the devastating socio-economic, political and environmental implications of the conflict between these two livelihood groups as well as its impact on national development. Whereas a number of factors have been adduced for this growing violence ranging from climatic transformations, deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification, soil degradation; political and ethnic strife; breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; proliferation of arms in the country and a dysfunctional legal regime that neglects justice; this paper, relying on the demographic theory of conflict, demonstrates how population overshoot in Nigeria explicate the new violent and widespread dimensions of the Farmers-Herders conflict. This paper, relying on the Demographic theory of conflict, argues that among the various causes of the Farmers-Herders conflict, the exponential growth of Nigeria’s population and the inability of the Nigerian State to meet the needs of the populace, contributes to the endless contest for space and property in the country, referred to in this paper as ‘population induced warfare’. In line with this thesis, this paper recommends that Nigeria as a country should begin to pay serious attention to the costs and impacts of population growth and create accordingly, rights-based population policies that adapts Nigeria’s population strength to a positive force for sustainable development.

ERC POLCON project funded.

ERC POLCON project funded.

This paper examines the impact of regional sanctions on the trajectory of the Burundian regime following the 1996 coup. Despite the country's socioeconomic and geopolitical vulnerability, the Buyoya government initially withstood the pressure from sanctions. Through a vocal campaign against these measures, the new government mitigated the embargo's economic consequences and partially re-established its international reputation. Paradoxically, this campaign planted the seed for long-term comprehensive political concessions. While previous literature has attributed the embargo's success to its economic impact, the government actually responded to the sanction senders' key demand to engage in unconditional, inclusive peace talks once the economy had already started to recover. Based on a novel framework for studying the signalling dimension of sanctions, I show how the regime's anti-sanctions campaign, with its emphasis on the government's willingness to engage in peace talks, backfired, with Buyoya forced to negotiate after having become entrapped in his own rhetoric.

In vier für die Politik grundlegenden Sphären (Recht, Wahrheit, Gemeinwohl, Gewalt) werden für die Jahre seit 2008 Handlungsmuster der russischen Spitzenelite untersucht und Kontinuitäten aufgezeigt. Ausgehend von den Handlungen werden Grundeinstellungen der Elite in diesen vier Bereichen herausgearbeitet, die sich maßgeblich auf die künftigen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland bzw. der Europäischen Union und Russland auswirken werden. Dabei wird dargelegt, dass die für viele westliche Beobachter überraschenden Handlungen Russlands seit 2014 auf Haltungen beruhen, die sich bereits in früheren Phasen bemerkbar gemacht haben. Insofern lassen sich diese Einstellungen als Teil einer langfristigen politischen Kultur der russischen Elite verstehen. Vor allem die Instrumentalisierung von Recht, Wahrheit und Gewalt in der Innen- und Außenpolitik sowie ein Kontrollbedürfnis, das auf Misstrauen gegenüber externen und internen Akteuren beruht, sind für die heutige russische Spitzenelite charakteristisch. Das Gemeinwohl bzw. das Wohlergehen der russischen Bevölkerung hat keine oder nur eine rein instrumentelle Priorität für die Elite. Bei der Entwicklung eines mittel- bis langfristigen Ansatzes für den Umgang mit Russland sollten deutsche und EU-Akteure diese Grundeinstellungen mitberücksichtigen, weil sie in absehbarer Zukunft die Handlungen zahlreicher Vertreterinnen und Vertreter der russischen Elite prägen werden. (Autorenreferat)

Brussels and London are gearing up for the Brexit negotiations. Prime Minister Theresa May delivered her Brexit speech and the Supreme Court ruled that the UK Parliament has to give its assent. The British government is still planning to declare that the UK intends to leave the EU by the end of March 2017. But how will the Brexit negotiations unfold? Valentin Kreilinger, Sophia Becker and Laura Maria Wolfstädter systematize the next steps in the process and examine the individual procedural requirements in order to analyse the legal and institutional context of Article 50 TEU.

This study examines behavioural patterns of the top echelons of Russia’s elite within four fundamental spheres (law, truth, public welfare and violence) since 2008 and discovers certain continuities. It reveals the elite's fundamental attitudes in the four areas as evinced by its actions – attitudes which will have a decisive impact on German-Russian and EU-Russia relations in the future. The study shows that Russia’s actions since 2014 - which have surprised many Western observers - are based on attitudes that were already perceptible before then. These attitudes can thus be considered part of the Russian elite's long-standing political culture. Today, it is the instrumentalisation of law, truth and violence in foreign and domestic politics, and a desire for control derived from mistrust in external and internal actors, that especially characterise Russia’s elite. The common good or well-being of the Russian people is not a priority for the elite, or only in purely instrumental terms. Politicians and policymakers in Germany and the EU need to take these fundamental attitudes into account when developing a medium- to long-term approach to Russia because they will shape the actions of numerous members of the Russian elite for the foreseeable future. (author's abstract)

Nach wie vor bedauert die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, dass Großbritannien die EU verlassen wird. 53 Prozent der deutschen Bevölkerung wäre es lieber gewesen, wenn Großbritannien sich dafür entschieden hätte, Mitglied in der EU zu bleiben. Lediglich 31 Prozent sehen den Brexit positiv. Im Vergleich zu der Reaktion unmittelbar nach dem britischen Plebiszit ist jedoch das Bedauern zurückgegangen, während positive Bewertungen zunehmen. Im Juli waren lediglich 26 Prozent überzeugt, dass es für die EU durchaus Vorteile hat, wenn Großbritannien ausscheidet, aktuell 31 Prozent. Gegenläufig ist der Anteil, der ein anderes Votum Großbritanniens bevorzugt hätte, von 58 auf 53 Prozent zurückgegangen.

Die britische Entscheidung, die Europäische Union infolge eines Volksentscheids zu verlassen, ist nicht zwangsläufig der Anfang vom Ende der EU. Die Bundeskanzlerin warnte in ihrer Regierungserklärung davor, schnelle und einfache Schlüsse aus dem Ergebnis zu ziehen - und rief stattdessen dazu auf, Ruhe und Besonnenheit walten zu lassen. "Keep calm and carry on" heißt ein geflügeltes Wort der Briten - ruhig bleiben und weitermachen. Wie kann dieses Weitermachen aussehen, wenn die restliche EU hier vor einem zweifachen Dilemma steht?

Brasiliens bisherige Präsidentin Dilma Rousseff ist vorläufig suspendiert. Dem Amtsenthebungsverfahren, das vom Parlament des Landes eingeleitet wurde, hat mittlerweile auch der Senat zugestimmt. Diese Zäsur bedeutet zugleich einen Schlusspunkt für das außenpolitische Programm eines Landes, das seit dem Amtsantritt von Rousseffs Vorgänger, Luiz Inacio »Lula« da Silva, immer wieder Anspruch auf eine weltpolitische Gestaltungsrolle erhoben hat. Angesichts der innenpolitischen Blockade wird Brasilien bis auf weiteres als maßgeblicher globaler und regionaler Akteur ausfallen. Die Folge ist, dass andere linksorientierte Regierungen in Lateinamerika eine wichtige Stütze verlieren. Venezuela, Bolivien und Ecuador sind zunehmend auf sich allein gestellt. Die Solidarität dieser Führungen ist gebrochen; in der Region kämpft die Linke um ihr politisches Überleben. Zugleich haben sich die USA in Lateinamerika zurückgemeldet. Washingtons Beziehungen mit Kuba wurden normalisiert, und Präsident Obama sucht demonstrativ die Nähe zur neuen Regierung Argentiniens. Die Anzeichen verdichten sich, dass die politischen Gewichte in der Region neu verteilt werden. Deutschland und Europa sollten sich rechtzeitig darauf einstellen. (Autorenreferat)