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Abstract The Indonesian government through the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 11 of 2019 regarding the Second Amendment to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 25 of 2018 regarding Mineral and Coal Mining has decided to accelerate the implementation of nickel ore exports starting from January 1, 2020. This regulation is considered to violate the General Elimination of Quantitative Restriction in Article XI of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and is being sued by the European Union to the WTO DSB. This article analyzes the scope of Article XI of the GATT and the conformity of the regulation on the ban on the export of nickel ore with justification in the GATT regulatory framework. This article uses a normative juridical approach, with the research done by examining library materials and secondary data. This research is a descriptive-analytical study that analyzes legal instruments related to the issues discussed, to deliver a comprehensive and systematic comprehension of the scope and application of the Quantitative Restriction Principle. This article also shows DSB WTO interpretation on Quantitative Restriction cases is still considered narrow and overrides the goals and rights of a country. Abstrak Pemerintah Indonesia melalui Peraturan Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral No. 11 Tahun 2019 tentang Perubahan kedua atas Peraturan Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral No. 25 tahun 2018 tentang Pengusahaan Pertambangan dan Mineral Batubara (Permen ESDM 11/2019) memutuskan untuk memberhentikan kegiatan ekspor bijih nikel mulai dari tanggal 1 Januari 2020. Peraturan ini dianggap melanggar Prinsip Restriksi Kuantitatif dalam Pasal XI General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dan dituntut oleh Uni Eropa kepada Dispute Settlement Body World Trade Organization (DSB WTO). Artikel ini menganalisa mengenai ruang lingkup dari Pasal XI GATT dan kesesuaian regulasi larangan ekspor bijih nikel dengan justifikasi dalam kerangka peraturan GATT. Artikel ini menggunakan metode pendekatan yuridis normatif, yakni penelitian hukum yang dilakukan melalui penelitian bahan pustaka serta data sekunder. Penelitian ini bersifat deskriptif analitis yang menganalisa instrument-instrumen hukum terkait, untuk memberikan pemahaman secara menyeluruh dan sistematis terhadap ruang lingkup dan pemberlakuan Prinsip Restriksi Kuantitatif. Artikel ini juga menunjukan bahwa, interpretasi dari panel DSB WTO terhadap suatu kasus masih ternilai sempit dan mengesampingkan tujuan serta hak suatu negara.

This study analyzes the economic consequences of reduced antimicrobial use for Danish pig producers. From estimated profit functions, shadow prices of antimicrobials were derived for different groups of farms. Results suggest that the average pig farmer's access to antimicrobials represents an economic value of around 1.75-4 euro cents for the marginal standard unit dose in the short run on farms with both systematically high and low antimicrobial use but a lower value in the long run, with considerable heterogeneity among farms. Restrictions on antimicrobial use in pig production are likely to imply losses to parts of the Danish pig sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International trade in used electrical and electronics equipment (UEEE) provides an avenue for socio-economic development in the developing world and also serves as a conduit for transboundary dumping of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) also referred to as electronic waste or e-waste. The latter problem arises from the absence of a regulatory framework for differentiating between functional UEEE and junk e-waste. This has resulted in both functional UEEE and junk e-waste being concurrently shipped to developing countries under the guise of international trade in used electronics. Dealing with these problems will require effective regulation of international trade in UEEE from both exporting and importing countries. Although, the export of e-waste from the European Community to developing countries is currently prohibited, significant amount of e-waste from the region continue to flow into developing countries due to lax regulatory measures in the latter. Hence, there is need for a regulatory regime in developing countries to complement the prohibitory regime in the major e-waste source countries. This paper proposes trade measures modelled in line with WTO rules which could be adopted by developing countries in addressing these problems. The proposed measures include the development of a compulsory certification and labelling system for functional UEEE as well as trade ban on commercial importation of UEEE not complying with the said certification and labelling system. The paper then goes further to examine these proposed measures in the light of WTO rules and jurisprudence.

International trade in used electrical and electronics equipment (UEEE) provides an avenue for socio-economic development in the developing world and also serves as a conduit for transboundary dumping of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) also referred to as electronic waste or e-waste. The latter problem arises from the absence of a regulatory framework for differentiating between functional UEEE and junk e-waste. This has resulted in both functional UEEE and junk e-waste being concurrently shipped to developing countries under the guise of international trade in used electronics. Dealing with these problems will require effective regulation of international trade in UEEE from both exporting and importing countries. Although, the export of e-waste from the European Community to developing countries is currently prohibited, significant amounts of e-waste from the region continue to flow into developing countries due to lax regulatory measures in the latter. Hence, there is a need for a regulatory regime in developing countries to complement the prohibitive regime in the major e-waste source countries. This paper proposes trade measures modelled in line with WTO rules that could be adopted by developing countries in addressing these problems. The proposed measures include the development of a compulsory certification and labelling system for functional UEEE as well as trade ban on commercial importation of UEEE not complying with the said certification and labelling system. The paper then goes further to examine these proposed measures in the light of WTO rules and jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The digestive response of the young rabbit to a short-term (28–53days) limitation of its voluntary intake (25%) was analysed according to age and in relation to the incidence of digestive troubles. Several physico–chemical parameters of the caecal biotope were studied in relation to the caecal bacterial community structure and diversity, and with other physiological criteria (stomach pH, ileum morphometry and maltase activity). The morphometry of the ileum was significantly affected by age (36 vs. 52days) but not by the intake level, while the relative maltase activity remained unchanged. In the stomach, the pH of antrum and fundus increased by approximately 1/3 between 36 and 52days, and was 31% (P =0.003) and 79% (P <0.001) higher for restricted compared to ad libitum rabbits respectively. However the caecal pH remained unchanged (mean: 5.83). The caecal redox potential increased slightly, by 8 units (P =0.02), when intake was limited, but did not change between 36 and 52days. The caecal bacterial diversity increased with age (4.8 vs. 5.2, P =0.014) while bacterial structure was modified. Limiting the intake for 16days did not modify the structure or the diversity of the bacterial community. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

One of the most interesting debates in economics is about free trade and protectionism. The arguments in favor of both directions are described by the analysis of free trade case and protectionism case. These are based on the economists' thoughts that, on a side, the state should not intervene in international flow of goods and services and, on another side, it should be created a system of tariffs, quotas and export subsidies in order to protect the national economy of each state in report with the foreign competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a simple way for countries to reap the benefits of trade liberalization without exacerbating problems of overexploitation of natural resources. In the context of a Ricardo–Viner dynamic trade model, it is shown that when a binding quantitative restriction regulates extraction of a natural resource, free trade is optimal. This is true even if the quantitative restriction is not optimal. In contrast, in the presence of a suboptimal tax (including a zero tax in the special case of open access) on the use of natural resources, trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By considering the optimal behaviour of illegal migrants who must confront the various enforcement techniques adopted by the host country, we show that an increase in penalties, in travel cost, or in the possibility of detection, would be effective in the ‘qualitative’ objective but not in the ‘quantitative’ objective. Moreover, when a host country starts accepting skilled legal migrants, if the required skill level is relatively low and the possibility of detection is sufficiently high, an increase in penalties will be effective in both objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]