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An economic choice entails computing and comparing the values of individual offers. Offer values are represented in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)-an area that participates in value comparison-but it is unknown where offer values are computed in the first place. One possibility is that this computation takes place in OFC. Alternatively, offer values might be computed upstream of OFC. For choices between edible goods, a primary candidate is the gustatory region of the anterior insula (gustatory cortex, GC). Here we recorded from the GC of male rhesus monkeys choosing between different juice types. As a population, neurons in GC represented the flavor, the quantity, and the subjective value of the juice chosen by the animal. These variables were represented by distinct groups of cells and with different time courses. Specifically, chosen value signals emerged shortly after offer presentation, while neurons encoding the chosen juice and the chosen quantity peaked after juice delivery. Surprisingly, neurons in GC did not represent individual offer values in a systematic way. In a computational sense, the variables encoded in GC follow the process of value comparison. Thus our results argue against the hypothesis that offer values are computed in GC. At the same time, signals representing the subjective value of the expected reward indicate that responses in GC are not purely sensory. Thus neuronal responses in GC appear consummatory in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroeconomics merges neuroscience, economics, and psychology to investigate the neural basis of decision making. Decision making involves assessing outcomes with subjective value, shaped by emotions and experiences, which are crucial in economic decisions. Functional MRI (fMRI) reveals key areas of the brain, including the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, that are involved in subjective value representation. Collaborative interdisciplinary efforts are essential for advancing the field of neuroeconomics, with implications for clinical interventions and policy design. This review explores subjective value in neuroeconomics, highlighting brain regions identified through fMRI studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientists increasingly apply concepts from reinforcement learning to affect, but which concepts should apply? And what can their application reveal that we cannot know from directly observable states? An important reinforcement learning concept is the difference between reward expectations and outcomes. Such reward prediction errors have become foundational to research on adaptive behavior in humans, animals, and machines. Owing to historical focus on animal models and observable reward (e.g., food or money), however, relatively little attention has been paid to the fact that humans can additionally report correspondingly expected and experienced affect (e.g., feelings). Reflecting a broader "rise of affectivism," attention has started to shift, revealing explanatory power of expected and experienced feelings—including prediction errors—above and beyond observable reward. We propose that applying concepts from reinforcement learning to affect holds promise for elucidating subjective value. Simultaneously, we urge scientists to test—rather than inherit—concepts that may not apply directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjective inferences of probability are critical for decisions involving uncertainty. Recent studies have suggested that extreme outcomes bias beliefs about the value of uncertain options toward the best/worst outcome possible when learning the odds through experience, leading to increased preferences for uncertain options over equivaluable sure bets when there is the prospect of gain and, conversely, aversion to uncertain options when there is the prospect of loss. However, prior studies regarding the influence of extreme outcomes on decisions involving uncertainty have only done so using 50/50 gambles, and it was unclear whether extreme outcomes biased probability perception more broadly. Across three pre‐registered experiments, we found that when people made decisions between equivaluable certain and uncertain options, they particularly preferred uncertain options at low probabilities (20%) when there was the prospect of gain and avoided them when there was the prospect of loss, with these preferences being reduced or even reversed at medium (50%) and high (80%) probabilities. We also found that uncertainty preferences were influenced by outcome extremity and the relative certainty associated with safe reference options. We conclude that extreme outcomes accentuate the overweighting of low probabilities and the underweighting of high probabilities in experience‐based choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Testimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between their experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of social scientific and humanistic study. Often discussed in terms of "the disability paradox," these studies contrast the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired states against the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not in fact experience their lives as horrible. Explanations for why such testimonial evidence is suspect range from claims about adaptive preferences to issues of qualitative research methodology. In this paper, I argue that the problem lies not with the evidence, but the intuitions in question. Using the disability paradox as a case study, I further argue against the use of the concept of intuitive horribleness in social epistemology. I contend that testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are baked into most deployments of the concept, and even if one were to justify its use in select cases, it should be accompanied with prima facie suspicion. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of this analysis for the literature on transformative experience and also for the stakes of multi-cultural, historically informed philosophical analyses more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What drives us to search for creative ideas, and why does it feel good to find one? While previous studies demonstrated the positive influence of motivation on creative abilities, how reward and subjective values play a role in creativity remains unknown. This study proposes to characterize the role of individual preferences (how people value ideas) in creative ideation via behavioral experiments and computational modeling. Using the Free Generation of Associates Task coupled with rating tasks, we demonstrate the involvement of valuation processes during idea generation: Preferred ideas are provided faster. We found that valuation depends on the adequacy and originality of ideas and guides response selection and creativity. Finally, our computational model correctly predicts the speed and quality of human creative responses, as well as interindividual differences in creative abilities. Altogether, this model introduces the mechanistic role of valuation in creativity. It paves the way for a neurocomputational account of creativity mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to examine the relationship between competitiveness and co-creation of value in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the pasta sector from La Serena and Coquimbo (Chile). A five-hypothesis relational model is proposed by using structural equations through the partial least squares method. The results show that competitiveness is a consequence of the positive, direct, and indirect influence of the co-creation of value that organizations have with their clients, where its variance is explained by approximately 58%. The perceived value determines 54.2% of the variance of the co-creation of value. It is concluded that it is important to encourage the development of the process of co-creation of value between companies and their clients to attain long-term survival of companies through sustainable development while promoting the pasta sector and the quality of its products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper contributes to the rapidly expanding body of experimental research on transformative decision making, and in the process, marks out a novel empirical interpretation for assessments of subjective value in transformative contexts. We start with a discussion of the role of subjective value in transformative decisions, and then critique extant experimental work that explores this role, with special attention to Reuter and Messerli (2018). We argue that current empirical treatments miss a crucial feature of practical deliberation manifesting across a variety of everyday decisions: often, people attach more weight to decision criteria that they can know—a phenomenon known as the “evaluability bias.” In transformative contexts, if people cannot know the subjective value of an option, they are unlikely to attach it much weight. Despite this, people may care very much about such value. We then use this point to develop and present new empirical results that, in addition to supporting our concerns about evaluability bias, support the hypothesis that people care about subjective value. Our work enriches the current philosophical understanding of transformative decisions and helps to frame the emerging experimental paradigm for the empirical dimensions of the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Vickrey auctions (VA) and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auctions (BDM) are strategically equivalent demand‐revealing mechanisms, differentiated only by a human opponent in the VA, and a random‐number‐generator opponent in the BDM. Game parameters are such that players are incentivized to reveal their private subjective values (SV) and behavior should be identical in both tasks. However, this has been repeatedly shown not to be the case. In this study, the neural correlates of outcome feedback processing during VA and BDM were directly compared using electroencephalography. Twenty‐eight healthy participants bid for household products which were then divided into high‐ and low‐SV categories. The VA included a human opponent deception to induce a social environment, while in reality a random‐number‐generator was used in both tasks. A P3 component peaking at 336 ms over midline parietal sites showed more positive amplitudes for high bid values, and for win outcomes in the VA but not the BDM. Both auctions also elicited a Reward Positivity potential, maximal at 275 ms along the central midline electrodes, that was not modulated by auction task or SV. Further, an exploratory N170 potential in the right occipitotemporal electrodes and a vertex positive potential component were stronger in the VA relative to the BDM. Results point to an enhanced cortical response to bid outcomes during VA task in a potential component associated with emotional control, and to the occurrence of face‐sensitive potentials in VA but not in BDM auction. These findings suggest modulation of bid outcome processing by the social‐competitive aspect of auction tasks. Directly comparing two prominent auction paradigms affords the opportunity to isolate the impact of social environment on competitive, risky decision‐making. Findings suggest that feedback processing as early as 176 ms is facilitated by the presence of a human competitor, and later processing is modulated by social context and subjective value. Directly comparing two prominent auction paradigms affords the opportunity to isolate the impact of social environment on competitive, risky decision‐making. Findings suggest that feedback processing as early as 176 ms is facilitated by the presence of a human competitor, and later processing is modulated by social context and subjective value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neuroeconomics merges neuroscience, economics, and psychology to investigate the neural basis of decision making. Decision making involves assessing outcomes with subjective value, shaped by emotions and experiences, which are crucial in economic decisions. Functional MRI (fMRI) reveals key areas of the brain, including the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, that are involved in subjective value representation. Collaborative interdisciplinary efforts are essential for advancing the field of neuroeconomics, with implications for clinical interventions and policy design. This review explores subjective value in neuroeconomics, highlighting brain regions identified through fMRI studies.

Decisions that require taking effort costs into account are ubiquitous in real life. The neural common currency theory hypothesizes that a particular neural network integrates different costs (e.g., risk) and rewards into a common scale to facilitate value comparison. Although there has been a surge of interest in the computational and neural basis of effort-related value integration, it is still under debate if effort-based decision-making relies on a domain-general valuation network as implicated in the neural common currency theory. Therefore, we comprehensively compared effort-based and risky decision-making using a combination of computational modeling, univariate and multivariate fMRI analyses, and data from two independent studies. We found that effort-based decision-making can be best described by a power discounting model that accounts for both the discounting rate and effort sensitivity. At the neural level, multivariate decoding analyses indicated that the neural patterns of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) represented subjective value across different decision-making tasks including either effort or risk costs, although univariate signals were more diverse. These findings suggest that multivariate dmPFC patterns play a critical role in computing subjective value in a task-independent manner and thus extend the scope of the neural common currency theory.

Research on anger in negotiation suggests that expressing anger can have detrimental effects on the relationship between the parties but may also improve the expresser's economic outcomes, resulting in the use of fake anger (i.e., anger that is expressed but not felt) as a negotiation strategy. Based on research on moral emotions, we argue that fake anger in negotiation will lead to expressers' guilt, which in turn negatively impacts their self-perception and their overall subjective experience of the negotiation. Across three studies (two online and one face-to-face), we consistently demonstrate that fake anger lowers negotiators' feelings about themselves as well as their overall subjective value, and that guilt mediates this effect. We discuss implications of these findings for theory and practice of negotiation and propose an agenda for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lies often go undetected, and we know little about the psychological and relational consequences of successfully deceiving others. While the evidence to date indicates that undetected dishonesty induces positive affect in independent decision contexts, we propose that it may elicit guilt and undermine satisfaction in negotiations despite facilitating better deals for deceivers. Across four studies, we find support for a deceiver's guilt account, whereby dishonesty triggers guilt and lessens negotiators' satisfaction with the bargaining experience. This pattern is robust to several factors, including the size of negotiators' incentives and individual differences in negotiators' moral character. It holds for both lies issued of negotiators' own volition and in compliance with others' orders. Large incentives also exacerbated dishonesty-induced guilt. Further, dissatisfaction stemming from dishonesty-induced guilt had downstream relational consequences. Despite going undetected, dishonesty in a focal negotiation reduced deceivers' likelihood of choosing to interact again with the same counterpart and adversely impacted their satisfaction in future negotiations with that counterpart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The drift-diffusion model (DDM) is widely used and broadly accepted for its ability to account for binary choices (in both the perceptual and preferential domains) and response times (RT), as a function of the stimulus or the choice alternative (or option) values. The DDM is built on an evidence accumulation-to-bound concept, where, in the value domain, a decision maker repeatedly samples the mental representations of the values of the available options until satisfied that there is enough evidence (or support) in favor of one option over the other. As the signals that drive the evidence are derived from value estimates that are not known with certainty, repeated sequential samples are necessary to average out noise. The classic DDM does not allow for different options to have different levels of precision in their value representations. However, recent studies have shown that decision makers often report levels of certainty regarding value estimates that vary across choice options. There is therefore a need to extend the DDM to include an option-specific value certainty component. We present several such DDM extensions and validate them against empirical data from four previous studies. The data support best a DDM version in which the drift of the accumulation is based on a sort of signal-to-noise ratio of value for each option (rather than a mere accumulation of samples from the corresponding value distributions). This DDM variant accounts for the impact of value certainty on both choice consistency and RT present in the empirical data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the core questions in Neuro‐economics is to determine where value is represented. To date, most studies have focused on simple options and identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) as the common value region. We report the findings of an fMRI study in which we asked participants to make pairwise comparisons involving options of varying complexity: single items (Control condition), bundles made of the same two single items (Scaling condition) and bundles made of two different single items (Bundling condition). We construct a measure of choice consistency to capture how coherent the choices of a participant are with one another. We also record brain activity while participants make these choices. We find that a common core of regions involving the left VMPFC, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), regions associated with complex visual processing and the left cerebellum track value across all conditions. Also, regions in the DLPFC, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the cerebellum are differentially recruited across conditions. Last, variations in activity in VMPFC and DLPFC value‐tracking regions are associated with variations in choice consistency. This suggests that value based decision‐making recruits a core set of regions as well as specific regions based on task demands. Further, correlations between consistency and the magnitude of signal change with lateral portions of the PFC suggest the possibility that activity in these regions may play a causal role in decision quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjective value is foundational to decision-making processes and people's sense of happiness. To better represent decision-makers' psychological characteristics when subjective value is formed, we establish an attention-and-reference-dependent subjective value model by simultaneously considering the absolute subjective value, relative subjective value, and attention distribution. Our model provides researchers with a theoretical tool for explaining, predicting, and adjusting decision behaviors. Additionally, to maximize the total experienced subjective value brought by multiple events, we compare hedonic editing strategies and demonstrate that the optimal hedonic editing strategy is sensitive to the stimulus intensity. This stimulus-intensity-sensitive strategy is contrary to the hedonic editing strategy inferred from the prospect theory value function when stimulus intensity is relatively small. The results of this study enrich transaction utility theory and expectation-disconfirmation theory and can guide decision-makers in enhancing happiness by rationally dealing with gains and losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to L. A. Paul (2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge for decision theory, as their subjective value is not epistemically accessible. However, several authors propose that the subjective values of options are often irrelevant to their ranking; in many cases, all we need for rational transformative decision-making are the known non-subjective values. This stance is in conflict with Paul’s argument that the subjective value can always swamp the non-subjective value. The approach presented in this paper takes Paul’s argument into account and shows how potential swamping can be controlled given that one desires the transformative outcome: If one knows from previous decisions that desired transformative outcomes are associated with positive subjective value and if, in addition, testimony confirms this association for the current decision situation, one can infer that a desired outcome’s expected subjective value has a positive valence. Accordingly, one can rationally choose the desired transformative option if its non-subjective value is no lower than the overall value of any other option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In value-based decision making, options are selected according to subjective values assigned by the individual to available goods and actions. Despite the importance of this faculty of the mind, the neural mechanisms of value assignments, and how choices are directed by them, remain obscure. To investigate this problem, we used a classic measure of utility maximization, the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, to quantify internal consistency of food preferences in Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode worm with a nervous system of only 302 neurons. Using a novel combination of microfluidics and electrophysiology, we found that C. elegans food choices fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions for utility maximization, indicating that nematodes behave as if they maintain, and attempt to maximize, an underlying representation of subjective value. Food choices are well-fit by a utility function widely used to model human consumers. Moreover, as in many other animals, subjective values in C. elegans are learned, a process we find requires intact dopamine signaling. Differential responses of identified chemosensory neurons to foods with distinct growth potentials are amplified by prior consumption of these foods, suggesting that these neurons may be part of a value-assignment system. The demonstration of utility maximization in an organism with a very small nervous system sets a new lower bound on the computational requirements for utility maximization and offers the prospect of an essentially complete explanation of value-based decision making at single neuron resolution in this organism.

Motivation is key for performance in domains such as work, sport, and learning. Research has established that motivation and the willingness to invest effort generally increase as a function of reward. However, this view struggles to explain some empirical observations—for example, in the domain of sport, athletes sometimes appear to lose motivation when playing against weak opponents—this despite objective rewards being high. This and similar evidence highlight the role of subjective value in motivation and effort allocation. To capture this, here, we advance a novel theory and computational model where motivation and effort allocation arise from reference-based evaluation processes. Our proposal argues that motivation (and the ensuing willingness to exert effort) stems from subjective value, which in turns depends on one's standards about performance and on the confidence about these standards. In a series of simulations, we show that the model explains puzzling motivational dynamics and associated feelings. Crucially, the model identifies realistic standards (i.e., those matching one's own actual ability) as those more beneficial for motivation and performance. On this basis, the model establishes a normative solution to the problem of optimal allocation of effort, analogous to the optimal allocation of neural and computational resources as in efficient coding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The computation and comparison of subjective values underlying economic choices rely on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In this area, distinct groups of neurons encode the value of individual options, the binary choice outcome, and the chosen value. These variables capture both the choice input and the choice output, suggesting that the cell groups found in the OFC constitute the building blocks of a decision circuit. Here, we show that this neural circuit is longitudinally stable. Using two-photon calcium imaging, we record from the OFC of mice engaged in a juice-choice task. Imaging of individual cells continues for up to 40 weeks. For each cell and each session pair, we compare activity profiles using cosine similarity, and we assess whether the neuron encodes the same variable in both sessions. We find a high degree of stability and a modest representational drift. Quantitative estimates indicate that this drift would not randomize the circuit within the animal's lifetime. [Display omitted] • Mice choose between different juice flavors based on subjective values • Using two-photon calcium imaging, neurons in OFC are recorded for up to 40 weeks • The activity profiles of individual cells are longitudinally stable • The decision variables encoded by individual cells are longitudinally stable Economic choices depend on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In mice choosing between juice flavors, Zhang et al. record from individual neurons for up to 40 weeks. Activity profiles and the representation of decision variables are longitudinally stable. Hence, different cell groups in the OFC form a stable decision circuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every day, humans make countless decisions that require the integration of information about potential benefits (i.e. rewards) with other decision features (i.e. effort required, probability of an outcome or time delays). Here, we examine the overlap and dissociation of behavioral preferences and neural representations of subjective value in the context of three different decision features (physical effort, probability and time delays) in a healthy adult life span sample. While undergoing functional neuroimaging, participants (N = 75) made incentive compatible choices between a smaller monetary reward with lower physical effort, higher probability, or a shorter time delay versus a larger monetary reward with higher physical effort, lower probability, or a longer time delay. Behavioral preferences were estimated from observed choices, and subjective values were computed using individual hyperbolic discount functions. We found that discount rates were uncorrelated across tasks. Despite this apparent behavioral dissociation between preferences, we found overlapping subjective value-related activity in the medial prefrontal cortex across all three tasks. We found no consistent evidence for age differences in either preferences or the neural representations of subjective value across adulthood. These results suggest that while the tolerance of decision features is behaviorally dissociable, subjective value signals share a common representation across adulthood.

The reward system implemented in the midbrain, ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex evaluates and compares various types of rewards given to the organisms. It has been suggested that autonomic factors influence reward-related processing via the hypothalamus, but how the hypothalamus modulates the reward system remains elusive. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, the hypothalamus was parcellated into individual hypothalamic nuclei performing different autonomic functions using boundary mapping parcellation analyses. The effective interaction during subjective evaluation of foods in a reward task was then investigated between the human hypothalamic nuclei and the reward-related regions. We found significant brain activity decrease in the paraventricular nucleus (PVH) and lateral nucleus in the hypothalamus in food evaluation compared with monetary evaluation. A psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed dual interactions between the PVH and (1) midbrain region and (2) ventromedial prefrontal cortex, with the former correlated with the stronger tendency of participants toward food-seeking. A dynamic causal modeling analysis further revealed unidirectional interactions from the PVH to the midbrain and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that the PVH in the human hypothalamus interacts with the reward-related regions in the cerebral cortex via multiple pathways (i.e., the midbrain pathway and ventromedial prefrontal pathway) to evaluate rewards for subsequent decision-making.

Nine studies find that people believe their money has greater purchasing power than the same quantity of others' money. Using a variety of products from socks to clocks to chocolates, we found that participants thought the same amount of money could buy more when it belonged to themselves versus others--a pattern that extended to undesirable products. Participants also believed their money-- in the form of donations, taxes, fines, and fees--would help charities and governments more than others' money. We tested six mechanisms based on psychological distance, the endowment effect, wishful thinking, better-than average biases, pain of payment, and beliefs about product preferences. Only a psychological distance mechanism received support. Specifically, we found that the perceived purchasing power of other people's money decreased logarithmically as others' psychological distance from the self increased, consistent with psychological distance's subadditive property. Further supporting a psychological distance mechanism, we found that framing one's own money as distant (vs. near) reduced the self-other difference in perceived purchasing power. Our results suggest that beliefs about the value of money depend on who owns it, and we discuss implications for marketing, management, psychology, and economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this digitalized era, Internet addiction has been a severe problem that needs imperative solutions derived from the same mechanism that leads to its addiction. To uncover a more nuanced mechanism for Internet addiction in association with decision-making focus and emotions and thus generate effective interventions, we conducted three experiments to investigate how various forms of emotion priming affect intertemporal choice among Internet addicts and normal Internet users. We divided the emotions into three categories, namely emotional valence (negative and positive emotions), expected emotion type (expected regret, expected joy), and current emotion type (current regret, current joy). In experiment one, we examined the effect of two participant types (Internet addicts and normal Internet users) with three emotion valences (positive, negative, and neutral). In experiment two, we examined the effect of two participant types (Internet addicts and normal Internet users) with three current emotion types (current regret, joy, and neutral). In experiment three, we examined the effect of two participant types (Internet addicts and normal Internet users) with two expected emotion types (expected regret and expected joy). We conducted a completely randomized experimental design in each experiment and used subjective value as the dependent variable index of intertemporal choice. The results showed that the subjective value of Internet addicts was significantly lower than that of normal Internet users across three studies. The subjective value of individuals primed with positive emotions was significantly higher than those primed with negative emotions, no matter whether they were normal Internet users or addicts (experiment one). The subjective value of individuals primed with expected joy was significantly higher than those primed with expected regret, no matter whether they were normal Internet users or addicts (experiment three). When primed with current joy, however, the Internet addicts' subjective value was significantly lower than when primed with current regret, but this did not apply to normal Internet users (experiment two). These results suggest positive emotions and expected joy enhanced long-term goals and greater rewards focus on intertemporal decision-making compared to negative emotions and expected regret. However, current joy facilitated short-term goals, and smaller rewards focus on intertemporal decision-making compared to current regret. The theoretical and practical implications for Internet addiction are also discussed in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past half-century, cognitive and social scientists have struggled with the irrationalities of human choice behavior; people consistently make choices that are logically inconsistent. Is human choice behavior evolutionarily adaptive or is it an inefficient patchwork of competing mechanisms? In this review, I present an interdisciplinary synthesis arguing for a novel interpretation: choice is efficiently irrational. Connecting findings across disciplines suggests that observed choice behavior reflects a precise optimization of the trade-off between the costs of increasing the precision of the choice mechanism and the declining benefits that come as precision increases. Under these constraints, a rationally imprecise strategy emerges that works toward optimal efficiency rather than toward optimal rationality. This approach rationalizes many of the puzzling inconsistencies of human choice behavior, explaining why these inconsistencies arise as an optimizing solution in biological choosers. A central question for decision-making scholars is: why are humans and animals so predictably inconsistent in their choices? In the language of economics, why are they irrational? Data suggest that this reflects an optimal trade-off between the precision with which the brain represents the values of choices and the biological costs of that precision. Increasing representational precision may improve choice consistency, but the metabolic cost of increased precision is significant. Given the cost of precision, the brain might use efficient value-encoding mechanisms that maximize informational content. Mathematical analyses suggest that a mechanism called divisive normalization approximates maximal efficiency per action potential in decision systems. Behavioral studies appear to validate this claim. Inconsistencies produced by decision-makers can be well modeled as the byproduct of efficient divisive normalization mechanisms that maximize information while minimizing metabolic costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research shows that people usually try to avoid exerting cognitive effort yet they are willing to exert effort to gain rewards. This cost–benefit framework provides predictions for behaviour outside the laboratory. Nevertheless, the extent to which such considerations affect real-life decisions is not clear. Here we experimentally examined computer-programmers' decisions to write code in a reusable manner, using functions, which demands an initial investment of cognitive effort or to clone and tweak code, a strategy whose cost increases with repetitions. Only a small portion of our participants demonstrated sensitivity to the benefits and costs of programming strategies. When asked to solve the tasks, participants tended to avoid using functions, demonstrating biased effort estimation. By contrast, when asked how they planned to solve the tasks, participants tended to demonstrate an opposite trend, overestimating effort, in line with an injunctive norm involving the overuse of functions. In the context of real-world problems, the effect of cost–benefit considerations may therefore be limited by task-irrelevant factors. Our interdisciplinary approach may be useful in providing novel theoretical insights and in promoting cognitive-effort investments outside the laboratory.

Logistic regressions were developed in economics to model individual choice behavior. In recent years, they have become an important tool in decision neuroscience. Here, I describe and discuss different logistic models, emphasizing the underlying assumptions and possible interpretations. Logistic models may be used to quantify a variety of behavioral traits, including the relative subjective value of different goods, the choice accuracy, risk attitudes, and choice biases. More complex logistic models can be used for choices between good bundles, in cases of nonlinear value functions, and for choices between multiple options. Finally, logistic models can quantify the explanatory power of neuronal activity on choices, thus providing a valid alternative to receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analyses. Logistic regressions are the primary method to analyze choice behavior in decision neuroscience studies. In this primer, Padoa-Schioppa describes how logistic analysis can quantify a variety of behavioral traits. He also discusses the assumptions and interpretations of different logistic models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Own-age bias is a well-known bias reflecting the effects of age, and its role has been demonstrated, particularly, in face recognition. However, it remains unclear whether an own-age bias exists in facial impression formation. In the present study, we used three datasets from two published and one unpublished functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that employed the same pleasantness rating task with fMRI scanning and preferential choice task after the fMRI to investigate whether healthy young and older participants showed own-age effects in face preference. Specifically, we employed a drift-diffusion model to elaborate the existence of own-age bias in the processes of preferential choice. The behavioral results showed higher rating scores and higher drift rate for young faces than for older faces, regardless of the ages of participants. We identified a young-age effect, but not an own-age effect. Neuroimaging results from aggregation analysis of the three datasets suggest a possibility that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was associated with evidence accumulation of own-age faces; however, no clear evidence was provided. Importantly, we found no age-related decline in the responsiveness of the vmPFC to subjective pleasantness of faces, and both young and older participants showed a contribution of the vmPFC to the parametric representation of the subjective value of face and functional coupling between the vmPFC and ventral visual area, which reflects face preference. These results suggest that the preferential choice of face is less susceptible to the own-age bias across the lifespan of individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral preferences pervade many aspects of our lives, dictating how we ought to behave, whom we can marry and even what we eat. Despite their relevance, one fundamental question remains unanswered: where do individual moral preferences come from? It is often thought that all types of preferences reflect properties of domain-general neural decision mechanisms that employ a common 'neural currency' to value choice options in many different contexts. This view, however, appears at odds with the observation that many humans consider it intuitively wrong to employ the same scale to compare moral value (e.g. of a human life) with material value (e.g. of money). In this paper, we directly test if moral subjective values are represented by similar neural processes as financial subjective values. In a study combining functional magnetic resonance imaging with a novel behavioral paradigm, we identify neural representations of the subjective values of human lives or financial payoffs by means of structurally identical computational models. Correlating isomorphic model variables from both domains with brain activity reveals specific patterns of neural activity that selectively represent values in the moral (right temporo-parietal junction) or financial (ventral-medial prefrontal cortex) domain. Intriguingly, our findings show that human lives and money are valued in (at least partially) distinct neural currencies, supporting theoretical proposals that human moral behavior is guided by processes that are distinct from those underlying behavior driven by personal material benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We produce a definition and argument for explicitly adopting value subjectivism in entrepreneurship research. While the field has progressively shifted toward subjectivism over the past decades, we remain saddled with positivist baggage in our theories' definitions of key variables, including the concept of value. Although modern scholars readily admit that value is subjective, what is generally meant by this is that it is idiosyncratically determined. We argue that value is more appropriately defined, atop pure subjectivism, as an increase in subjective satisfaction or well-being. We develop and elaborate on this definition and explore its implications for entrepreneurship theory and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Own-age bias is a well-known bias reflecting the effects of age, and its role has been demonstrated, particularly, in face recognition. However, it remains unclear whether an own-age bias exists in facial impression formation. In the present study, we used three datasets from two published and one unpublished functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that employed the same pleasantness rating task with fMRI scanning and preferential choice task after the fMRI to investigate whether healthy young and older participants showed own-age effects in face preference. Specifically, we employed a drift-diffusion model to elaborate the existence of own-age bias in the processes of preferential choice. The behavioral results showed higher rating scores and higher drift rate for young faces than for older faces, regardless of the ages of participants. We identified a young-age effect, but not an own-age effect. Neuroimaging results from aggregation analysis of the three datasets suggest a possibility that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was associated with evidence accumulation of own-age faces; however, no clear evidence was provided. Importantly, we found no age-related decline in the responsiveness of the vmPFC to subjective pleasantness of faces, and both young and older participants showed a contribution of the vmPFC to the parametric representation of the subjective value of face and functional coupling between the vmPFC and ventral visual area, which reflects face preference. These results suggest that the preferential choice of face is less susceptible to the own-age bias across the lifespan of individuals.

A series of studies in which monkeys chose between two juices offered in variable amounts identified in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) different groups of neurons encoding the value of individual options (offer value), the binary choice outcome (chosen juice), and the chosen value. These variables capture both the input and the output of the choice process, suggesting that the cell groups identified in OFC constitute the building blocks of a decision circuit. Several lines of evidence support this hypothesis. However, in previous experiments offers were presented simultaneously, raising the question of whether current notions generalize to when goods are presented or are examined in sequence. Recently, Ballesta and Padoa-Schioppa (2019) examined OFC activity under sequential offers. An analysis of neuronal responses across time windows revealed that a small number of cell groups encoded specific sequences of variables. These sequences appeared analogous to the variables identified under simultaneous offers, but the correspondence remained tentative. Thus, in the present study, we examined the relation between cell groups found under sequential versus simultaneous offers. We recorded from the OFC while monkeys chose between different juices. Trials with simultaneous and sequential offers were randomly interleaved in each session. We classified cells in each choice modality, and we examined the relation between the two classifications. We found a strong correspondence; in other words, the cell groups measured under simultaneous offers and under sequential offers were one and the same. This result indicates that economic choices under simultaneous or sequential offers rely on the same neural circuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Addiction to the Internet has emerged as a new kind of addictive behavior. Although previous studies have revealed that impairments in working memory led to suboptimal decision making (e.g., a greater willingness to choose smaller, more immediate rewards), little is known about how working memory affects intertemporal choice in Internet addicts and normal users. Thus, this study's aim was to investigate the effect of working memory task on intertemporal choice in 33 participants addicted to internet and 25 healthy controls. Participants were administered (a) a test for Internet Addiction, (b) a single delay discounting self-report questionnaire (c) a working memory task. Differences between the Internet addicts and the control group were observed in terms of delay discounting rates, reaction times, and in memory accuracy rates. We observed significantly higher delay discounting rates among individuals addicted to the Internet. Moreover, it was documented that reaction times follow the 4-level working memory condition were significantly longer than follow the 2-level condition, in both the Internet addicts and the control group. The current findings suggest that Internet addicts are more likely to make short-sighted decisions than normal Internet users. The higher the level of working memory, the more likely an individual is to choose the present smaller reward, thus making short-sighted decisions, and have longer response times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• fMRI meta-analysis used to identify neural correlates of effort-based valuation. • vmPFC activity scales positively with net value and negatively with effort costs. • pre-SMA ROI has an opposite pattern of activation. • vmPFC is a candidate region for domain-general cost/benefit value integration. Choosing how much effort to expend is critical for everyday decisions. While several neuroimaging studies have examined effort-based decision-making, results have been highly heterogeneous, leaving unclear which brain regions process effort-related costs and integrate them with rewards. We conducted two meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging data to examine consistent neural correlates of effort demands (23 studies, 15 maps, 549 participants) and net value (15 studies, 11 maps, 428 participants). The pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) scaled positively with pure effort demand, whereas the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) showed the opposite effect. Moreover, regions that have been previously implicated in value integration in other cost domains, such as the vmPFC and ventral striatum, were consistently involved in signaling net value. The opposite response patterns of the pre-SMA and vmPFC imply that they are differentially involved in the representation of effort costs and value integration. These findings provide conclusive evidence that the vmPFC is a central node for net value computation and reveal potential brain targets to treat motivation-related disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the adage goes, “money makes the world go round” – but which direction does it spin? This analysis considers how basic decision research can help us work out how to answer this question. It suggests that the difficulty of deriving clear predictions based on existing decision research is at least partly rooted in two restrictive conventions. The first is the focus on deviations from rational choice, and the effort to capture observed deviations by assuming subjective value functions. While it is difficult to reject the hypothesis that choice behavior reflects the weighting of subjective values, it is not clear that it advances the derivation of useful predictions. A second restrictive convention is the focus on objective hypothesis testing, which favors analyses that evaluate small refinements of the popular models. The potential benefits of relaxing these conventions are considered, with reference to recent choice prediction competitions that facilitate the exploration of distinct assumptions and model development techniques. The winners in these competitions assume very different decision processes than those assumed by the popular “subjective functions” models. The relationship of the results to the big data revolution is discussed.

This paper focuses on cases of epistemically transformative experiences, as Paul calls them, cases where we have radically different experiences that teach us something we would not have learned otherwise. Paul raises the new and rather intriguing question of whether epistemic transformative experiences pose a general problem for the very possibility of rational decision-making. It is argued that there is an important grain of truth in Paul’s set up and solution when it is applied to a certain narrowly defined set of cases – choices to have a new taste experience in a safe environment, where no important objective values are at stake. But the way she generalizes this approach to large-scale life choices, such as the choice to become a parent, is less convincing. Furthermore, given a proper understanding of revelatory value, there is no need to reconfigure the agent’s choice situation in order to enable rational decision-making.

Addiction to the Internet has emerged as a new kind of addictive behavior. Although previous studies have revealed that impairments in working memory led to suboptimal decision making (e.g., a greater willingness to choose smaller, more immediate rewards), little is known about how working memory affects intertemporal choice in Internet addicts and normal users. Thus, this study’s aim was to investigate the effect of working memory task on intertemporal choice in 33 participants addicted to internet and 25 healthy controls. Participants were administered (a) a test for Internet Addiction, (b) a single delay discounting self-report questionnaire (c) a working memory task. Differences between the Internet addicts and the control group were observed in terms of delay discounting rates, reaction times, and in memory accuracy rates. We observed significantly higher delay discounting rates among individuals addicted to the Internet. Moreover, it was documented that reaction times follow the 4-level working memory condition were significantly longer than follow the 2-level condition, in both the Internet addicts and the control group. The current findings suggest that Internet addicts are more likely to make short-sighted decisions than normal Internet users. The higher the level of working memory, the more likely an individual is to choose the present smaller reward, thus making short-sighted decisions, and have longer response times.

• OFC maps goods onto multi-dimensional attribute space for value computation. • Mapping is preference-based and independent of sensory or motor contingencies. • Mapping associated neuronal activity reflects the abstraction of core task features. • OFC cognitive map flexibly adapts to task contexts. Since the discovery of cognitive maps in rodent hippocampus (HC), the cognitive map has evolved from originally referring to spatial representations encoding locations and objects in Euclidean spaces to a general low-dimensional organization of information along selected feature dimensions. A cognitive map includes hypothetical constructs that bridge between environmental stimuli and the final overt behavior. To neuroeconomists, utility and utility functions are such constructs with neurobiological basis that drive choice behavior. Emergence of distinct functional neuron groups in the primate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) during simple economic choice indicates the formation of an abstract cognitive map for organizing information of goods for value computation. Experimental evidence suggests that organization of neuronal activity in such cognitive map reflects the abstraction of core task features. Thus, such map can be adapted to accommodate economic choices under various task contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACCd) in decision making has often been discussed but remains somewhat unclear. On the one hand, numerous studies implicated this area in decisions driven by effort or action cost. On the other hand, work on economic choices between goods (under fixed action costs) found that neurons in ACCd encoded only post-decision variables. To advance our understanding of the role played by this area in decision making, we trained monkeys to choose between different goods (juice types) offered in variable amounts and with different action costs. Importantly, the task design dissociated computation of the action cost from planning of any particular action. Neurons in ACCd encoded the chosen value and the binary choice outcome in several reference frames (chosen juice, chosen cost, chosen action). Thus, this area provided a rich representation of post-decision variables. In contrast to the OFC, neurons in ACCd did not represent pre-decision variables such as individual offer values in any reference frame. Hence, ongoing decisions are unlikely guided by ACCd. Conversely, neuronal activity in this area might inform subsequent actions.

Elga (Philos Impr 10(5): 1–10, 2010) has argued that, even when no particular subjective probability is required by one's evidence, perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective probabilities. Otherwise, they would be rationally permitted to knowingly turn down some sure gains. I argue that it is likewise true that, even when we do not possess enough practical reasons for a sharp evaluation (because of optionality or ignorance), perfectly rational people will have sharp subjective values. Those who would be most inclined to reject this argument are those who claim that we are rationally required by either our beliefs that objective values are unsharp (such as strong incomparability, vague value, or parity) or by our own 'real' values to have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the former claim, I show that we need not believe that all objective values are sharp to rationally have unsharp subjective values. Regarding the latter claim, I conclude that sharpened subjective values must be 'real' (i.e., practically authoritative) because otherwise perfect rationality would be impossible in principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk engenders a phenomenologically distinct experience from certainty, often driving people to behave in ostensibly irrational ways, and with potential consequences for our subjective sense of confidence in having made the best choice. While previous work on decision confidence has largely focused on ambiguous perceptual decisions or value-based choices under certainty, it is unclear how subjective confidence reports are formed during risky value-based choice (i.e. those with uncertain outcomes). Accordingly, we sought to examine the effect of risky (versus certain) choice upon confidence ratings in a calibrated economic choice task and explore the well-documented interrelationships between confidence and subjective value (SV) as well as choice response time (RT) in the context of value-based choice. By jointly analyzing choices (risky versus certain), SV of the chosen option, confidence, and RT, we found a systematic effect of risk on subjective confidence: subjective confidence reports were significantly higher when selecting a certain prospect compared with a risky one. Interestingly, risk attenuated the strength of the relationships between confidence and both RTs and difference in subjective value (ΔSV), as well as the relationship between RT and ΔSV. Taken together, these results corroborate how choice, RT, confidence and SV relate in value-based choice under risk, informing both theories of confidence and risk preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]