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In this paper we present the first estimate of the full income distribution in pre‐industrial Sweden (including present‐day Finland). We draw on the schedule and the individual assessments devised by the authorities to distribute the 1613 Älvsborg ransom taxation to estimate income inequality, as well as the income shares of the top quantiles and of various social groups. We find that Sweden was relatively equal compared with other early modern European societies, for two main reasons: first, because the nobility, the clergy, the burghers, and other middle‐rank social groups all held relatively small shares of the total income, and second, because the landless groups were less numerous in Sweden than in other societies. This resulted in a large share of the total income going to the relatively homogeneous group of landed peasants, who made up the majority of the population. Our study thus speaks to the political historiography of early modern Sweden, within which negotiation and collaboration between the landed peasantry and the state has been seen as pivotal to the state formation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with performance-pay worker compensation and occupational choice. We analytically and numerically examine the distributional effects of entrepreneurial talent and performance-pay contracts. Risk-neutral, more talented individuals become entrepreneurs, inducing workers to exert effort through incentive contracts. Entrepreneurial talent and worker effort significantly influence income inequality through complex general equilibrium channels. Economies with higher tariffs, more entrepreneurs, less skilled or more heterogeneous workers, and economies without worker effort, display higher income inequality measured by the top one percent income share and the Gini Coefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the series of the top 1% income shares in 137 countries, I examine the relationship between top-end inequality and subsequent economic growth from the 1920s to the 2010s. These data enable a versatile exploration of various time horizons. To address concerns regarding chosen functional forms, I employ penalized spline methods to accommodate potential nonlinearities. Empirical findings suggest that the relationship between top-end inequality and subsequent growth is complex, contingent upon both the investigated time horizon and the level of economic development. I find some evidence for a positive link at medium levels of economic development, with this positive link being more pronounced in short- to medium-term associations. I also find that the positive medium-run association weakens as economic development advances. In advanced economies, a negative (or nonpositive) medium- to long-term relationship emerges between the top 1% income share and growth in many settings. Furthermore, I conclude that longer-run associations need to be investigated further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers are liable to 'treasure what is measured' and overlook phenomena that are not. In an era of increased reliance on administrative data, existing policies also often determine what is measured in the first place. We explore this two-way interaction between measurement and policy in the context of the investment incomes and capital gains that are missing from the UK's official income statistics. We show that these 'missing incomes' change the established picture of economic inequality over the past decade, revealing rising top income shares during the period of austerity. The underestimation of these forms of income in official statistics has hidden the impact of tax policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthiest. We urge a renewed focus on how policy affects and is affected by measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using income tax administrative data for Australia, we examine levels and trends in the persistence in top‐income group membership, focusing on the top 1 percent. Top‐income persistence increased markedly between 1991 and 2018, with most of the increase occurring in the mid‐2000s and early 2010s. In the mid‐ to late‐2010s, Australian top‐income persistence rates were near the top of the range of tax‐data estimates for other countries. We decompose the increase into factors associated with (i) changes in the composition of the top‐income group and (ii) increases in persistence rates for specific population subgroups. We find that the rise in top‐income persistence is accounted for by changes in subgroup persistence rates, notably for individuals aged 35–64, and especially those aged 55–64. We suggest that these effects are partially related to increases in the effective retirement age over the relevant period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies on income inequality have some characteristics that differentiate them from their earlier counterparts. The spotlight on high incomes has illuminated a new angle from which to view income inequality. Because estimates of top income shares can be used as a proxy for power inequality, they can enrich our comprehension of the role of the elite in Latin America's economic development. However, scholars interested in studying the history of economic inequality in Latin America face certain methodological and theoretical problems of their own: (1) because food and other commodities such as minerals represent the lion's share of exported goods in Latin America, cycles in commodity prices have shaped the region's economic history. Thus, the crux of income inequality in Latin America is who becomes richer and who becomes poorer when exports prices rise and fall; and (2) the sort of fiscal statistics typically used capture only a few countries and sometimes only limited periods. Thus, as I argue, scholars should use dynamic social tables to produce new information. I exemplify both points with a historical analysis of three Latin American countries: Chile, Colombia, and Argentina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a novel assessment of how the World Inequality Database (WID) top income adjustment applied by Blanchet, Chancel, and Gethin (2021) to European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU‐SILC) data for 26 countries over 2003–2017 for Distributional National Accounts purposes affects inequality in equivalized gross and disposable household income. On average, the Gini is increased by around 2.4 points for both gross and disposable income, with notable differences across countries but limited impact on trends. EU‐SILC countries that rely on administrative register data see relatively small effects on inequality. Comparing with two other recent studies, differences in impacts on measured inequality depend less on the adjustment method and more on whether external data sources are used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The share of women in the top 1 percent of the UK's income distribution has been growing over the last two decades (as in several other countries). Our first contribution is to account for this trend using regressions of the probability of being in the top 1 percent, fitted separately for men and women, in order to contrast between the sexes the role of changes in characteristics and changes in returns to characteristics. We show that the rise of women in the top 1 percent is primarily accounted for by their greater increases in the number of years spent in full‐time education. Although most top income analysis uses tax return data, we derive our findings taking advantage of the much more extensive information about personal characteristics that is available in survey data. Our use of survey data requires justification given survey under‐coverage of top incomes. Providing this justification is our second contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last decades have witnessed a revolution in manufacturing production characterized by increasing technology adoption and a strong expansion of international trade. Simultaneously, the income distribution has exhibited both polarization and concentration among the richest. Combining datasets from the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, the International Federation of Robotics, EU KLEMS, and COMTRADE, we study the causal effect of industrial automation on income inequality in the U.S. during 2010-2015. We exploit spatial and time variations in exposure to robots arising from past differences in industry specialization across U.S. metropolitan areas and the evolution of robot adoption across industries. We document a robust positive impact of robotics on income for only the top 1 percent of taxpayers, which is largest for top income fractiles. Therefore, industrial automation fuels income inequality and, particularly, top income inequality. According to our estimates, one more robot per thousand workers results in relative increments of the total taxable income accruing to fractiles P99 to P99.9, P99.9 to P99.99 and P99.99 to P100, of 2.1 percent, 3.5 percent and 5.9 percent, respectively. We also find that robotization leads to increased exports to high-income and upper-middle-income economies, and that this is one of the key mechanisms behind the surge in top income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that small, but lucrative high-status subgroups lead to an upward ratcheting of compensation levels through the diffusion of norms. Combining relational theories of inequalities and theories of social norms I show how subfield status hierarchies play out at the firm level. I examine the impact of excess compensation in alternative finance (private equity, hedge and venture funds) on traditional finance. Based on multilevel regression on 2159 US and UK executives and longitudinal analyses on 261 firms from 2010 to 2017, I find first, that managers with an alternative finance background receive a pay premium in traditional finance (19.7%). Secondly, within the UK, compensation levels in organizations that witnessed the arrival of sectoral migrants rise above the expected increase. The findings suggest that understanding income dynamics requires detailed scrutiny of high-status subgroups, especially if activities are structured as opaque and lightly regulated organizational forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper calculates the top income shares in Greece from 1967 (the seizure of power by the military dictatorship) until 2017 (the aftermath of the debt crisis). This long‐run perspective allows for the examination of the relationship between inequality and institutional transformations, namely democracy, finance, and crisis. We find in particular that (a) transition to democracy did not affect the income share of the top decile, whereas social democracy had a significant negative impact; (b) financial development and liberalization substantially increased all top decile shares; and (c) debt crisis, consolidation, and recession increased the share of the upper ranks of the top decile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been important studies of recent income inequality and of poverty in South Africa, but very little is known about the long-run trends over time. There is speculation about the extent of inequality when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, but no hard evidence. In this paper, we provide evidence that is partial—being confined to top incomes—but which for the first time shows how the income distribution changed on a (near) annual basis from 1913 onwards. We present estimates of the shares in total income of groups such as the top 1% and the top 0.1%, covering the period from colonial times to the twenty-first century. For a number of years during the apartheid period, we have data classified by race. The estimates for recent years bear out the picture of South Africa as a highly unequal country, but allow this to be placed in historical and international context. The time series presented here will, we hope, provide the basis for detailed investigation of the impact of South African institutions and policies, past and present. But the similarity of the changes over time in top incomes across the four ex-dominions suggests that national developments have to be seen in the light of common global forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Population changes in countries with little natural growth tend to occur via migration channels and among poorer individuals such as refugees and economic migrants, or richer individuals such as international white collar workers or global entrepreneurs. These migratory flows are increasing in size, they are difficult to capture in censuses and surveys, and they potentially bias the measurement of inequality. This paper provides a formal treatment of the impact of population changes on the measurement of inequality when changes occur to the extremes of an income distribution. It provides the conditions under which inequality is expected to increase or decrease and determines the relative importance of including or excluding selected observations at the top or at the bottom. An application to US data illustrates the mathematical results and shows that including or excluding observations from the extremes can bias the measurement of inequality significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a new method to approximate income distribution dynamics at the micro level using only macro data on aggregate moments of the income distribution. Under the assumption that individual incomes follow a lognormal autoregressive process, we show that the evolution of the mean and standard deviation of log income across individuals provides sufficient information to bound the degree of mobility. We estimate mobility bounds for 46 countries, using time series data on aggregate moments of the income distribution available in the World Inequality Database and the World Bank's PovcalNet database. This new data allows us to study the correlates of mobility, and to document churning in the top and bottom of the income distribution, in a much larger set of countries than was previously possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UK official statistics on income distribution have incorporated top-income adjustments to household survey data since 1992. This article reviews the work undertaken by the Department for Work and Pensions and the Office for National Statistics, and the academic research that influenced them, and reflects on the lessons to learn from the UK experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low response rates among rich households are thought to be a serious problem in many applications using household surveys. The paper discusses the various ways the problem can be dealt with, and makes some recommendations for practice, including in developing countries. Under certain conditions, income-selective non-compliance with an initially randomized assignment can be corrected by reweighting the data. This requires that the surveys pick up at least some top incomes. If not, then income tax records can help, including in estimating distributional national accounts. However, tax data come with their own concerns including tax avoidance/evasion, weak coverage of informal sectors and illicit incomes, and concerns about construct validity, given the limitations of taxable income as a basis for inter-personal comparisons of economic welfare. An appropriately weighted survey-based distribution of an acceptable measure of economic welfare need not be less reliable for most purposes of distributional analysis than income-tax records, including in combination with surveys. The choice will depend on the question to be addressed, and country-specific circumstances. These measurement issues warrant further research across multiple settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the sensitivity of long-run trends in top income shares to differences in top-share measures. While the standard measure fixes a share of the population, we define alternatives that allow variation in both incomes and size of the top group based on defining absolute income thresholds. In an application to United States data, we find that top income share trends over the past century vary somewhat depending on the measure used. Allowing top groups to increase in size after 1980 along with overall economic growth results in a larger increase of top income shares. The historical drops before WWII are sensitive to the choice of income deflator: using GDP inflates interwar top income shares but using CPI deflates them. Altogether, these results recommend using complementary approaches to defining top income groups when measuring long-term top income share trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Top incomes are often related to Pareto distribution. To date, economists have mostly used Pareto Type I distribution to model the upper tail of income and wealth distribution. It is a parametric distribution, with interesting properties, that can be easily linked to economic theory. In this paper, we first show that modeling top incomes with Pareto Type I distribution can lead to biased estimation of inequality, even with millions of observations. Then, we show that the Generalized Pareto distribution and, even more, the Extended Pareto distribution, are much less sensitive to the choice of the threshold. Thus, they can provide more reliable results. We discuss different types of bias that could be encountered in empirical studies and, we provide some guidance for practice. To illustrate, two applications are investigated, on the distribution of income in South Africa in 2012 and on the distribution of wealth in the United States in 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite South Africa's need for inclusive economic growth, we find that the top income percentiles continue to diverge from the rest of the income distribution. We compare household survey data and tax data (which, unlike household survey data, includes accurate data for the very rich) to investigate the patterns of income growth over the period 2003 to 2018. We find that the gap between the stagnant middle and the top end of the income distribution widened, particularly over the post‐recession period. We also show that the divergence was partly driven by high returns to capital for those with top incomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional theory implies that fiscal federalism hinders redistribution and increases inequality. Decentralization might however improve predistribution. To obtain more precise empirical evidence on this relationship we introduce an interaction between tax decentralization and jurisdictional fragmentation and analyze its impact on pre- vs. after-tax inequality. The empirical strategy relies on the unique institutional setting and data consistency in Switzerland which allows to exploit cantonal variance since 1945. According to our findings, tax decentralization reduces income inequality as long as jurisdictional fragmentation remains limited. Significant effects in pre-tax income suggest an impact via the predistribution instead of the redistribution channel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a novel series of Chilean top‐income shares covering half a century, mainly based on income‐tax declarations and the National Accounts. Such a time frame of analysis is still rare in the literature of developing countries. We distinguish between a fiscal‐income series (1964–2017) and an adjusted series (1990–2017). The former covers individual income, while the latter also includes corporate undistributed profits, which affects both levels and trends. The fiscal‐income estimates start with low levels and a decreasing trend over the 1960s. They then increase rapidly during the dictatorship years (1973–89). The series ends with a high, yet slowly decreasing, concentration for most of the recent democratic period (1990–2017). By contrast, the adjusted series has followed a U‐shape since the return of democracy, contradicting the established consensus on falling inequality over the period. Furthermore, Chile ranks among the most unequal countries in both the OECD and Latin American countries over the period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors analyze to what extent and how the tax burden should be shifted towards top income earners in order to reduce income inequality. Starting from Lambert and Aronson (Inequality decomposition analysis and the Gini coefficient revisited 1993) and Alvaredo (A note on the relationship between top income shares and the Gini coefficient 2011) decomposition by income groups, they prove that for three types of revenue-neutral linear personal income tax reforms (PIT) based on Pfähler (1984) the redistributive effect is always higher than before the reform; and when the size of the rich group is sufficiently small (e.g. 1%), the best option is allocating tax changes proportionally to net income, and the worst doing it proportionally to tax liabilities. An empirical illustration of the theoretical results is provided using micro data from the Spanish PIT.

During the last couple of decades, various pundits proved the income inequality is on the rise. The United States, Russia, Brazil, even countries of the Western Europe are tackling the levels of inequality previously known only before the WWI. Long tradition of the inequality research built its base with the analyses of the top incomes (Kuznets, Piketty, Saez, Atkinson). This article aims to assess the evolution of the top incomes (P90, P99) in four countries forming so called the Visegrad Group between the years 1992 and 2017. The article is organized as follows: (1) Firstly, we introduce the reader into the basics of top income research. (2) Secondly, we explain the data, series we used and associated methodology while delimiting three minor partial goals. (3) Lastly, we present our findings, the series we constructed and we assess the evolution of the top incomes in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The contribution of the articles is threefold: (1) We provide coherent top incomes series for Slovakia based on P90 and P99 fractiles. (2) Next, we uniquely compare the evolution of top incomes in all V4 countries. (3) Lastly, we put our findings into the global comparison with developed and emerging countries like the United States, Russia, China, Denmark, and Sweden to answer whether the V4 region really is the emblem of equality or this notion is just an illusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990–2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 64 percent, compared to 37 percent in Western Europe, 47 percent in the US and 55 percent in Brazil (see Alvaredo et al. 2018). This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil‐rich and population‐rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under‐estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We combine household surveys and national accounts, as well as recently released tax data to track the dynamics of Indian income inequality from 1922 to 2015. According to our benchmark estimates, the top 1 percent of earners captured less than 21 percent of total income in the late 1930s, before dropping to 6 percent in the early 1980s and rising to 22 percent in the recent period. Our results appear to be robust to a range of alternative assumptions seeking to address numerous data limitations. These findings suggest that much more can be done to promote inclusive growth in India. We also stress the need for more transparency on income and wealth statistics, which is key to allow an informed democratic debate on inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With financialization now acknowledged as one of the most potent threats to income equality, can finance-driven inequality be explained by a singular causal argument? Taking the case of top incomes across the OECD, this paper addresses the standard causal narrative of finance-driven inequality, where rising top income inequality is explained as a function of deregulation, financial sector growth, and a parallel weakening of the role of trade unions and the government. Applying fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to a time-series dataset (1975-2005), it assesses the ways in which configurations of institutions combined in different ways prior to the recent financial crisis, to create policy contexts conducive to top income growth. It does this by adopting a time-series approach to QCA, involving calibration and analysis of data at three successive historical waves. Results suggest that top incomes in the era of finance-driven capitalism were subject to a diversity of causal paths which generated similar outcomes in different contexts, in a manner which departs substantially from the standard narrative. In doing so, it elaborates on the application of time-series approaches to case-based analysis, and uses its results to discuss the ways in which institutions may combine in different ways to generate similar, or divergent outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the determinants of racial inequality in the composition of the top incomes in Brazil. The results show that the factors explaining racial inequality behave unevenly across different levels of the income distribution, with the effect of discrimination reaching its maximum at the higher quantiles. This contradicts the thesis of “whitening” – embranquecimento – insofar as this thesis claims that blacks of a higher socioeconomic status may not suffer discrimination in Brazil or, at least, that they may be discriminated at a lesser extent. The data is from the 2010 Brazilian national Census. The methods are linear and non-linear regressions.

Long Term Changes of Income Inequalities, Their Social Importance and Relationship With Economic Development – in the European and Global Perspective Data analysis based on Gini index proves that income inequalities were growing in the 1980s and 1990s and next, mixed trends prevailed, with the exception of fast growth in the incomes of 1% top richest households. In spite of the fact that the expansion of knowledge-based economy has begun in the same time as income inequality growth, there are no direct connection between these two phenomena. The intermediary factor is financial capitalism. Innovations created in new economy (ICT) encourage the development of financial capitalism and quick growth of 1% of the highest incomes. The social importance of inequality growth is very low. The growth of income inequalities very slightly changes the evaluation of the existing income inequalities. The increase of salary inequality has not diminished work motivation in European enterprises. The growth of financial capitalism has encouraged growth of venture capital investment in sectors of knowledge-based economy.

Highlights • First analysis of top income shares in Brazil from 1926 to 2015. • Concentration of income at the top follows a sine wave pattern. • Changes correlate closely with political-institutional disruptions. • “Tax-adjusted” Ginis suggest surveys overstate the recent decline in inequality. Abstract This paper uses income tax tabulations to estimate top income shares in Brazil over the long run. Between 1926 and 2015, the concentration of income at the top remained very high, following a sine wave trend: top shares ebbed and flowed over time, frequently in tandem with political and institutional disruptions. There is some evidence in favor of Williamson’s “missed leveling” hypothesis regarding the origins of Latin America’s exceptionally high levels of inequality, but the recent decline in inequality is cast in a more dubious light, since top income shares remained quite stable since 2000 and the "tax-adjusted" Gini coefficients show a smaller and shorter, though still sizeable, decrease. The nature of the political regime matters, but democracy is not a sufficient condition for redistribution. Brazil’s tumultuous political history suggests top income shares change substantially mostly during political-institutional crises, when the typical quid pro quo of more liberal regimes in normal times collapses. I complement the analysis with international comparisons and a discussion of the role of institutions in shaping inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Household income surveys often fail to capture top incomes, which leads to an underestimation of income inequality. A popular solution is to combine the household survey with data from income tax records, which has been found to result in significant upward corrections of inequality estimates. Unfortunately, tax records are unavailable in many countries, including most of the developing world. In the absence of data from tax records, this study explores the feasibility of using data on house prices to estimate the top tail of the income distribution. In an application to Egypt, where estimates of inequality based on household surveys alone are low by international standards, the study finds strong evidence that inequality is indeed being underestimated by a considerable margin. The Gini index of household per capita income for urban Egypt is found to increase from 39 to 52 after correcting for the missing top tail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Data analysis based on Gini index proves that income inequalities were growing in the 1980s and 1990s and next, mixed trends prevailed, with the exception of fast growth in the incomes of 1% top richest households. In spite of the fact that the expansion of knowledge-based economy has begun in the same time as income inequality growth, there are no direct connection between these two phenomena. The intermediary factor is financial capitalism. Innovations created in new economy (ICT) encourage the development of financial capitalism and quick growth of 1% of the highest incomes. The social importance of inequality growth is very low. The growth of income inequalities very slightly changes the evaluation of the existing income inequalities. The increase of salary inequality has not diminished work motivation in European enterprises. The growth of financial capitalism has encouraged growth of venture capital investment in sectors of knowledge-based economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major literature using tax data measures the share of income captured by the top of the income distribution. We correct existing Australian estimates by removing employers’ social contributions from the denominator and explain the limitations of using public record tax tables to capture the numerator. We show that Australian Tax Office unit record sample data are only able to accurately measure incomes of top income groups below the top 1 per cent. We conclude that greater access to the entire unit tax record population will be necessary to bring Australian research in this area up to that in the United States and United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Survey under‐coverage of top incomes leads to bias in survey‐based estimates of overall income inequality. Using income tax record data in combination with survey data is a potential approach to address the problem; we consider here the UK's pioneering ‘SPI adjustment’ method that implements this idea. Since 1992, the principal income distribution series (reported annually in Households Below Average Income) has been based on household survey data in which the incomes of a small number of ‘very rich’ individuals are adjusted using information from ‘very rich’ individuals in personal income tax return data. We explain what the procedure involves, reveal the extent to which it addresses survey under‐coverage of top incomes and show how it affects estimates of overall income inequality. More generally, we assess whether the SPI adjustment is fit for purpose and consider whether variants of it could be employed by other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public debates about the rise in top income shares often focus on the growing dispersion in earnings, and the soaring pay for top executives and financial-sector employees. But can the change in the marginal distribution of earnings on its own explain the rise in top income shares? Are top executives replacing capital owners in the group of top-income earners, or are we rather witnessing a fusion of top capital and top earnings? This paper proposes an extension of the copula framework and uses it for exploring the changing composition of top incomes. It illustrates that changes in top income shares can easily be decomposed into respective changes in the marginal distributions of labour and capital income and the changing association between the two types of income. An application using tax record data from Norway shows that the association between top labour and capital incomes grew stronger between 1995 and 2005 in the top half of the wage and capital income distribution, though it declined for the top 1% of capital income receivers. A gender decomposition demonstrates that the association of wage and capital incomes at the top is particularly striking for men, whilst women are largely under-represented in the top halves of the two marginal distributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study exploits unprecedented access to income data and a combination of newly developed statistical methods to evaluate income inequality in Egypt and test for potential top incomes biases. Income inequality in Egypt is found to be low by regional and world standards; top incomes are found to follow the Pareto distribution and do not show anomalies compared to surveys worldwide. Correcting for top incomes biases increases the Gini coefficient significantly. The magnitude of the upward correction varies between 1.1 and 4.1 percentage points depending on the choice of correction method and welfare measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In economics, rank-size regressions provide popular estimators of tail exponents of heavy-tailed distributions. We discuss the properties of this approach when the tail of the distribution is regularly varying rather than strictly Pareto. The estimator then over-estimates the true value in the leading parametric income models (so the upper income tail is less heavy than estimated), which leads to test size distortions and undermines inference. For practical work, we propose a sensitivity analysis based on regression diagnostics in order to assess the likely impact of the distortion. The methods are illustrated using data on top incomes in the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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To deal with the problem of underestimation of top incomes in household surveys, we propose a methodology to combine the income distributions of the Brazilian 2010 Census (survey) and of 2010 DIRPF (personal income tax reports). The method consists in estimating a system of non-response weights that uses as frame the tax register and is applied to the top of the distribution. After applying this calibration methodology, we decompose inequality income sources. Correcting survey distributions with tax data increases the contribution of non-labor income to inequality, as the case of the Brazilian Census shows. Changes in the methodology do not affect the results substantially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the development of top incomes in Scandinavia. I first explain why academia over the past two decades has focused on the income share of top groups, in particular the one percent of the population with the highest incomes. Furthermore, I examine some of the main drivers of inequality that have been considered in the literature and present new suggestive evidence on the role of capital income and, in particular, the shift from interest income to dividends that has occurred over the past decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary This paper presents the first in-depth analysis of the changing composition of the global income rich and the rising representation of developing countries at the top of the global distribution. We construct global distributions of income during 1988–2012 based on both household surveys and the new top incomes data derived from tax records, which better capture the rich who are typically excluded from household surveys. We find that the representation of developing countries in the global top 1% declined until about 2002, but that since 2005 it has risen significantly. This coincides with a decline in global inequality since 2005, according to a range of measures. We compare our estimates of the country-composition and income levels of the global rich with a number of other sources—including Credit Suisse’s estimates of global wealth, the Forbes World Billionaires List, attendees of the World Economic Forum, and estimates of top executives’ salaries. To varying degrees, all show a rise in the representation of the developing world in the ranks of the global elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]