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The architecture of international aid and climate finance should be reformed to address the needs of climate migrants. While humanitarian aid agencies that support some climate migrants are increasingly overburdened, climate migration has been underestimated and largely neglected by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The policy community has based a high-end estimate of 216 million potential climate migrants by 2050 on Groundswell (2021), but Groundswell does not address all drivers. It uses statistical methods to estimate internal migration from slow-onset drivers including crop yields, water supplies, and sea level rise, but the state of knowledge only permits rough, "back-of-the-envelope" estimates for other forms and drivers. Working out such estimates for sudden-onset drivers and for the remaining slow-onset drivers, if mitigation and adaptation are weak, I find that there could be about 500 million climate migrants by 2050. While the UNFCCC classifies climate migration under adaptation, few adaptation resources are devoted to migrants' needs. Based on humanitarian aid expenses for other kinds of migrants, I estimate it could cost around $7000 per person to help climate migrants to rebuild their lives. At this rate, support for climate migrants would be a significant part of the total climate finance, and with organizational needs for supporting climate migrants being quite different from those for adaptation proper, it would make sense for the UNFCCC to address climate migration as a separate category on par with mitigation and adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores equity in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations during a time of multiple overlapping global crises. Drawing on a combination of semi-structured interviews and a roundtable with key negotiators and observers engaged in the UNFCCC process during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as a collaborative ethnographic study and social media analysis on the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), we find that inequities within the UNFCCC process reflect the broader social and geopolitical inequities at international and intranational levels. Multiple intersecting crises reinforce and compound these inequities for particularly marginalized and vulnerable groups and slow progress in tackling climate change in an equitable manner. Applying a critical climate justice lens, we show that in order for the climate negotiations to be resilient to global crises, the process needs to go beyond a surface-level attempt at achieving justice through representation and move towards a more active shifting of power to poor and climate-vulnerable countries and populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change initiated a two-year work programme that, in part, would work to determine how to assess progress in achieving the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Set in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the GGA aims to "enhance[e] adaptive capacity, [strengthen] resilience, and reduc[e] vulnerability to climate change." One possible outcome of the "GlaSS" work programme is the production of a set of global metrics for adaptation. As scholarship on measurement reveals, however, there are many shortcomings to indicator frameworks, and existing sets of global goals, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, have proven ineffective in producing substantive change. As the inception of institutional architectures is a critical moment in understanding their effects, this study takes stock of the GlaSS at its halfway point. While "developing" and "developed" countries diverge in their preferences for metrics, they converge in their desire for the metrics to be scientifically-grounded and based on existing models and data. These countries' differences reflect the broader politics of accountability and challenges of consensus in climate change governance. Their similarities risk reproducing problematic measurement practices critiqued in the literature. At stake is effective adaptation in the world's most vulnerable communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global goals play a catalyzing role in orienting efforts to address climate change. Yet, the negotiation of the main goal in climate governance is understudied. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the negotiation, adoption, and refinement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (unfccc) Long-Term Global Goal (ltgg), from the late 1970s to date. I gather insights from semi-structured interviews with climate governance experts, the scientific literature, and official documentation to highlight the developments that shaped the ltgg over time. The study shows that agential, ideational, normative, structural, and contextual factors co-interacted in negotiating, adopting, and refining the ltgg. Drawing lessons from the ltgg experience, the manuscript contributes to knowledge on the politics of global goals, international negotiations, climate governance, and, more broadly, international relations, diplomacy, and global environmental politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationally reported greenhouse gas inventories are a core component of the Paris Agreements transparency framework. Comparisons with emission estimates derived from atmospheric observations help identify improvements to reduce uncertainties and increase the confidence in reported values. To facilitate comparisons over the contiguous United States, we present a 0.1° × 0.1° gridded inventory of annual 2012-2018 anthropogenic methane emissions, allocated to 26 individual source categories, with scale-dependent error estimates. Our inventory is consistent with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks (GHGI), submitted to the United Nations in 2020. Total emissions and patterns (spatial/temporal) reflect the activity and emission factor data underlying the GHGI, including many updates relative to a previous gridded version of the GHGI that has been extensively compared with observations. These underlying data are not generally available in global gridded inventories, and comparison to EDGAR version 6 shows large spatial differences, particularly for the oil and gas sectors. We also find strong regional variability across all sources in annual 2012-2018 spatial trends, highlighting the importance of understanding regional- and facility-level activities. Our inventory represents the first time series of gridded GHGI methane emissions and enables robust comparisons of emissions and their trends with atmospheric observations.

The legal systems for ocean governance and climate change governance are based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, respectively. However, due to differences in their negotiation backgrounds, legal scope, goals, and tasks, there is a lack of interaction between the two at the legal system level. The ocean plays a crucial role in regulating the Earth's climate system, yet its value is often underestimated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The aim of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in addressing climate change. Specifically, we will examine the Convention's ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and identify areas where it falls short, such as inadequate regulation of sea level rise, ocean acidification, and ocean fertilization. Based on this, proposals for governance paths from the perspective of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea include developing the Agreement relating to the climate change and ocean governance and reinterpreting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in accordance with the Paris Agreement. The content should be adapted more flexibly to current climate change challenges, and provisions related to sea level rise and maritime boundaries should be reinterpreted to fill legal gaps. In addition, it is important to establish coordinated regulatory rules and framework agreements to address the issues of ocean fertilization and ocean acidification. Finally, to remedy the shortcomings in proving causation, scientific theories and due diligence obligations should be attributed. Through these measures, effective ocean law governance paths that address climate change can be explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global climate and biodiversity crises are closely intertwined, yet no policy instrument currently tackles both jointly. This is problematic, as the lack of international platforms for designing coordinated and coherent policy frameworks that align targets across the nexus of biodiversity and climate change poses risks to nature and people.Here, we argue that the successful implementation of both the Paris Agreement and the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) requires a joint work programme between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Such a joint work programme could fill the current global governance vacuum and address critical implementation gaps, while fostering innovation and synergies in climate and biodiversity action.Based on a review of existing work programmes under the UNFCCC and interagency and joint work programmes established with the CBD, we provide a concept of how this joint programme could be set up, ideas on the type of issues it should tackle and recommendations for successful implementation.Policy implications: The UNFCCC and CBD are unique platforms for providing the evidence to, and guiding the way through the changes we need, but higher levels of integration between the biodiversity and climate change agendas are needed to plug the implementation gap between the GBF and the Paris Agreement. The upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16) present a clear policy window for the two conventions to introduce a formal governance structure, such as the one proposed in this contribution, that brings together ideas, people, organizations and processes necessary for joining the dots on how to both stabilize our climate and recover our nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, developed and developing countries, each based on their economic, political, and geographical background, have a different interpretation of the causes and consequences of climate change, so that each of them, based on different but believable and convincing statistics and principles, accuse each other of causing climate change and being responsible for its consequences. One of the most recent initiatives to reconcile the contradictory interpretations of the parties was to establish the loss and damage Fund in COP27 and its operationalization in COP28. Can the operationalization of the Fund be a decisive resolution in the field of contradictory interpretations between the parties regarding the responsibility caused by climate change? The recent study shows that due to different political and economic backgrounds, each party has contradictory interpretations regarding the causes and consequences of climate change based on different legal principles and scientific data. Although the mere establishment of the Fund is a positive step to reconcile these contradictory perceptions, the conflicting interpretations, especially regarding the finance recipients and contributors, indicate that the tragic story of the responsibility for climate change still has an open and ambiguous ending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The special reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have a unique character in IPCC scientific assessment. Their main purpose is to address specific timely issues of policy relevance. This article explores the nature and role of IPCC special reports along the lines of three questions: (1) the history (‘where they come from’); (2) the function (‘what they are doing’); and (3) the future (‘where they are going’). In earlier assessment cycles, special reports were characterised mostly as a direct channel for quickly responding to the request from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The conduct of special reports has been gradually institutionalised to embed its planning in the overall scoping of the entire assessment cycle. More recently, they have become a vehicle to consolidate cross-cutting scientific perspectives and serve the diverse needs of the international policy community, not only the UNFCCC. This historical evolution is, in a sense, the result of striving for greater policy relevance. Special reports have a dual political function—namely, turning into the site or object of politicised debates on science (politicisation) and serving as ‘de facto governance’ with the effect of normalising politically contested ideas (normalisation). This dual function is two different faces emerging from the process into which the IPCC is brought to deal with political controversy. The duality of the two functions also manifests inherent tensions that lie behind the IPCC’s ‘policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive’ principle. For the future of special reports, the IPCC could reconsider the role of special reports in light of the priority over comprehensive assessment reports, the responsiveness to the UNFCCC request and the selection and scope definition of timely topics. However, there will remain a trade-off between provisional science and lasting political impact caused by the future undertaking of IPCC special reports on any topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trust is necessary to ensure international cooperation between nation-states who negotiate responses to address the causes and effects of climate change. There is reason to believe that an erosion of trust has been happening since the Paris Agreement negotiations. Yet, it is unclear if and how trust started to erode. Interviews with twenty-two climate negotiators indicate that a contested compliance with CBDRRC is resulting in an erosion of trust in line with issues of reliance, unfulfilled responsibility, lack of reciprocity, and absence of recognition. Such issues include a perceived lack of compliance with the provisions of finance and other forms of support, lack of progress in reflecting the highest possible ambition in the implementation of NDCs, and challenges in increasing resilience and addressing loss and damage. An erosion of trust from contested compliance with organising principles has significant implications for climate negotiations, especially for the transition away from fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much existing empirical research on polycentric climate governance (PCG) systems examines small-N examples. In response, we aim to advance studies of PCG by exploring, and reflecting on, the use of large-N data sets for analyzing PCG. We use Python (a programming language) to create a novel data set from the United Nations' Global Climate Action Portal. This method allows us to quantify key variables for 12,568 businesses located in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries: the number of businesses' climate commitments, their progress toward meeting those commitments, and businesses' memberships in "more polycentric" networks via transnational climate initiatives (TCIs). Our analysis of these data reveals that greater interconnectedness may strengthen climate policy performance, since businesses with memberships in TCIs more commonly achieved their commitments. Additional research using these data, and/or similar methods, could be conducted on climate governance and on other areas of international environmental governance, such as mining and oil production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement ushered in an era of climate governance underpinned by a polycentric theory of change, emphasizing experimentation, collaboration, and innovation while downplaying political contestation, power asymmetries, and the need for regulatory action by the state. This article explores the roles the state plays in polycentric climate governance, focusing on the tension between the regulatory state, where authorities set, monitor, and enforce rules, and the orchestrating state, which facilitates collaboration with nonstate actors to induce behavioral change. Using decarbonization in Sweden as an illustrative case study, the article synthesizes the results of two research projects evaluating the promises and limits of polycentric climate governance. The results problematize the view that Sweden is a forerunner in climate governance, suggesting that while the Swedish government has mobilized support from important industries and cities in favor of decarbonization, that support may be insufficient to achieve necessary societal transformation for deep decarbonization. Finally, the study reflects on the conditions necessary for polycentric governance to effectively decarbonize society, highlighting the pivotal role of the regulatory state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement is an important milestone in international climate policy and the associated negotiations of the United Nations Climate Summit under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is a supplementary mechanism—regarding carbon markets—to reduce greenhouse gases and achieve the UNFCCC's main objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations. The 2021 United Nations Climate Summit in Glasgow (COP26) played a key role in the pursuit of this goal. Via an overview of Article 6 negotiations in past COP summits and a systematic review and qualitative meta‐synthesis of the literature leading up to COP26, I identify three arguments involving Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8 behind the selected literature. I substantiate these arguments based on the meta‐evaluation of the existing literature and propose a three‐stage meta‐evaluation of the arguments on Article 6 (carbon markets) of the Paris Agreement in the context of COP26 to ascertain if the negotiations were successful in leading to requisite agreements on Article 6. I conclude that future qualitative research should focus on Articles 6.4 and 6.8 of the Paris Agreement and examine the outcomes of future climate debates to see how ideas will flow through the negotiations regarding these two articles to pursue the goal of the UNFCCC under the Paris Agreement. Related Articles: Jihyung Joo, Jihyung, Jouni Paavola, and James Van Alstine. 2023. "The Divergence of South Korea's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) from the EU ETS: An Institutional Complementarity View." Politics & Policy 51(6): 1155–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12566. Nunes Silva, Carlos. 2012. "Policy and Evidence in a Partisan Age: The Great Disconnect—By Paul Gary Wyckoff." Politics & Policy 40(3): 541–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00363.x. Robles, Pedro, and Daniel J. Mallinson. 2023. "Catching up with AI: Pushing toward a Cohesive Governance Framework." Politics & Policy 51(3): 355–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12529. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of research suggests that the global conception of climate change is increasingly taking a justice-focus. However, the justice-framings of different actors in the UNFCCC process and their evolution have not yet been examined. We conduct a critical discourse analysis of climate justice claims of state and non-state actors in COP15, COP19, COP21 and COP24 which are key moments for climate justice under the UNFCCC. Our findings indicate that the UNFCCC has not delivered on climate justice, power stands out as a key issue in the negotiations, and the negotiations reproduce structures of climate injustice. We identified four new country groupings with different climate justice frames. The Radicals consider climate change an imminent threat, while Opportunists seek to benefit from it. The Hypocrites recognize their contribution to climate change but avoid responsibility through libertarian mechanisms. The Evaders construe justice a normative issue and block others' justice claims. These groupings help discern how justice framings have evolved and how they are used in strategic ways to advance interests in multilateral forums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unpacking the experience of Ecojesuit as a global network helps in exploring new ways of collaborating across institutions and committed individuals for better participation in global processes. Ecojesuit, a tiny voice at the fringes of the United Nations (UN) meetings on climate and sustainability, adds effort to the broader social commitment for global action. It connects with other organizations sharing goodwill, capacities and voices caring for our common home and those struggling in the local context of climate disasters. While COP28 has been a great disappointment for those seeking fossil fuel phaseout, research of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is increasingly upheld. Such participation in international relations deepens the Jesuit Universal Apostolic Preferences (UAPs) and Jesuit regional Conferences in apostolic planning. The process of growing a Jesuit network of broad collaboration takes decades; each revision involves greater participation and inclusion of present realities and meaning in life.

There has been growing interest in the Conference of Parties (COPs) meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in food systems, which account for a third of global emissions and are heavily impacted by climate change. While there has been much rhetoric about the need for transformation at recent COPs, we examine whether this solely remains at the level of rhetoric and ambition or is likely to deliver the climate action that is needed. Based on literature, documentation of UNFCCC meetings, and our own participation, we observe that progress in the past on agriculture has been extremely slow and has led to limited action, while the recent verbiage on food systems has not been matched by significant progress in the negotiations. The urgent action needed is not realised through the UNFCCC processes. New and radically different ways to catalyse action are needed, and the UNFCCC process urgently needs reform as part of wider multilateral reforms. We propose that the scale of the COPs is reduced and that the focus shifts to the results delivered through rigorous evaluation, accountability and transparency, and a shift towards less consensus-based approaches to drive action and ambition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Non‐state actors (NSAs) have been widely recognized as important participants in the global climate regime. Their participation is considered to have the potential to enhance the democratic legitimacy of global governance institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). What is the mechanism through which NSAs grant legitimacy to the institution? This study connects NSA legitimation with their deliberation at multilateral venues. I argue that, while NSAs do not have formal voting or decision‐making power, evaluating their participation in deliberation activities, such as the Side Events at the annual Conference of Parties, can shed light on our understanding of whether there is equality in their participation and who gets to contribute to the institutional legitimacy of the UNFCCC. Drawing on the example of women's groups at the UNFCCC, I demonstrate their increasing participation in deliberation. Quantitative analysis and interviews suggest that their participation is relatively inclusive with a diverse range of actors and viewpoints. Although Global Northern NSAs enjoy some advantages in participation, the effect is balanced by NSAs' social embeddedness, especially for the Southern groups, and the robust collaborations between the North and South. These features are likely to enhance the legitimacy of UNFCCC. Future research should consider how to understand and assess legitimacy in global governance regimes and who may be left out in the legitimation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the governance of climate change under the Paris Agreement, specifically focusing on the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) as a governance instrument. The author argues that the adoption of the Paris Agreement did not resolve many of the differences between states, and further research is needed to accurately interpret its results. The article outlines five aspects for future research on NDCs, including the need to consider both countries' positions during negotiations and the adopted decisions, as well as the interlinkages between NDCs and other parts of the Paris Agreement. The author also highlights the importance of avoiding oversimplification and considering the political struggles that surround climate governance. [Extracted from the article]

In this article, we examine how young climate activists make use of the United Nations (UN) constituency system to give voice to children and youth in global climate governance. Our study is based on a mapping of accredited youth nongovernmental organizations (YOUNGO) as well as fieldwork at two UN Climate Change Conferences, where we conducted interviews, observed events, and analyzed plenary interventions. Informed by constructivist accounts of political representation, the article pays attention to the performative relationship between institutionalized means of youth representation and "the represented." When analyzing our material, we asked who speaks for youth, how youth are spoken of, and how institutions shape representative speech. Our study identifies three subject positions that offer competing interpretations of who youth are as a political community and what they want. Rather than taking youth's demands and interests as a starting point for representative politics, the article illustrates how the UN constituency system actively constructs youth and effectively molds young climate activists into professional insiders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For countries' emission-reduction efforts under the Paris Agreement to be effective, baseline emission/removals levels and reporting must be as transparent and accurate as possible. For Indonesia, which holds among the largest area of tropical peatlands and mangrove forest in the world, it is particularly important for these high-carbon ecosystems to produce high-accuracy greenhouse gas inventory and to improve national forest reference emissions level/forest reference level. Here, we highlight the opportunity for refining greenhouse gas emission factors (EF) of peatlands and mangroves and describe scientific challenges to support climate policy processes in Indonesia, where 55 to 59% of national emission reduction targets by 2030 depend on mitigation in Forestry and Other Land Use. Based on the stock-difference and flux change approaches, we examine higher-tier EF for drained and rewetted peatland, peatland fires, mangrove conversions, and mangrove on peatland to improve future greenhouse gas flux reporting in Indonesia. We suggest that these refinements will be essential to support Indonesia in achieving Forest and Other Land Use net sink by 2030 and net zero emissions targets by 2060 or earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change (CC) is a global problem bringing multiple different changes in different regions that exacerbate the conflict between landscape demands. Policy in EU and elsewhere are facing the huge challenge of CC by developing specific regulations and strategies (e.g., European climate law, RDP 2014–2020) generally shaped in the United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The "new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change" sets out how the EU can adapt to the unavoidable impacts of CC and become climate resilient by 2050. Unfortunately, the factual implementation of these policies remains critical. Most often there is a lack of science‐based decision support tools empowering regional and local levels to act toward climate resilience. Here we have produced a strong interdisciplinary research effort to support the implementation of the EU strategy on adaptation to CC by providing free web‐based Decision Support Systems having a strong focus on factual territories. Our Geospatial Decision Support System aims to support local authorities/communities, scientists, and other stakeholders in EU and more in detail in Italy in better understanding and implementing local adaptation to climate change by means of a "Climate Change Resilience" toolbox oriented to evaluate the climatic anomalies and thermal crop adaptation. Specifically, in this research, two implemented tools have been discussed: (i) tool on General climatic variation and (ii) tool on Crop thermal adaptation. These tools are demonstrated in two different case studies at both EU and national level. Such a toolbox has been produced in the framework of the LANDSUPPORT Horizon 2020 project (www.landsupport.eu). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main challenges for modern international law is its capacity to deal with global public interests. In a world characterized by growing interdependence, the international community requires instruments to regulate the global commons, provide global public goods, and enforce its fundamental values. In this context, this article contributes to the debate on the legal consequences of recognizing climate stability as a global public good. While these goods are regulated on a case-by-case basis, some of them have the status of being common concerns of humankind. Since the ICJ and the ILC have not clarified the content of this legal status, I discuss the main academic perspectives and propose a new standpoint. Considering the current stage of public international law, I argue that the common concern status does not generate new state obligations but impacts the content of those commitments already included in the international climate change regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Conference of Parties (COP) is the longest running forum for international discussion of climate change and offers rich data in the form of speeches. Studying how elites have historically communicated about climate change can help us understand their approaches to address climate change. In this study, we analyzed 2493 COP statements from 1995 to 2021 to describe how sentiment is used, and to see whether specific issues associated with climate policy (adaptation, mitigation, financing, development, disasters) are discussed in particular sentiment contexts. Quantitative analysis (sentiment analysis with multi-level modelling) revealed that leaders expressed high levels of positive sentiment in these diplomatic statements, but also some negative sentiment. Over time, representatives at COP used more positive, angry, and fearful sentiments in speeches. Representatives of wealthier and more developed countries expressed themselves differently than those from less wealthy and developing countries. To examine sentiment surrounding policy issues we used embedding regression. Countries expressed different sentiments about adaptation, mitigation, and development depending on their development status, and about disasters depending on their wealth. Shifts in sentiment over time were observed when results were plotted graphically, and these shifts may be related to specific events and agreements. Using these two approaches, we highlight how those with the power to make top-down changes to address climate change have historically talked about this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a commonly held view, states have fundamentally re-organized the differentiation between developed and developing countries in the climate regime in the 2015 Paris Agreement. In this view, the Paris Agreement replaces the 'rigid', 'static', and 'dichotomous' system of differentiation based on Annexes I and II to UN Framework Convention on Climate Change with a more 'flexible', 'dynamic', and 'subtle' solution. I argue that this view is incomplete. In fact, the early climate regime included additional layers of differentiation that go beyond the binary distinction between Annex and non-Annex parties. Through a discussion of three episodes in which states adjusted the system to the 'special circumstances' of regime members, I show how informalization and individualization – two hallmarks of differentiation in the Paris Agreement – had become central well before COP-21 and that the international climate regime thus developed a lot more gradually than is often assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study employs quantitative and qualitative methodologies mainly to examine how UNFCCC Executive Secretaries use concessive but-constructions and linguistic polyphony to implicitly argue points of view and convey stance in speeches on climate change. Our findings indicate that, in order to achieve its goals for global climate governance while adhering to humanitarian and diplomatic principles, UNFCCC speeches delivered to the Parties to the Convention and the Stakeholders emphasize the urgent need for concerted action on climate change while implicitly expressing discontent and mild criticism of various Parties and Stakeholders for failing to do their fair share in support of such action. This style of discourse aims to promote group unity, solidarity, and transparency while minimizing the possibility of offending any Parties or Stakeholders. Nevertheless, given the urgency of addressing climate change challenges, we advise that UNFCCC speakers utilize more explicit linguistic methods that exert more direct pressure on specific Parties or Stakeholders who fail to assume their share of responsibility. In addition, we suggest that the UNFCCC focus on enabling the implementation of practical actions to limit the effects of global warming, while continuing to urge affluent countries to provide developing countries with much-needed financial and technological help. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving the Paris Agreement's global temperature goal of keeping warming well below 2 °C and ideally 1.5 °C requires limiting fossil fuel production. In the United Nations climate change negotiations, this need is only beginning to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, as some countries have already adopted supply-side climate policies, initial cooperative activities have started, and calls grow for a fossil fuel treaty, questions arise about the prospects and possible effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply. Combining qualitative insights on possible participants in a supply-side coalition with a quantitative analysis based on integrated assessment general equilibrium modelling, this article addresses these questions. Through k-means clustering based on fossil reserves per capita, fossil fuel rents and existing supply-side policies, we first identify which (groups of) countries are most likely to lead the formation of an international supply-side coalition, and which (groups of) countries are likely to follow. Drawing on these insights, we develop several scenarios for the evolution of international supply-side coalitions and compare these to a business-as-usual scenario. By doing so, we demonstrate the global and regional environmental, trade and macroeconomic effects of international cooperation on limiting fossil fuel supply and combining fossil supply restrictions with carbon pricing to meet the Paris goals. Our findings underscore the importance of pursuing supply-side and ambitious demand-side climate policies in parallel, and identify the scope and coverage, size of the coalition, and incentives for participation as key design elements for an international supply-side coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goals of the Paris Agreement (PA) on collectively managing climate change can only be reached if all parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commit to actions supporting their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Developing-economy nations play a crucial role in reaching the PA targets, particularly in the Agriculture, Forest, and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) sector. However, developing country Parties also face several constraints in tracking and communicating progress towards their climate policy targets and implementation of their NDCs. The operationalization of Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) and Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) under the PA will bring stricter reporting timeframes and advanced transparency for all parties. With these requirements rapidly coming into force, addressing reporting gaps is now a pressing priority. The present study analyzes the NDCs, and Biennial Update Reports (BURs) submitted by developing country Parties under the UNFCCC. In an illustrative exercise, our in-depth analysis concentrates on reporting on the AFOLU sector and identifies issues impeding a comprehensive and comparable Global Stock Take (GST): (i) issues of consistency in reporting timeframes (ii) issues in transparency of reporting on mitigation sectors and on relevant progress indicators (iii) incomparability of methodological approaches proposed and used, and (iv) the implications of limited national capacity for transparent reporting. The UNFCCC and developed country Parties now have the opportunity of providing specialized support for developing country Parties. This could include tailored guidance to address gaps in both greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions accounting, and reporting challenges, to ensure consistent, comprehensive, and transparent reporting to reinforce capacities moving forward following the next GST. The lack of consistent, transparent, and comparable communication from developing country Parties on NDC progress for key climate change impact mitigation sectors, such as AFOLU, has implications for operationalization of the GST. Delayed and inconsistent reporting are expected to affect the aggregation and consolidation of information across countries to inform global progress. Increased support for tailored capacity building and data gathering is required to enable transparent communication on progress in NDC implementation, monitoring, and reporting. Developing country groups will need to improve the transparency of reporting progress on the implementation and achievement of their NDCs to match the expected increase in carbon footprints with growing economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and governments increasingly frame climate protection in terms of green growth, arguing that continued economic growth and climate protection are complementary and mutually beneficial. With such framing, governments hope to overcome the global common goods problem associated with climate change and to enable higher ambition on climate action within and across states. Yet, no empirical evidence to date has been provided on how widespread the support for green growth is in international climate politics. This paper, therefore, investigates which countries employ green growth framings at UNFCCC negotiations, and whether this relates to domestic factors, in particular economic structure, level of development and climate impacts. We conduct panel-data analysis on green growth positions derived from hand-coding a unique dataset of High-level Segment statements at the Convention of the Parties (COPs) from 2010 to 2019 for 151 countries. The results reveal that, to date, green growth proponents are those countries with the most advanced national clean energy technology (CET) capacities – as measured by the Green Complexity Index. The findings highlight that green growth is not promoted by all countries at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, climate protection is increasingly framed as a green growth opportunity to motivate global ambition. Clean Energy Technology (CET) leading countries are more likely to use green growth framings than other less-technologically advanced peers and those with high exposure to climate risks. Mechanisms to support green growth pathways for all countries should be scaled up, including technology transfer and finance to foster local capacities and human capital. Given that green growth framings are not universally endorsed, further emphasis should be placed on additional co-benefits of climate action beyond economic growth, such as food and energy security, adaptation and resilience-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our understanding of climate change has expanded to include issues beyond reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, we do not have a sound empirical understanding of how negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations have evolved to address an increasingly wide range of issues relevant to climate change. To understand what the climate talks have focused on and how the volume of work has changed, the authors create a Climate Negotiations Database that categorizes negotiation agenda items starting from the first Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1995. Overall, the volume of work in the negotiations is shown to have steadily increased over time but it is not necessarily tied to the negotiation of new rules enshrined in major agreements or outcomes. While the negotiations have broadened to include a wider range of issues, we demonstrate that transparency and mitigation matters traditionally dominate the agendas. This finding lends support to the call for greater balance among issues. Transparency and mitigation show different patterns. While mitigation issues are more negotiations-intensive, and often about markets, the transparency discussions tend to be more implementation-focused. The database provides an empirical base for further research on various aspects of global climate governance. Intergovernmental agendas provide one way to study how countries collectively view climate change and potential governance options. The Climate Negotiations Database finds relative stability in the top ten climate issues discussed over time, with mitigation and transparency as the top two categories. The range of issues discussed in the context of international climate negotiations has expanded, especially since 2007. The climate talks have broadened their focus beyond reducing emissions. There is a mismatch between the recurrence of mitigation sub-items and substantive outcomes that would yield emissions reductions. Half of the mitigation sub-items relate to market mechanisms and forests, perhaps indicating a lack of attention to the core work of reducing emissions from industrial sources. The number of agenda sub-items for the climate regime spiked at the start of the Paris Agreement negotiations and remained relatively high. Under the Paris Agreement, the balance of issues considered may shift and potentially amplify the recent downturn in mitigation-related items. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I argue that the Women and Gender Constituency (WGC) in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been remarkable in its efforts to mainstream gender in the Convention. The WGC has been at the forefront of the fight to embed a gender perspective into global climate change politics and has been the driving force for the UNFCCC's progression from gender-blind in 1992 to a Gender Action Plan in 2017. Through an intersectional framework, I demonstrate that foregrounding gender as a political issue and feminist activism in the history of the UNFCCC makes visible a tricky strategic bind whereby an "insider" approach to influencing the negotiations has meant that while women–environment links are firmly embedded in UNFCCC discourse, gender–environment links are less well received. Understanding this strategic bind faced by feminist climate activists is important politically, to advance feminist arguments in global climate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Successful nonstate climate actions can scale up their efforts and/or have their approaches replicated by others. To strengthen these "catalytic impacts" and their contribution to global mitigation and adaptation efforts, multiple international awarding mechanisms have been established, including Momentum for Change, launched by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To assess the actual value of awarding mechanisms for fostering catalytic impacts among nonstate climate actions, this article identifies drivers and barriers for catalytic impacts and the extent to which Momentum for Change addresses them, using the concept of enabling power. Research results indicate that only a selective range of drivers and barriers for catalytic impact is actually addressed through Momentum for Change, which mainly strengthens reputation as a driver. Overall, the study demonstrates that the enabling power of Momentum for Change relies on the legitimacy of the UNFCCC in climate governance. However, the extent to which awarding mechanisms help foster catalytic impact is also dependent on an initiative's individual context, which may affect its ability to capitalize on reputational benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measuring the effectiveness of adaptation and tracking collective progress has received increasing attention across the domains of policy, finance and research. This is linked to the need to monitor and evaluate bilateral and multilateral adaptation finance as well as a commitment in the Paris Agreement to a collective global goal on adaptation and assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation in the global stocktake. In this viewpoint I argue that this focus on defining and measuring adaptation progress has underplayed the importance of how measurement might influence action. Engaging with diverse scholarship on knowledge practices and measurement opens up new perspectives on how measurement might play a role in governing adaptation across scales and the role of experts and forms of knowledge in shaping implementation. These also open up new policy-relevant questions around how metrics can best be designed to be support transformative adaptation action through mechanisms such as incentives, norms and framing. This viewpoint outlines the empirical context and policy space of internationally-financed adaptation efforts, drawing in relevant scholarship applied in similar domains to define an emerging research agenda on the measurement of adaptation as a social and political process that shapes policy, finance and implementation across multiple scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change due to global warming will have an impact on marine and coastal ecosystems, including causing loss of biodiversity and threatening the sustainability of marine and coastal resources. The Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) made Indonesia, which is a tropical archipelagic state as one of the hotspots that is very at risk of being affected by global warming. This risk is especially experienced by cities on the coast. Therefore the importance of adaptation, especially in dealing with the impacts of climate change that has already occurred. The adaptation process cannot be delayed any longer because the earth's temperature will certainly increase beyond the threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius in 2030 compared to the pre-Industrial Revolution temperature of 1850. Currently, the global temperature increase has reached 1.1 degrees Celsius. Therefore, Indonesia must immediately make adaptation efforts by utilizing the Blue Carbon Ecosystem which is based on research that blue carbon can absorb and store 100 times more carbon and is more permanent than forests on land. This stored carbon can be stored for thousands of years. Because of this great potential, coastal ecosystems can play many roles as adaptation solutions and mitigation of climate change impacts. Therefore researchers conduct research with the aim of the research is to create Strategies and Adaptation Efforts for Utilizing Blue Carbon Ecosystems: Disaster Resilience, Climate Crisis, and Sustainable Development, with the main target of implementing Resource Based Theory in developing strategies for utilization of Marine Resources, especially Utilization of Carbon Ecosystems Blue in Indonesian marine environment. This research is expected to provide theoretical and empirical evidence related to the development of blue ecosystem utilization strategies, climate crisis, and sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Conference of Parties (COP) of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) provides a platform at a specific periodicity (one, two or three years) to review work of the Convention in question. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a 'universal' convention with 198 parties. The 28th annual meeting of the COP (UNFCCC) was held in Dubai (UAE) during 30 November - 13 December 2023. The UN provides 'secretariat' support to the UNFCCC, hence the usage of prefix 'United Nations'. It is called a 'framework convention' since it was adopted with a bare skeleton on 09 May 1992. It required 'fleshing out' of the UNFCCC with required elements to make it work for the "'ultimate objective" of "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Article 2). It led to the adoption of the ("related legal instruments") 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement. The climate change regime now comprises these three legal instruments that seek to address the global climate problematique. Whereas COP27 (Sharm El-Shaik; 06–21 November 2022) was known for adoption of the decision on "loss and damage" funding for vulnerable countries hit hard by climate disasters, COP28 unveiled the first global climate 'stocktake'. This took place on the heels of UNEP Emissions Gap Report (20 November 2023) that issued warming that "world is heading for a temperature rise far above the Paris Agreement goals unless countries deliver more than they have promised". The UNEP report called for the GHG emissions (by 2030) to "fall by 28 per cent for the Paris Agreement 2°C pathway and 42 per cent for the 1.5°C pathway". Thus, there is a big chasm between what is laid down in the climate change regulatory framework, what is scientifically ordained and what is actually given effect on the ground by the states Parties. After 30 years (1994–2024), the resultant 'conundrum' presents a challenge at this juncture of planetary crisis. It calls for the state Parties to the global climate change regime to engage in a major course correction in the current global climate change regulatory approaches for securing our planetary future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that the waste sector is a potential emitter of methane gas (CH4), which has a greenhouse effect up to 28 times greater than that of carbon dioxide (CO2). The management of municipal solid waste (MSW) generates greenhouse gases (GHG) directly through emissions from the process itself as well as indirectly through transportation and energy consumption. The objective of this study was to evaluate the GHG emissions contributed by the waste sector in the Recife metropolitan region (RMR) and to define mitigation scenarios to comply with the Brazilian Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), a result of the Paris Agreement. To achieve this, an exploratory study was carried out, including a literature review, collection of data, estimation of emissions using the IPCC model (2006), and comparison between the values assumed by the country in 2015 and those estimated in the adopted mitigation scenarios. The RMR is composed of 15 municipalities, has an area of 3,216,262 km2 and a population of 4,054,866 inhabitants (2018), generating approximality 1.4 million t -year of MSW. It was estimated that, in the period from 2006 to 2018, 25.4 million t CO2e were emitted. The comparative analysis between the absolute values defined in the Brazilian NDC and the results from the mitigation scenarios showed that approximately 36 million t CO2e could be avoided through the disposal of MSW in the RMR, equivalent to a 52% reduction in emissions estimated for 2030, a percentage greater than the 47% reduction assumed in the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Conference of Parties (COP) of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) provides a platform at a specific periodicity (one, two or three years) to review work of the Convention in question. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a 'universal' convention with 198 parties. The 28th annual meeting of the COP (UNFCCC) was held in Dubai (UAE) during 30 November - 13 December 2023. The UN provides 'secretariat' support to the UNFCCC, hence the usage of prefix 'United Nations'. It is called a 'framework convention' since it was adopted with a bare skeleton on 09 May 1992. It required 'fleshing out' of the UNFCCC with required elements to make it work for the "'ultimate objective" of "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Article 2). It led to the adoption of the ("related legal instruments") 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement. The climate change regime now comprises these three legal instruments that seek to address the global climate problematique. Whereas COP27 (Sharm El-Shaik; 06–21 November 2022) was known for adoption of the decision on "loss and damage" funding for vulnerable countries hit hard by climate disasters, COP28 unveiled the first global climate 'stocktake'. This took place on the heels of UNEP Emissions Gap Report (20 November 2023) that issued warming that "world is heading for a temperature rise far above the Paris Agreement goals unless countries deliver more than they have promised". The UNEP report called for the GHG emissions (by 2030) to "fall by 28 per cent for the Paris Agreement 2°C pathway and 42 per cent for the 1.5°C pathway". Thus, there is a big chasm between what is laid down in the climate change regulatory framework, what is scientifically ordained and what is actually given effect on the ground by the states Parties. After 30 years (1994–2024), the resultant 'conundrum' presents a challenge at this juncture of planetary crisis. It calls for the state Parties to the global climate change regime to engage in a major course correction in the current global climate change regulatory approaches for securing our planetary future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous literature has proposed that international cooperation in small groups of countries, so-called “climate clubs,” will be an effective complement to the UNFCCC process. Little research has investigated the potential for an industry-specific climate club. Filling this gap, we assess possibilities for a climate club in the aviation sector in which “leader” countries pay followers to use sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs). We seek to understand if such cooperation is possible at a reasonable price. In addition, we examine the ideal coalition size for successful cooperation and the sensitivity of outcomes to SAF price and mix rate. To investigate these questions, we use an agent-based model calibrated with data on countries’ populations, GDP, and jet fuel consumption. Our results indicate that modest cooperation is possible under various circumstances but limited by SAF price and maximum mix rate. Furthermore, there may be compelling reasons to start with a very small number of club members.