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It is widely agreed that the color vision process moves quickly from cone receptors to opponent color cells in the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus. Many workers have proposed the transformation or coding of long, medium, short (LMS) cone responses to r − g, y − b opponent color chromatic responses (unique hues) on the following basis: That L, M, S cones represent Red, Green, and Blue hues, with Yellow represented by (L + M), while r − g and y − b represent the opponent pairs of unique hues. The traditional coding from cones to opponent colors is that L − M gives r − g, while (L + M) − S gives y − b. This convention is open to several criticisms, and a new coding is required. A literature search produced 16 studies of cone responses LMS and 15 studies of spectral (i.e., ygb) opponent color chromatic responses, in terms of response wavelength peaks. Comparative analysis of the two sets of studies shows the means are almost identical (within 3 nm; i.e., L = y, M = g, S = b). Further, the response curves of LMS are very similar shapes to ygb. In sum, each set can directly transform to the other on this proposed coding: (S + L) − M gives r − g, while L − S gives y − b. This coding activates neural operations in the cardinal directions r − g and y − b.

INTRODUCTION: Hypoxia can be a problem for warfighters, compromising visual and cognitive performance. One area of study has been hypoxia-induced decrements in color vision.METHODS: The present study examined how hypoxia affected the perception of wavelengths associated with unique green and with unique yellow as well as discriminability by the blue vs. yellow (b-y) and the red vs. green (r-g) spectrally opponent color channels while breathing O2 levels found at sea level and at 5500 m. Measurements of wavelengths producing unique green (minimizing response by the b-y channel) and unique yellow (minimizing response by the r-g channel) preceded measurements of wavelength discriminability near those unique hues.RESULTS: Relative to sea level, unique yellow shifted to shorter wavelengths (0.54 nm) and unique green shifted to longer wavelengths (2.3 nm) under hypoxia. In terms of an equal psychophysical scale, both unique hues shifted by similar magnitudes. Wavelength discriminability of both color channels was compromised by statistically reliable amounts of 16–17% under hypoxia.DISCUSSION: These results were consistent with previous studies and the inference that postreceptor, M-cone neurons were differentially compromised by hypoxia. However, these measurable changes in color vision due to hypoxia were not perceived by the subjects.Bierman A, LaPlumm T, Rea MS. Declines in wavelength discrimination and shifts in unique hue with hypoxia. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(5):394–402.

We introduce ‘Colors - One’, a perceptually based color photo editing app built for the Apple ecosystem. The app’s core algorithm augments standard Poisson image editing methods to allow the prediction and editing of perceived image color, rather than pixel color. Users can isolate 16 unique hues and edit the contrast color of each hue individually. The resulting photo edits are striking and provide new insights into the nature of perceptual color representations.

In both theory and practice, individual behavioral differences can reveal details of underlying neural mechanisms, and this has been widely exploited in experimental psychology. However, under some circumstances, individual differences are conspicuous by their absence. Three illuminating examples are treated in this theoretical review: (1) In color vision, there is a surprising lack of variation in red–green color opponency, especially as studied using unique hues, given the huge variation of L:M-cone ratios in normal observers. (2) Conversely, in achromatic vision, individual differences in L:M-cone ratios can be studied by measuring spectral sensitivity (luminance efficiency) functions. However, contrary to reasonable expectations, parvo and magno mechanisms can give rise to indistinguishable spectral sensitivity functions, so individual variations in parvo and magno activation often cannot be studied via spectral sensitivity. (3) Similar convergences occur in neuroscience: in simulated and actual neuronal networks and in electrophysiological/functional imaging studies of intact animals/humans. Neuronal systems trained or developed to do the same tasks need not wind up with the same wiring or the exact same behavior. However, under some circumstances, their behaviors can become functionally similar. Markedly different neural mechanisms somehow yield similar behaviors, a result found in systems as different as motor behaviors in crustaceans and sensory behaviors in humans. Theoretically, similar neural mechanisms can result from different neural combinations, a response convergence which limits our ability to infer the origins of some perceptual channels. When expected individual differences do not manifest, this is a clue that something interesting is happening and a goad to further investigation.

The idea of colour opponency maintains that colour vision arises through the comparison of two chromatic mechanisms, red versus green (RG) and yellow versus blue (YB). The four unique hues, red, green, blue, and yellow, are assumed to appear at the null points of these the two chromatic systems. However, whether unique hues have a distinct signature that can be reliably discerned in neural activity is still an open question. Here we hypothesise that, if unique hues represent a tractable cortical state, they should elicit more robust activity compared to non-unique hues. We use a spatiotemporal decoding approach to reconstruct an activation space for a set of unique and intermediate hues across a range of luminance values. We show that electroencephalographic (EEG) responses carry robust information about isoluminant unique hues within a 100-300 ms window from stimulus onset. Decoding is possible in both passive and active viewing tasks, but is compromised when concurrent high luminance contrast is added to the colour signals. The efficiency of hue decoding is not entirely predicted by their mutual distance in a nominally uniform perceptual colour space. Instead, the encoding space shows pivotal non-uniformities which suggest that anisotropies in neurometric hue-spaces are likely to represent perceptual unique hues. Furthermore, the neural code for hue temporally coincides with the neural code for luminance contrast, thus explaining why potential neural correlates of unique hues have remained so elusive until now.

Variations in colour perception have featured prominently in recent attempts to argue against the view that colours are objective mind-independent properties of the perceptual environment: either physical properties, such as types of surface reflectance profile (e.g. Byrne and Hilbert 1997, 2003, 2007 and Tye 2006), or else sui generis mind-independent properties (e.g. Campbell 1993). My aim in this paper is to defend the view that colours are mind-independent properties in response to worries arising from one type of empirically documented case of perceptual variation: variation in the perception of the “unique hues”. §1 sets out the challenge raised by variation in the perception of the unique hues. I argue in §2 that the empirical findings are less dramatic than they might initially appear, and in §3 that accounting for the inter-personal differences is consistent with the view that colours are mind-independent properties that normal subjects veridically perceive, at least roughly speaking.

Deuteranomalous color matching behavior is different from normal because the middle-wavelength sensitive cones contain an abnormal Lʹ pigment instead of the M pigment of the normal observer. However, there is growing evidence that deuteranomalous color experience is not very different from that of normal trichromats. Here, normal and deuteranomalous observers chose monochromatic unique yellow lights. They also chose broadband lights, displayed on a computer monitor, that corresponded to eight special colors: the Hering unique hues (red, yellow, green, blue), and binary colors perceptually midway between them (orange, lime, cyan, purple). Deuteranomalous monochromatic unique yellow was shifted towards red, but all the broadband special color selections were physically similar for normal and deuteranomalous observers. Deuteranomalous special colors, including monochromatic unique yellow, were similar to those of normal observers when expressed in a color-opponent chromaticity diagram based on their own visual pigments, but only if (1) color-opponent responses were normalized to white, and (2) the deuteranomalous diagram was expanded along the r – g dimension to compensate for the reduced difference between deuteranomalous L- and Lʹ-cone photopigments. Particularly, deuteranomalous observers did not choose binary colors with extra r – g impact to overcome their insensitivity along the r – g dimension. This result can only be compatible with the known abnormality of the deuteranomalous Lʹ photopigment if deuteranomalous observers adjust their perceptual representation of colors to compensate for their color vision deficiency.

Unique hue plays a critical role in color appearance models and uniform color spaces. Past studies investigating unique hues commonly used 40 Munsell samples with the same chroma and lightness levels to produce color stimuli, with a hue angle step of 9°. These 40 samples were always simultaneously presented to the observers. Both the larger hue angle step and the simultaneous presentation of the samples may help to reduce the variations. In this study, we reduced the hue angle step to 5° and each stimulus was individually presented to the observer, which resulted in larger inter- and intra-observer variations. The results suggested that the hue angles of the unique hues in both CIECAM02 and CIELAB should be revised, but both CIECAM02 and CIELAB had good hue uniformity at the hue angles of the four unique hues.

There is still much to understand about the brain’s colour processing mechanisms and the transformation from cone-opponent representations to perceptual hues. Moreover, it is unclear which area(s) in the brain represent unique hues. We propose a hierarchical model inspired by the neuronal mechanisms in the brain for local hue representation, which reveals the contributions of each visual cortical area in hue representation. Hue encoding is achieved through incrementally increasing processing nonlinearities beginning with cone input. Besides employing nonlinear rectifications, we propose multiplicative modulations as a form of nonlinearity. Our simulation results indicate that multiplicative modulations have significant contributions in encoding of hues along intermediate directions in the MacLeod-Boynton diagram and that our model V2 neurons have the capacity to encode unique hues. Additionally, responses of our model neurons resemble those of biological colour cells, suggesting that our model provides a novel formulation of the brain’s colour processing pathway.

Past studies investigating the unique hues only used samples with a relatively high saturation levels under standard illuminants. In this study, 10 observers selected the four samples with unique hues from 40 V6C8 (Value 6 Chroma 8) and 40 V8C4 (Value 8 Chroma 4) Munsell samples under six light sources, comprising three levels of Duv (i.e., 0, −0.02, and −0.04) and two levels of correlated color temperature (i.e., 2700 and 3500 K). Significant differences were found between the two chroma levels for unique blue and yellow, with the hue angles of unique yellow and blue judged using the desaturated samples being significantly different from those defined in CIECAM02. The iso‐lines of unique yellow, blue, and green did not always go through the origin of the a*‐b* or a′‐b′ planes in CIELAB and CAM02‐UCS. Thus, the problems of CIECAM02, CIELAB, and CAM02‐UCS identified in this study need further investigations.

Hardin’s (Color for philosophers: unweaving the rainbow, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1988) empirically-grounded argument for color eliminativism has defined the color realism debate for the last 30 years. By Hardin’s own estimation, phenomenal structure—the unique/binary hue distinction in particular—poses the greatest problem for color realism. Examination of relevant empirical findings shows that claims about the unique hues which play a central role in the argument from phenomenal structure should be rejected. Chiefly, contrary to widespread belief amongst philosophers and scientists, the unique hues do not play a fundamental role in determining all color appearances. Among the consequences of this result is that greater attention should be paid to certain proposals for putting the structure of phenomenal color into principled correspondence with surface reflectance properties. While color realism is not fully vindicated, it has much greater empirical plausibility than previously thought.

Profound vision loss occurs after prolonged exposure to an unchanging featureless visual environment. The effect is sometimes called visual fade. Here we investigate this phenomenon in the color domain using two different experiments. In the first experiment we determine the time needed for a colored background to appear achromatic. Four backgrounds were tested. Each represented the observers’ four unique hues. This adaptation time was compared with time to recover after adaptation Hue shifts at the end of the adaptation period were also measured. There were wide individual differences in adaptation times and recovery times. Overall recovery was faster than adaptation (p < 0.02). There were minimal shifts in hue. In the second experiment the changes in saturation (Munsell chroma) and lightness (Munsell value) of the background were monitored at six time intervals during the adapting process. Again asymmetric matching with Munsell samples was used. There were two distinct components to both the adaptation and recovery phases; one fast with time constant

There is still much to understand about the color processing mechanisms in the brain and the transformation from cone-opponent representations to perceptual hues. Moreover, it is unclear which areas(s) in the brain represent unique hues. We propose a hierarchical model inspired by the neuronal mechanisms in the brain for local hue representation, which reveals the contributions of each visual cortical area in hue representation. Local hue encoding is achieved through incrementally increasing processing nonlinearities beginning with cone input. Besides employing nonlinear rectifications, we propose multiplicative modulations as a form of nonlinearity. Our simulation results indicate that multiplicative modulations have significant contributions in encoding of hues along intermediate directions in the MacLeod-Boynton diagram and that model V4 neurons have the capacity to encode unique hues. Additionally, responses of our model neurons resemble those of biological color cells, suggesting that our model provides a novel formulation of the brain’s color processing pathway.

There exist two widely used notions concerning the structure of phenomenal color space. The first is the notion of unique/binary hue structure, which maintains that there are four unique hues from which all other hues are composed. The second notion is the similarity structure of hues, which describes the interrelations between the hues and hence does not divide hues into two types as the first notion does. Philosophers have considered the existence of the unique/binary hue structure to be empirically and phenomenally well-grounded, and the structure has been considered to be primary because this can account for the similarity structure. Consequently, the unique/binary hue structure has played a central role in color philosophy. This calls for the assessment of the justification for its existence carried out in this paper. It is concluded that, despite the prevalent view among philosophers, none of their reasons for endorsing the existence of the unique/binary hue structure are justified. Since the notion of the unique/binary hue structure appears intuitively plausible for many, however, a sketch explaining this intuition is outlined at the end.

An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective (non-subject-involving) facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues (Gomez-Torrente (2016) Nous 50(1): 3-40),. In (Hansen (2015)), I argued that the recent objectivist response doesn't apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation.

The aim of the research reported by this study was on the one hand to identify what colors were associated with particular words in relation to a specific language (Italian), by portraying them in color stimuli on the screen of a monitor; and on the other hand to verify whether some words of that language denoted colors that were either particularly well defined or confused with others. In an experiment using special software, the subjects were asked to produce colors directly, instead of choosing among a number of colors presented on the screen. The results showed that (i) it is possible to identify the color-stimuli to which the terms of a language refer; that (ii) the “best” colors Giallo (Yellow), Rosso (Red), Blu (Blue), and Verde (Green) which the subjects were requested to produce were very similar to the corresponding unique hues; that (iii) among the mixed hues there were perceptually intermediate colors, that is, ones exactly midway between two consecutive unique colors: Arancione (Orange) and Viola (bluish Purple); that (iv) Turquoise and Lime were clearly positioned in the mental space of color of the participants; and that (v) for Italian speakers some hues coincide: Azzurro (Azure) and Celeste (Cerulean); Arancione (Orange), RossoGiallo (RedYellow) and Carota (Carrot); Lime and GialloVerde (YellowGreen), so that their color terms can be considered synonyms. Our most interesting finding, however, is that for Italian speakers these four mixed colors with their specific names (Lime, Turchese (Turquoise), Viola (bluish Purple) and Arancione (Orange) fall perceptually in the middle of each of the four quadrants formed in the hue circle by the four unique hues. The resulting circle is therefore characterized by eight colors of which four are unique and four are intermediate mixed. It would be advisable to repeat the study cross-culturally to test for possible similarities and differences in color meanings with speakers of different languages. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Col Res Appl, 42, 89–101, 2017

The aim of this study was twofold, first to determine the effect of field view size and second of illumination conditions on the selection of unique hue samples (UHs: R, Y, G and B) from two rotatable trays, each containing forty highly chromatic Natural Color System (NCS) samples, on one tray corresponding to 1.4° and on the other to 5.7° field of view size. UH selections were made by 25 color-normal observers who repeated assessments three times with a gap of at least 24 h between trials. Observers separately assessed UHs under four illumination conditions simulating illuminants D65, A, F2 and F11. An apparent hue shift (statistically significant for UR) was noted for UH selections at 5.7° field of view compared to those at 1.4°. Observers’ overall variability was found to be higher for UH stimuli selections at the larger field of view. Intra-observer variability was found to be approximately 18.7% of inter-observer variability in selection of samples for both sample sizes. The highest intra-observer variability was under simulated illuminant D65, followed by A, F11, and F2.

A central problem in neuroscience is elucidating synaptic connections, the connectome. Because mammalian forebrains contain many neurons, labeling specific neurons with unique tags is desirable. A novel technology, Brainbow, creates hundreds of hues by combinatorial expression of multiple fluorescent proteins (FPs).We labeled small numbers of neurons, and their axons, with unique hues, by expressing Brainbow from a helper virus-free Herpes Simplex Virus (HSV-1) vector.The vector expresses a Brainbow cassette containing four FPs from a glutamatergic-specific promoter. Packaging HSV-Brainbow produced arrays of seven to eight Brainbow cassettes, and using Cre, each FP gene was in a position to be expressed, in different cassettes. Delivery into rat postrhinal (POR) cortex or hippocampus labeled small numbers of neurons with different, often unique, hues. An area innervated by POR cortex, perirhinal (PER) cortex, contained axons with different hues. Specific axons in PER cortex were matched to specific cell bodies in POR cortex, using hue.HSV-Brainbow is the only technology for labeling small numbers of neurons with unique hues. In Brainbow mice, many neurons contain the same hue. Brainbow-adeno-associated virus vectors require transduction of the same neuron with multiple vector particles, confounding neuroanatomical studies. Replication-competent Brainbow-pseudorabies virus vectors label multiple neurons with the same hue.Attractive properties of HSV-Brainbow include each vector particle contains multiple cassettes, representing numerous hues, recombination products are stabile, and experimental control of the number of labeled neurons. Labeling neurons with unique hues will benefit mapping forebrain circuits.

The paper examines the notion, widespread in the contemporary color science, that there are certain hues, specifically focal red, yellow, green and blue (RYGB), that are unique or privileged in human prelinguistic color perception, all other chromatic hues being perceptually composed of these. I successively consider and reject all motivations that have been provided for this opinion; namely the linguistic (unique hues as referents of necessary and sufficient color descriptors), “phenomenological” (unique hues as phenomenologically pure color experiences), and some minor or historical motivations. I conclude that, contrary to the standard opinion, there is no solid reason to claim that the RYGB hues are unique among colors in a sense that would allow for direct neurophysiological explanation. The notion also has no relevance for the construction of perceptual color spaces and is not defensible as an explanatory principle with respect to the existing crosslinguistic patterns of color categorization.

Eight panels were prepared using the most highly chromatic Natural Colour System (NCS) samples for each hue. Each panel consisted of a test hue and two reference hues, the samples representing either mean unique hues (uH) R, Y, B, or G as determined in earlier experiments or intermediate hues half way between them, (iHs) Or, Pp, YG, and BG. Subjects were asked to determine whether they considered it possible to match the test hue with the reference hues. A total of 45 color-normal subjects participated in the study in three separate trials with at least 24 h gap between consecutive trials. The results, with very few exceptions, showed that a match was considered possible for the four iHs based on a mixture of adjacent pairs of uHs, while the majority did not believe uHs could be matched based on amounts of adjacent iHs. Statistical analysis of the test results indicates that responses for the two sets of panels were significantly different (P ∼ 0, df = 539). The results provide support for Hering's uHs concept. However, a number of subjects believed that a mixture of adjacent iHs can result in a match of the reference uHs. Potential causes may include the use of experimental mean unique and intermediate hues and learned facts of colorant mixture. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Col Res Appl, 40, 264–269, 2015

In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects (naming) has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them (matching) the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the relative magnitude of inter-subject variability in the matching experiment is for both tested colors larger than that in the naming experiment, thus invalidating their claims. In addition, we point out several serious shortcomings in the experiment.

Recently, a line of minimum tint in chromaticity space for sources of illumination of different correlated color temperatures (CCTs) from 2700 K to 6500 K has been reported. This line of minimum tint did not correspond to the line of blackbody radiation implicitly associated with sources of white illumination used in architectural applications. It was noted that chromaticities along the line of minimum tint were not metamers but, rather, should represent, for a given CCT, chromaticities where the neural signals from the two spectral opponent channels were minimized. Earlier work provided a theoretical framework for representing the four unique hues where the neural signals from one spectral opponent channel are minimized. This framework was used here to quantitatively represent the line of minimum tint and then to empirically test whether this representation could predict the amount of tint perceived in six different sources of “white” Illumination.” Based on these results, a provisional model is proposed for describing the tint and the amount of tint perceived in “white” Illumination used in architectural applications. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Col Res Appl, 39, 466–479, 2014

The relationship between the information the visual system gathers at its interface with the outside world and the perceptual reality of four primary hues and the resulting hue circle has been and remains of interest since the second half of the 19th century. Considerable effort has been expended over many decades in determining statistical mean choices of color stimuli that for individuals represent unique hues in given conditions of viewing. In this article, historical and recent data are used to show the present state of knowledge. To have a means of comparison, in this article spectral and display unit stimuli are converted to Munsell hues on basis of dominant or complementary wavelengths of highest chroma data. Relatively good agreement was found between spectral and color sample data, with display data being significantly different in case of unique green. The issue of significant interobserver variability found in all data and its implications are highlighted. Problems with generating simple psychophysical models, particularly related to unique red, are discussed and a brief survey of the current knowledge on neural processing that may lead to unique hue perception is presented. Data still required for a meaningful definition of mean unique hue stimulus data are listed. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Col Res Appl, 39, 279–287, 2014; Published Online 20 March 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/col.21793

Unique hues are usually defined as those that cannot be introspectively reduced to any other hue. According to a major dogma of color science, there are four unique hues: yellow, blue, red, and green. Yet only 55 of the 173 inexperienced observers who participated in our experiment selected exactly four Munsell papers that, according to their judgment, had a unique hue. The number of papers selected by the rest of the observers varied from zero to nine. We believe that such variability of unique hue selection is due to the ambiguity of the introspective criteria for hue uniqueness. Along with the traditional technique of unique hue selection, an alternative method based on partial hue-matching has also been used to establish the nomenclature of unique hues. The partial hue-matching method is based on observer judgments concerning the presence of a common hue in a pair of colors. Observers are not supposed to name (or make any other judgments of) this common hue. Without presupposing their number, the unique hues are derived from the observer's responses to a sample of color pairs. The results obtained by this new method generally support the classical notion of four unique hues.