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Passive surveillance can be most effective in the early detection of disease outbreaks given that farmers observe their animals daily. The European Animal Health Law states that unexplained excess mortality should be reported to the veterinary authorities. In the Netherlands, in addition to notifications to the competent authority, Royal GD is commissioned a passive surveillance component that consists of a veterinary helpdesk and postmortem examination for early detection of emerging diseases. The aim of this study was to evaluate this voluntary passive surveillance component through excess mortality in cattle. Weekly on-farm mortality was calculated using the cattle Identification and Registration records. Mortality was assessed on regional level for dairy, veal and other beef cattle using a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) (log-link, negative binomial). We used a cumulative sum of the model residuals to identify periods of excess mortality. The mortality was defined as excessive when above five times the standard error. The analysis was also conducted on herd level, but these models did not converge. We checked for an association between the two passive surveillance components elements and excess mortality. A GLM (log-link, negative binomial) with the number of contacts or submissions per region as the dependent variables and excess mortality per region and year as independent variables was carried out. Overall, the models showed significantly higher use of passive surveillance components in periods of excess mortality compared to non-excess periods. In dairy cattle the odds for contact or submission were between 1.72 (1.59-1.86) and 2.02 (1.82-2.25). For veal calves we found the odds of 2.19 (1.18-4.04) and 2.24 (1.78-2.83) relative to periods without excess mortality. Beef cattle operations, other than veal, showed only an increased odds for postmortem submissions in calves of 3.71 (2.74-5.01), submissions for cattle and contact in general was not increased fo

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) can be transmitted from pigs to humans and cause liver inflammation. Pigs are a major reservoir of HEV and most slaughter pigs show evidence of infection by presence of antibodies (ELISA) or viral RNA (PCR). Reducing the number of HEV infected pigs at slaughter would likely reduce human exposure, yet how this can be achieved, is unknown. We aimed to identify and quantify the effect of biosecurity measures to deliver HEV negative batches of pigs to slaughter. A case-control study was performed with Dutch pig farms selected based on results of multiple slaughter batches. Case farms delivered at least one PCR and ELISA negative batch to slaughter (PCR−ELISA−), indicating absence of HEV infection, and control farms had the highest proportion of PCR and/or ELISA positive batches (PCR+ELISA+), indicating high within-farm transmission. Data about biosecurity and housing were collected via a questionnaire and an audit. Variables were selected by regularization (LASSO regression) and ranked, based the frequency of variable selection. The odds ratios (OR) for the relation between case-control status and the highest ranked variables were determined via grouped logistic regression. Thirty-five case farms, with 10 to 60% PCR−ELISA− batches, and 38 control farms with on average 40% PCR+ELISA+ batches, were included. Rubber and steel floor material in fattening pens had the highest ranking and increased the odds of a PCR−ELISA− batch by 5.87 (95%CI 3.03–11.6) and 7.13 (95%CI 3.05–16.9) respectively. Cleaning pig driving boards weekly (OR 1.99 (95%CI 1.07–3.80)), and fly control with predatory flies (OR 4.52 (95%CI 1.59–13.5)) were protective, whereas a long fattening period was a risk. This study shows that cleaning and cleanability of floors and fomites and adequate fly control are measures to consider for HEV control in infected farms. Yet, intervention studies are needed to confirm the robustness of these outcomes.

Several reports demonstrated the susceptibility of domestic cats to SARS-CoV-2 infection. Here, we describe a thorough investigation of the immune responses in cats after experimental SARS-CoV-2 inoculation, along with the characterization of infection kinetics and pathological lesions. Specific pathogen-free domestic cats ( n = 12) were intranasally inoculated with SARS-CoV-2 and subsequently sacrificed on DPI (days post-inoculation) 2, 4, 7 and 14. None of the infected cats developed clinical signs. Only mild histopathologic lung changes associated with virus antigen expression were observed mainly on DPI 4 and 7. Viral RNA was present until DPI 7, predominantly in nasal and throat swabs. The infectious virus could be isolated from the nose, trachea and lungs until DPI 7. In the swab samples, no biologically relevant SARS-CoV-2 mutations were observed over time. From DPI 7 onwards, all cats developed a humoral immune response. The cellular immune responses were limited to DPI 7. Cats showed an increase in CD8+ cells, and the subsequent RNA sequence analysis of CD4+ and CD8+ subsets revealed a prominent upregulation of antiviral and inflammatory genes on DPI 2. In conclusion, infected domestic cats developed a strong antiviral response and cleared the virus within the first week after infection without overt clinical signs and relevant virus mutations.

The susceptibility of domestic cats to infection with SARS-CoV-2 has been demonstrated by several experimental studies and field observations. We performed an extensive study to further characterize the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between cats, through both direct and indirect contact. To that end, we estimated the transmission rate parameter and the decay parameter for infectivity in the environment. Using four groups of pair-transmission experiment, all donor (inoculated) cats became infected, shed virus, and seroconverted, while three out of four direct contact cats got infected, shed virus, and two of those seroconverted. One out of eight cats exposed to a SARS-CoV-2-contaminated environment became infected but did not seroconvert. Statistical analysis of the transmission data gives a reproduction number R0 of 2.18 (95% CI = 0.92 to 4.08), a transmission rate parameter b of 0.23 day21 (95% CI = 0.06 to 0.54), and a virus decay rate parameter m of 2.73 day21 (95% CI = 0.77 to 15.82). These data indicate that transmission between cats is efficient and can be sustained (R0 . 1), however, the infectiousness of a contaminated environment decays rapidly (mean duration of infectiousness 1/2.73 days). Despite this, infections of cats via exposure to a SARS-CoV-2-contaminated environment cannot be discounted if cats are exposed shortly after contamination. IMPORTANCE This article provides additional insight into the risk of infection that could arise from cats infected with SARS-CoV-2 by using epidemiological models to determine transmission parameters. Considering that transmission parameters are not always provided in the literature describing transmission experiments in animals, we demonstrate that mathematical analysis of experimental data is crucial to estimate the likelihood of transmission. This article is also relevant to animal health professionals and authorities involved in risk assessments for zoonotic spill-overs

Pigs are a reservoir of hepatitis E virus (HEV), which causes hepatitis in humans. To study the epidemiology of HEV in pig farms, sampling methods are currently used that cause discomfort to pigs, such as rectal sampling. In line with the 3Rs principle, we aimed to evaluate non-invasive methods to detect pens with HEV-shedding pigs. Twenty-eight pens of one farm were sampled cross-sectionally. Individual rectal swabs (IRS) were collected to determine prevalence within pens. Four pen-level samples were compared: a pool of IRS per pen (P), boot socks (BS), oral fluid (OF) and pooled faecal droppings (FD). Each sample was tested by RT-PCR and the sensitivity and specificity of each method was determined by Bayesian latent class analysis. According to IRS, 19/28 pens were HEV positive. BS had a sensitivity of 95% and detected HEV in pens with 10% of pigs shedding; however, specificity was below 30%. FD were comparably accurate to P, with a sensitivity and specificity of 94% and 86%, respectively. BS sampling is thus advised to detect early shedding of HEV or pen contamination, and FD to determine the duration of shedding. This study demonstrates that non-invasive sampling can replace rectal swabs in research on HEV in pigs.

In the Netherlands, 69 of the 126 (55%) mink farms in total became infected with SARS-CoV-2 in 2020. Despite strict biosecurity measures and extensive epidemiological investigations, the main transmission route remained unclear. A better understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms is of relevance for countries where mink farming is still common practice and can be used as a case study to improve future emerging disease preparedness. We assessed whether SARS-CoV-2 spilled over from mink to free-ranging animals, and whether free-ranging animals may have played a role in farm-to-farm transmission in the Netherlands. The study encompassed farm visits, farm questionnaires, expert workshops and SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibody testing of samples from target animal species (bats, birds and free-ranging carnivores). In this study, we show that the open housing system of mink allowed access to birds, bats and most free-ranging carnivores, and that direct and indirect contact with mink was likely after entry, especially for free-ranging carnivores and birds. This allowed SARS-CoV-2 exposure to animals entering the mink farm, and subsequent infection or mechanical carriage by the target animal species. Moreover, mink can escape farms in some cases, and two SARS-CoV-2-positive mink were found outside farm premises. No other SARS-CoV-2-RNA-positive free-ranging animals were detected, suggesting there was no abundant circulation in the species tested during the study period. To investigate previous SARS-CoV-2 infections, SARS-CoV-2 antibody detection using lung extracts of carcasses was set up and validated. One tested beech marten did have SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, but the closest SARS-CoV-2-infected mink farm was outside of its home range, making infection at a mink farm unlikely. Knowing that virus exchange between different species and the formation of animal reservoirs affects SARS-CoV-2 evolution, continued vigilance and monitoring of mink farms and surrounding w

Animals like mink, cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In the Netherlands, 69 out of 127 mink farms were infected with SARS-CoV-2 between April and November 2020 and all mink on infected farms were culled after SARS-CoV-2 infection to prevent further spread of the virus. On some farms, (feral) cats and dogs were present. This study provides insight into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2-positive cats and dogs in 10 infected mink farms and their possible role in transmission of the virus. Throat and rectal swabs of 101 cats (12 domestic and 89 feral cats) and 13 dogs of 10 farms were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using PCR. Serological assays were performed on serum samples from 62 adult cats and all 13 dogs. Whole Genome Sequencing was performed on one cat sample. Cat-to-mink transmission parameters were estimated using data from all 10 farms. This study shows evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 12 feral cats and 2 dogs. Eleven cats (18%) and two dogs (15%) tested serologically positive. Three feral cats (3%) and one dog (8%) tested PCR-positive. The sequence generated from the cat throat swab clustered with mink sequences from the same farm. The calculated rate of mink-to-cat transmission showed that cats on average had a chance of 12% (95%CI 10%–18%) of becoming infected by mink, assuming no cat-to-cat transmission. As only feral cats were infected it is most likely that infections in cats were initiated by mink, not by humans. Whether both dogs were infected by mink or humans remains inconclusive. This study presents one of the first reports of interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that does not involve humans, namely mink-to-cat transmission, which should also be considered as a potential risk for spread of SARS-CoV-2.

In the Netherlands, 69 of the 126 (55%) mink farms in total became infected with SARS-CoV-2 in 2020. Despite strict biosecurity measures and extensive epidemiological investigations, the main transmission route remained unclear. A better understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms is of relevance for countries where mink farming is still common practice and can be used as a case study to improve future emerging disease preparedness. We assessed whether SARS-CoV-2 spilled over from mink to free-ranging animals, and whether free-ranging animals may have played a role in farm-to-farm transmission in the Netherlands. The study encompassed farm visits, farm questionnaires, expert workshops and SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibody testing of samples from target animal species (bats, birds and free-ranging carnivores). In this study, we show that the open housing system of mink allowed access to birds, bats and most free-ranging carnivores, and that direct and indirect contact with mink was likely after entry, especially for free-ranging carnivores and birds. This allowed SARS-CoV-2 exposure to animals entering the mink farm, and subsequent infection or mechanical carriage by the target animal species. Moreover, mink can escape farms in some cases, and two SARS-CoV-2-positive mink were found outside farm premises. No other SARS-CoV-2-RNA-positive free-ranging animals were detected, suggesting there was no abundant circulation in the species tested during the study period. To investigate previous SARS-CoV-2 infections, SARS-CoV-2 antibody detection using lung extracts of carcasses was set up and validated. One tested beech marten did have SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, but the closest SARS-CoV-2-infected mink farm was outside of its home range, making infection at a mink farm unlikely. Knowing that virus exchange between different species and the formation of animal reservoirs affects SARS-CoV-2 evolution, continued vigilance and monitoring of mink farms and surrounding w