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Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative).
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . May2015, Vol. 172 Issue 5, p1371-1386. 16p. - Publication Year :
- 2015
-
Abstract
- Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have recently defended probabilistic accounts of promotion, according to which an agent's ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires just in case her ϕ-ing makes the satisfaction of that desire more probable relative to some baseline. In this paper I do three things. First, I formalize an argument, due to Jeff Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, to the effect that Mark Schroeder's and Stephen Finlay's probabilistic accounts of promotion cannot be correct. Next, I extend this argument to a recent alternative offered by D. Justin Coates and show how Coates' attempt to avoid the argument by introducing a distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' probability doesn't help. Finally, I suggest an alternative way of understanding promotion in terms of increase in degree of fit between the causal upshot of an action and the content of a desire. I show how this view, disjunctively paired with probabilism about promotion, solves the problems with previous accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *PROBABILISM
*ETHICS
*CERTAINTY
*CONDUCT of life
*TRUTH
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 172
- Issue :
- 5
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 101830596
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0354-4