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Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors.
- Source :
-
Games & Economic Behavior . Jul2015, Vol. 92, p430-454. 25p. - Publication Year :
- 2015
-
Abstract
- We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, either discrete or Lipschitz-continuous, seeking the optimal deterministic incentive compatible auction. We give a geometric characterization of the optimal auction, resulting in a duality theorem and an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal deterministic auction in the two-bidder case and an NP-completeness result for three or more bidders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08998256
- Volume :
- 92
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Games & Economic Behavior
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 108808006
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.009