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Realismo científico y entidades inconsistentes. Críticas a la metafísica de Colyvan.
- Source :
-
Acta Scientiarum: Human & Social Sciences . Jul-Dec2015, Vol. 37 Issue 2, p187-195. 9p. - Publication Year :
- 2015
-
Abstract
- According to Mark Colyvan, certain mature scientific developments (specifically, Newtonian cosmology, descriptive oceanography, early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory) contain contradictory assumptions, and this enables the prima facie adoption of certain naturalized realism of inconsistent entities. An exotic aspect of Colyvan's proposal is the claim that the resulting variety of realism emerges from the mere application of the parameters of theory evaluation involved in Quine's epistemology. While this is a highly controversial claim in itself, it will not be analyzed in this paper. My intention is to show that the theories put forward by Colyvan do not exhibit the properties required to promote a philosophically respectable metaphysics of contradictory entities. The theses defended are: (i) neither Newtonian cosmology nor descriptive oceanography exhibits any genuine contradiction; (ii) the apparent inconsistencies in early calculus and Dirac's quantum theory respectively exhibit a weak enough methodological effectivity so that their use do not rationally demand a realistic recovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- Spanish
- ISSN :
- 16797361
- Volume :
- 37
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Acta Scientiarum: Human & Social Sciences
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 112427568
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v37i2.27157