A Veto Players Analysis of Subnational Territorial Reform in Indonesia.

Indonesia has been prolific in creating local governments since 1999. This article reexamines provincial division in Indonesia and proposes a Veto players (VP) Theory of territorial reform, a function of the interplay of a number of VPs, their cohesion, and congruence of VP preferences. Using comparative analysis and process tracing of successful and failed cases through key informant interviews and secondary materials, Indonesia is found to have large but decisive VPs, where the direction of reform is contingent on the preferences of local players through territorial leveraging or opportunism. They are political elites who are supported by social movements whose preferences run parallel with the former. Despite a large absolute number of VPs, territorial reform was achieved due to smaller effective number of VPs (via established executive-legislative relations), due to mirroring and manipulation of preferences through side payments and other strategic behaviors (lobbying and social mobilization), and through reciprocity norms of patronage and personal linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]