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CONTRA EL PLURALISMO LĂ“GICO MODALISTA.
- Source :
-
Eidos . Jul-Dec2016, Issue 25, p286-309. 24p. - Publication Year :
- 2016
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I argue against the modalist logical pluralism of Bueno and Shalkowski (2009). In the first part, I show that it is not well motivated, at least if its motivation comes from the objections they raise against the approach of Beall and Restall (2006). I defend the position of Beall and Restall against these objections, resorting to the requisites of necessity and normativity, which were misunderstood by Bueno and Shalkowski. In the second part, I analyze the modalist position and provide some arguments against it. I show that the examples offered by Bueno and Shalkowski do not justify a logical pluralism, but rather a logical monism based on classical logic where some inferential contexts can be internalized. I show that these internalizations are very plausible for the two examples the authors provide: database management and the analysis of epistemic concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *PLURALISM
*MODAL logic
*ETHICAL intuitionism
*EPISTEMIC logic
*MONISM
*HISTORY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- Spanish
- ISSN :
- 16928857
- Issue :
- 25
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Eidos
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 116561991