Double-Sided Bandwidth-Auction Game for Cognitive Device-to-Device Communication in Cellular Networks.

Device-to-device (D2D) communication has been recently proposed to reduce cellular traffic by directly connecting the local nodes. In this paper, we consider a cellular-based primary network coexisting with a cognitive D2D pair. The primary network consists of a base station and multiple cellular users, which can sell their spectrum to the D2D user. Additionally, under low-interference conditions, the spectrum can be simultaneously shared between cellular users and D2D-capable users, which is called the nonorthogonal sharing mode. We introduce a double-sided bandwidth-auction game for cognitive D2D communication. In the auction, the D2D transmitter has three types of service providers (SPs) or sharing modes. The SPs operate on different frequency spectra, and a D2D-capable pair intends to share these spectra. This situation is formulated as an auction game, where a D2D transmitter bids a demand price–bandwidth curve, and each SP offers a price–bandwidth supply curve. The Nash equilibrium point of the auction game is analytically obtained. Then, a learning method is proposed for the decision making of the players in an incomplete-information repeated game. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed learning method to the Nash equilibrium point is studied through the converse Lyapunov theorem. Finally, the proposed auction game is extended to the multiple-D2D case, and the optimal bandwidth allocation strategy to maximize the sum rate is derived. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]