Nuclear Signaling and China's Perception about Nuclear Threat: How China Handled Nuclear Threats in the Cold War.

This paper seeks to close the gap in current literature about China's perception of nuclear threat by reviewing the way in which China dealt with nuclear threats during Cold War. In particular, the paper examines the dynamic interaction between nuclear signaling and China's response to nuclear threats during the three nuclear crises in China's history: the Korean War, the First and Second Taiwan Crises, and Sino-Soviet border crisis in the late 1960s.The analysis shows that during the Korean War although American nuclear signals were inaccurate and had communication problems the Chinese were fully prepared for nuclear threat even before the Volunteer Army marched into North Korea. American nuclear threat did not bring about significant benefit for the U.S. During Taiwan crises in the 1950s, because of general signaling problems, both the U.S. and China seriously misunderstood each other's strategic intentions. China did not really expect nuclear threat from the U.S. and U.S.' nuclear threat helped compel China into concessions. Lastly, in the Sino-Soviet border crisis, the Soviets' nuclear signaling was very effective in raising Chinese concerns about nuclear strikes. China's response to Soviets' nuclear threats was unprecedentedly extensive. Its impact on the development of China's defense strategy and defense industry was deep and long-lasting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]