Controlling the unruly agents – linkages between accountability and corruption within the executive structures of Botswana.

Representative democracy entails delegation of power to representatives and other actors within the political system. Oftentimes, the delegating party has little insight into the actions of the person(s) to whom power is delegated. Ensuring that the power-holder does not misuse his/her powers is, therefore, a challenge. This article analyses accountability mechanisms through which the delegating party can prevent and detect misuse of power in the form of corruption. The article argues that political institutions contribute towards such mechanisms being available/unavailable to the delegating party. The analysis focuses on the case of Botswana, where executive structures stipulate the accountability mechanisms available to principals. As shown by the analysis, principals have formal access to many such mechanisms. Oftentimes, however, these mechanisms are not applied. The analysis shows that accountability alone cannot explain levels of corruption within executive structures of Botswana but that informal rules also explain the presence/absence of corrupt practices. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]