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The political economy of pricing car access to downtown commercial districts.
- Source :
-
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological . Apr2017, Vol. 98, p76-93. 18p. - Publication Year :
- 2017
-
Abstract
- We study the political economy of pricing access to downtown commercial districts, using curbside parking fees as the main example. A spatial equilibrium model is embedded in a political economy framework in which special interest groups (urban and suburban retailers, local residents) lobby the city government. We have the following results. If downtown and suburban stores sell a homogeneous good, the local government underprices downtown parking if suburban stores operate with low enough markups. If goods are heterogeneous and some consumers engage in multiple-stop shopping (i.e., shop both downtown and in the suburbs), suburban stores will not lobby at all; lobbying by downtown retailers leads to parking fees below the social optimum. Furthermore, local residents do not necessarily lobby for high parking fees on downtown shoppers. If a decline in urban stores leads to negative externalities (urban blight) they may join forces with downtown retailers and lobby against high parking fees on shoppers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01912615
- Volume :
- 98
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 122329298
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2016.12.012