Secure estimation for cyber-physical systems with adversarial attacks and unknown inputs: An L2-gain method.

This paper investigates the attack-resilient state estimation problem for linear systems with adversarial attacks and unknown inputs, where the upper bound of the unknown inputs is unknown. It is assumed that the attacker has limited resources and can only manipulate a certain number of sensors. In most of the existing observer design approaches for the systems with unknown inputs even in the absence of attacks, the observer matching condition should be satisfied. To overcome this restriction, a novel switched observer is proposed, where the matched unknown inputs will be completely compensated by means of the outputs and the mismatched part will be suppressed in terms of L2-gain rejection property. Meanwhile, the observer can provide an attack-resilient state estimation. Compared with the existing results, the proposed observer can guarantee that the resulting observer error system is stable with unknown input attenuation level γ that can be optimized. Finally, a simulation example of an unmanned ground vehicle is provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]