Pricing, collection, and effort decisions with coordination contracts in a fuzzy, three-level closed-loop supply chain.

In this paper, a fuzzy, closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), with one manufacturer, one retailer and one collector, is investigated. The optimal decision problem is analyzed based on a fuzzy price and sales effort-dependent demand to evaluate how members decide wholesale price, collection rate, retail price, and sales effort under different decision-making structures. Six game theory models are established and optimal solutions are extracted and compared by applying game and fuzzy theories. According to the results, collaboration between a manufacturer and retailer is favorable for both customers and the chain as a whole; the most effective model for collecting used products is collaboration between the manufacturer and collector. Finally, a practical, new channel coordination scheme is explored to match the performance of a decentralized CLSC to that of a centralized CLSC. The results illustrate that the proposed contract can effectively coordinate decentralized CLSCs. It is also beneficial from both consumer and environmental perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]