MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PARADOJA EN PITKIN POR UNA CONCEPCIÓN DUAL DE LA REPRESENTACIÓN.

Contemporary theories of representation are unanimous about the relational nature of representation. However, relational understandings of representation do not necessarily accept the latter is constituted by a duality. This paper argues that relational but not dual theories of representation tend to be flawed in two ways: they present normative deficits and thus are unable to evaluate representation; and when they do so, it is at the expenses of introducing analytical inconsistencies. To support such argument, a demanding analytical strategy is adopted: examining Pitkin's famous paradox transformation in order to show both normative deficits and analytical inconsistencies in her classic The Concept of Representation, which is deemed as pioneering work in putting forward a dual definition of representation. I claim that dual understanding of democratic representation implies that the latter is constituted by am irreducible tension between two agents-represented/representative-, which turns representation inescapable ambivalent and agonistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]