MOORE V. TEXAS: THE CONTINUED QUEST FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD.

The Supreme Court has long held that certain types of sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Throughout the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it has reiterated that excessive-punishment claims are informed by evolving standards of decency. When the Court assesses a form of punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it utilizes a two-part proportionality review. This test requires the Court to first assess whether a national consensus has formed against a particular type of punishment through an examination of state legislation. If a national consensus exists, then the Court subjectively contemplates whether it has reason to disagree with the legislative trend. Consequently, a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if the Court agrees with the national consensus. In 2002, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that using capital punishment on intellectually disabled offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In its decision, the Court provided little guidance and left to the states the autonomy to develop standards for assessing intellectual disability in such cases. However, this task proved problematic, demonstrated by the Court granting certiorari twice in the past fifteen years to determine whether state standards adhere to its 2002 holding. In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down Texas's procedural standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. Specifically, it held that Texas's use of seven evidentiary questions based upon lay perceptions was unconstitutional because a national consensus had formed against utilizing this type of subjective indicia to determine intellectual disability. This Case Comment analyzes the Court's reasoning behind its invalidation of Texas's standards, as well as the differences in state procedures for determining intellectual disability. These variations in state standards indicate that intellectually disabled offenders may be subject to the death penalty in some states but not in others depending on where they are tried and sentenced. Finally, through the lens of the incorporation and equal protection doctrines, this Comment argues that the Court should cease its search for national consensus when contemplating the constitutionality of different state procedures and instead provide a uniform test for determining intellectual disability in capital cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]