LA DOCTRINA DEL ANĀTMAN EN EL BUDISMO TEMPRANO.

This paper has a twofold aim. Its main purpose is to analyse the arguments that Theravada Buddhism claims for rejecting the Self (ātman). The concept of anātman rests on four arguments. The first and second arguments are aimed at eternalism, which supposes a permanent ātman. The third argument seeks to refute materialism: as, if there is no Self that survives death, who is reborn and who is liberated? Buddhism is based on the concept of dependent origination (paṭicca samuppāda), which allows us to see ourselves, not as substantial agents, but instead as a process that may be tracked through continuity. The fourth argument states that belief in ātman is harmful: the «self» functions like a magnet for attachments and leads only to suffering. The paper's secondary purpose, framing this discussion, compares this change in the Indian conception of the Self with certain western views of Subjectivity: the Cartesian model, which is similar to the Vedic conception of ātman rejected by Buddha; Hume's model based on continuity, which is similar to early Buddhist conceptions; and Kant's model of a transcendental Subject that unifies experience, theoretically related to some later developments of Mahayana Buddhism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]