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The fragmentary model of temporal experience and the mirroring constraint.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Jan2019, Vol. 176 Issue 1, p21-44. 24p. - Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- A central debate in the current philosophical literature on temporal experience is over the following question: do temporal experiences themselves have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents? Extensionalists argue that experiences do have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents. Atomists insist that experiences don't have a temporal structure that mirrors their contents. In this paper, I argue that this debate is misguided. Both atomism and extensionalism, considered as general theories of temporal experience, are false, since temporal experience is not a single undifferentiated phenomena as both theories require. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I show that introspection cannot settle the debate. Second, I argue that the neuroscientific evidence is best read as revealing a host of mechanisms involved in temporal perception - some admitting of an extensionalist interpretation while others admitting only of an atomistic interpretation. As a result, neither side of the debate wins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *PHILOSOPHY of mind
*ATOMISM
*NEUROSCIENCES
*SENSORY perception
*INTROSPECTION
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 176
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 133859491
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-1004-4