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An intuitionistic defence of Berkeley's master argument.
- Source :
-
Analysis . Apr2019, Vol. 79 Issue 2, p236-242. 7p. - Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- Berkeley's 'master argument' for idealism has been the subject of extensive criticism. Two of his strongest critics, A.N. Prior and J.L. Mackie, argue that due to various logical confusions on the part of Berkeley, the master argument fails to establish his idealist conclusion. Prior (1976) argues that Berkeley's argument 'proves too little' in its conclusion, while Mackie (1964) contends that Berkeley confuses two different kinds of self-refutation in his argument. This paper proposes a defence of the master argument based on intuitionistic argument. It begins by giving a brief exposition of the master argument and Prior's and Mackie's criticism. The following section explains why we might read the master argument along intuitionistic lines. The final section demonstrates that, according to intuitionistic logic, Berkeley's argument withstands the criticisms of Prior and Mackie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *IDEALISM
*INTUITIONISTIC mathematics
*REASONING
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00032638
- Volume :
- 79
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Analysis
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 136137430
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any010