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Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition.
- Source :
-
Discrete Dynamics in Nature & Society . 6/25/2019, p1-8. 8p. - Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market's average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 10260226
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Discrete Dynamics in Nature & Society
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 137156000
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/9231582