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Where are virtues?
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Sep2019, Vol. 176 Issue 9, p2331-2349. 19p. - Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- This paper argues that the question, 'where are virtues?' demands a response from virtue theorists. Despite the polarizing nature of debates about the relevance of empirical work in psychology for virtue theory, I first show that there is widespread agreement about the underlying structure of virtue. Namely, that virtues are comprised of cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show that there are well-developed arguments that cognitive processes can extend beyond the agent. Then, I show that there are similarly well-developed arguments that affective processes can extend beyond the agent. I then introduce three cases to establish that these cognitive and affective processes are relevantly similar to the cognitive and affective processes countenanced by plausible theories of virtue. Finally, I conclude that virtue theorists must abandon default internalism, the (often implicit) view that the cognitive and affective processes comprising virtues are internal to the agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 176
- Issue :
- 9
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 137664138
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1128-1