Public resources allocation using an uncertain cooperative game among vulnerable groups.

Purpose: This paper aims to solve the problem of public resource allocation among vulnerable groups by proposing a new method called uncertain α-coordination value based on uncertain cooperative game. Design/methodology/approach: First, explicit forms of uncertain Shapley value with Chouqet integral form and uncertain centre-of-gravity of imputation-set (CIS) value are defined separately on the basis of uncertainty theory and cooperative game. Then, a convex combination of the two values above called the uncertain α-coordination value is used as the best solution. This study proves that the proposed methods meet the basic properties of cooperative game. Findings: The uncertain α-coordination value is used to solve a public medical resource allocation problem in fuzzy coalitions and uncertain payoffs. Compared with other methods, the α-coordination value can solve such problem effectively because it balances the worries of vulnerable group's further development and group fairness. Originality/value: In this paper, an extension of classical cooperative game called uncertain cooperative game is proposed, in which players choose any level of participation in a game and relate uncertainty with the value of the game. A new function called uncertain α-Coordination value is proposed to allocate public resources amongst vulnerable groups in an uncertain environment, a topic that has not been explored yet. The definitions of uncertain Shapley value with Choquet integral form and uncertain CIS value are proposed separately to establish uncertain α-Coordination value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]