The case against the constitutional validity of mass surveillance programmes.

In recent years, we have seen a rise in digital technology. In response to the tempestuous nature of technology and its manifold "threats", the State has adopted fresh armoury. It has inducted mass surveillance programmes, which collect information on every citizen. In India, these measures were adopted in 2007. India's bulk phone metadata collection programme, equivalent to the National Security Agency is called the Central Monitoring System. Additionally, India has created the Crime and Criminal Tracking and Network System, a nation-wide reposity of criminal data. This paper delves into a constitutional analysis of the validity of these programmes by identifying the key constitutional concerns and reviewing whether these programmes satisfy the test of proportionality. Finally, this paper critiques the ramifications of these measures on democracy. It argues that these measures stifle the exchange of information in the public sphere and reduce public space for reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]