Cooperation with a vessel transfer policy for coopetition among container terminals in a single port.

This paper discusses the effects of the cooperation among terminal operators in a single port as a part of their coopetition strategy in order to increase overall port competitiveness by minimizing vessel traffic congestion and berthing delays at terminals. A mixed-integer programming model is formulated incorporating game-theoretical decision-making, and then tested with the Port of Colombo, Sri Lanka. The results show that depending on the terminals' objectives, namely "minimizing total penalty cost" and "maximizing total profit," cooperation among terminals in the operation stage reduces berthing delays and increases terminal utilization than in the status quo, where terminals do not cooperate in the operation stages. This paper discusses policy recommendations to increase the effectiveness of vessel transfers, while also considering the port authority's policies toward enforcing penalty charges for berthing delays and collecting terminal fees from concession terminals. • Proposes coopetition to increase port competitiveness by minimizing berthing delays. • Analyzes the effect of cooperation among terminals with a vessel transfer policy. • Formulates a mixed-integer programming model with game-theoretical decision-making. • Different results are based on terminal fee collection policy for transfer vessels. • Vessel transfers and berthing delays are changed when terminal objective changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]