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Logic Locking With Provable Security Against Power Analysis Attacks.
- Source :
-
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits & Systems . Apr2020, Vol. 39 Issue 4, p766-778. 13p. - Publication Year :
- 2020
-
Abstract
- Outsourcing of integrated circuit (IC) fabrication to external foundries has lead to many new security vulnerabilities, including IC piracy, overbuilding, and reverse engineering. In this regard, logic locking (LL) was introduced to protect intellectual property from such threats. In this paper, we evaluate the strength of various LL techniques, including earlier works, such as random LL (RLL) and fault analysis-based LL (FLL), against power-based side-channel attack. We have developed attacks where at least 60% of the key bits can be successfully recovered for 60% of the circuits for both RLL and FLL using a 32-bit key. However, the success rate reduces to 45% and 35% for RLL and FLL, respectively, when using a 64-bit key. We demonstrate the practicality of our proposed attack by mounting it against RLL and FLL implementations of ISCAS’85 and MCNC benchmark circuits on Spartan-6 FPGA platform. Further, we present differential power analysis (DPA) results on mutual information analysis on LL techniques that capture any dependence between the intermediate data and the captured power traces. We also formally establish that resilience to satisfiability-based (SAT) attack implies resilience to DPA attack as well for an LL technique. We validate this further via experiments on Spartan-6 FPGA on SAKURA-G development board for a recent LL technique that is known to thwart the SAT attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 02780070
- Volume :
- 39
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits & Systems
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 143315610
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2019.2897699