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The virtue of error: Solved games and ethical deliberation.
- Source :
-
European Journal of Philosophy . Sep2020, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p639-656. 18p. - Publication Year :
- 2020
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I argue that genuine ethical deliberation, and hence ethical agency, is incompatible in principle with the possession of determinate practical prescriptions concerning how best to act in a concrete ethical situation. I make this argument principally by way of an analogy between gameplay and ethical deliberation. I argue that trivially solved games of perfect information (the example I use is tic‐tac‐toe) are, or become, in some sense unplayable for the individual for whom the game is trivially solved. The reason for this, I suggest, is that there ceases to be space within the game for the distinction between that individual being a better and being a worse player of the game. I then use this example as an occasion to reflect on the kind of epistemic indeterminacy that appears to be a condition of genuine ethical deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09668373
- Volume :
- 28
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 146649500
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12595