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The virtue of error: Solved games and ethical deliberation.

Authors :
McNeill, David N.
Source :
European Journal of Philosophy. Sep2020, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p639-656. 18p.
Publication Year :
2020

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that genuine ethical deliberation, and hence ethical agency, is incompatible in principle with the possession of determinate practical prescriptions concerning how best to act in a concrete ethical situation. I make this argument principally by way of an analogy between gameplay and ethical deliberation. I argue that trivially solved games of perfect information (the example I use is tic‐tac‐toe) are, or become, in some sense unplayable for the individual for whom the game is trivially solved. The reason for this, I suggest, is that there ceases to be space within the game for the distinction between that individual being a better and being a worse player of the game. I then use this example as an occasion to reflect on the kind of epistemic indeterminacy that appears to be a condition of genuine ethical deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
09668373
Volume :
28
Issue :
3
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
European Journal of Philosophy
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
146649500
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12595