A loss-averse retailer–supplier supply chain model under trade credit in a supplier-Stackelberg game.

At present, the research on relevant decision-making considering the loss risk/ default risk in trade credit is on the rise This paper presents a supply chain model with a risk-averse retailer and a supplier offering loss sharing and trade credit in a supplier-Stackelberg game where the decision variables are the optimal order quantity and loss sharing ratio. The model is analyzed and compared to a newsvendor model without loss sharing and trade credit. Meanwhile, we provide a numerical example and sensitivity analysis to obtain managerial insights. We determine the trend and sensitivity hierarchies between the parameters and the optimal results. The main novelty and contribution of the paper can be demonstrated in two aspects. First, the risk tolerance largely affects the profit of supply chain members, therefore, we incorporate risk-averse parameter into trade credit policy. Second, we incorporate loss sharing into the supplier-Stackelberg game with trade credit for a loss-averse retailer. The findings highlight that for a risk-averse retailer, the supplier can improve the retailer's utility and its own profits through trade credit and loss sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]