The two-for-one entity and a 'for whom' puzzle: UNC as both a peace driver and the US hegemony keeper in Asia.

Does the US-led UNC (United Nations Command) have enough clout to misapply its original function, thereby making those assets available to hegemonic rivalry? Is this clout likely to be seen as equally important by all members? The UNC was established as an integrated warfighting organization during the Korean War and continues to this day as the peace driver on the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the UNC helps the US hegemony sustain the region, functioning as the two-for-one entity for both peace and hegemony. Seen in this light, the UNC serves as a rare case in international politics. The UNC allows the US to be armed with four types of leverage-political, military, economic and institutional-which contribute to hegemony maintenance. The institutionally given legal nature of the UNC with a large international audience makes the four types of leverage more viable. The effectiveness of the UNC could possibly encourage the US to use it to further US interest in its hegemonic competition with China. If the US were to maximize its function as a hegemony keeper, however, the UNC is likely to lose its convergent ground gradually because it is seen as a far-fetched intention by the UNC members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]