ALGORITHMIC BAYESIAN PERSUASION.

Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to inuence the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the U.S. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic and fundamental model in this space: the celebrated Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow [Am. Econ. Rev., 101 (2011), pp. 2590-2615]. Here there are two players, a sender and a receiver. The receiver must take one of a number of actions with an a priori unknown payoff, and the sender has access to additional information regarding the payoffs of the various actions for both players. The sender can commit to revealing a noisy signal regarding the realization of the payoffs of various actions, and would like to do so to maximize her own payoff in expectation assuming that the receiver rationally acts to maximize his own payoff. When the payoffs of various actions follow a joint distribution (the common prior), the sender's problem is nontrivial, and its computational complexity depends on the representation of this prior. We examine the sender's optimization task in three of the most natural input models for this problem, and essentially pin down its computational complexity in each. When the payoff distributions of the different actions are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and given explicitly, we exhibit a polynomial-time (exact) algorithmic solution, and a "simple" (1-1=e)-approximation algorithm. Our optimal scheme for the i.i.d. setting involves an analogy to auction theory, and makes use of Border's characterization of the space of reduced-forms for single-item auctions. When action payoffs are independent but nonidentical with marginal distributions given explicitly, we show that it is #P-hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility. In doing so, we rule out a generalized Border's theorem, in the sense of Gopalan, Nisan, and Roughgarden [Public projects, boolean functions, and the borders of Border's theorem, in Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15, ACM, New York, 2015, p. 395], for this setting. Finally, we consider a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution of action payoffs presented by a black box sampling oracle, and exhibit a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with a bicriteria guarantee. Our FPTAS is based on Monte Carlo sampling, and its analysis relies on the principle of deferred decisions. Moreover, we show that this result is the best possible in the black-box model for information-theoretic reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]