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Why It Is Difficult To Defend the Plantinga‐Type Ontological Argument.
- Source :
-
Heythrop Journal . Mar2022, Vol. 63 Issue 2, p196-209. 14p. - Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- The Plantinga‐type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility‐premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility‐premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility‐premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi‐maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility‐premise, the Plantinga‐type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility‐premise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *ONTOLOGICAL proof of God
*INTUITION
*ONTOLOGY
*PROOF of God
*POSSIBILITY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00181196
- Volume :
- 63
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Heythrop Journal
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 155655567
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.13682