Back to Search
Start Over
森林采伐限额管理制度中的寻租行为及其治理瘁.
- Source :
-
Issues of Forestry Economics . May2022, Vol. 42 Issue 3, p233-240. 8p. - Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- Background--The forest felling quota management system has reversed the situation of excessive consumption of forest resources and made contribution to the protection of ecological resources and environment. Existing researches mostly focus on the two subjects of rent-seeking behaviors, forestry authorities and forest resource managers, and pay less attention to the performance of duties and supervision of supervisors. The analysis of the cost and benefit between forestry authorities and forest resource managers is mostly based on completely rational assumptions, ignoring the consideration of the uncertainty caused by psychological heterogeneity. (2) Methods--Combining the prospect theory and game theory, based on uncertainty and bounded rationality hypothesis, established on game relation among the regulatory departments, the forestry administration and operators, rent-seeking behavior problems under the forest felling quota management system were researched, the game proceeds perception matrix among them was built, and the three mixed Nash equilibrium was solved, so that the players in the whole process of revenue perception and game decision-making are always based on the assumption of bounded rationality. (3) Results--Under the forest felling quota management system, the forestry administrations chose not to seek rent, but made administrative intervention on the cutting license with public power, so the rent-seeking behavior would not occur. Similarly, if the forest resource manager chooses not to seek rent, the rent-seeking behavior cannot occur. Therefore, the condition of rent-seeking behavior is that the rent-seeking income of forestry administrations and forest resource managers is equal to or greater than that of non-rent-seeking income. Whether rent-seeking or not, the forestry administrations and forest resources operators depends on its probability of regulatory oversight and the subjective judgment of regulatory success probability. The subjective judgment not only influenced by the force of punishment of rent-seeking behavior, the rent of rent-seeking behavior and the extra income, also affected by degree parameters of loss aversion effect and diminishing marginal sensitivity in prospect theory. Whether the supervision department will conduct supervision depends on the subjective judgment of the forestry administration on the probability of rent-seeking and its own probability of supervision success. And the subjective judgment is subject to the government's regulatory costs, the force of punishment for rent-seeking behavior, to the judgement of rent and extra income in the rent-seeking behavior of forestry administrations and forest resource managers, as well as the influence of the forestry administration of normal income. Regulators about its regulation ability and the judgment of the rent-seeking behavior also affect its regulatory policy. ⑷ Conclusions and Discussions--In the rent-seeking behavior of forest felling quota management system, there is uncertainty in the decision-making judgment of regulators, forestry administrations and forest resource managers, so the rent-seeking behavior in forest felling quota management system is a decision behavior with uncertain risk. And as the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior is rooted in the omission of forest felling quota system, in order to fundamentally restrain the rent-seeking behavior in the application process of forest felling license, we must rearrange the system to avoid the distorted allocation of forest felling quota, resulting in the loss of social benefits. It is concluded that the possibility of rent-seeking behavior can be decreased from three aspects: perfecting the forest felling quota management system, establishing and perfecting the supervision mechanism, improving the practice standards of forestry administrations, and strengthening the construction of professional ethics. On this basis, accurate and scientific prevention of rent-seeking behavior can be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- Chinese
- ISSN :
- 10059709
- Volume :
- 42
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Issues of Forestry Economics
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 157165226
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.16832/j.enki.1005-9709.20210260