When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums.

• This paper explores the developmental consequences of introducing slum-level elections to formally select slum representatives. • Slum elections help improve the provision of public goods and services only in communities that are highly organized. • First, in communities that are organized, residents are better able to collectively demand and monitor public goods provision, making slum leaders more responsive. • Second, organizational structures and experiences encourage the emergence of new leaders that challenge old brokers, skewing political competition towards public goods provision. Does electoral democracy improve public goods provision for the poor? This paper considers whether and how the introduction of elections to choose slum-level representatives affects the provision of basic public goods and services in these communities. To address this question I take advantage of an unexpected interruption in the judicial process that introduced elections in urban slums in Argentina. Drawing on an original household survey, an expert survey, and insights from in-depth interviews, I show that the introduction of elections enhanced public goods and services provision only in slums with high organizational density. In such a context, existing organizational structures and citizens' organizational experience facilitated individuals' endeavors to demand and monitor the provision of public goods and the emergence of new leaders other than partisan brokers that skewed political competition towards the provision of public goods. These findings contribute to our understanding of the relationship between elections, organizational activity and public goods provision in urban informal settlements and have implications for development practitioners: Under the right conditions, the democratic selection of slum intermediaries vis-à-vis the state can substantially improve the livelihood of these communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]