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Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers.
- Source :
-
Mathematics (2227-7390) . Aug2022, Vol. 10 Issue 15, p2705-2705. 9p. - Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing bargaining theory from general real world applications. We study the uniqueness of bargaining equilibrium in a bargaining game of two sellers and two buyers, which has instances in real-world markets. Each seller (or buyer) wants to reach an agreement with a buyer (or seller) on the division of a pie in the bargaining game. A seller and a buyer will receive their agreed divisions if they can reach an agreement. Otherwise, they receive nothing. The bargaining game includes a finite number of rounds. In each round, a player can propose an offer or accept an offer. Each player has a constant discounting factor. Under the assumption of complete information, we prove that the equilibrium of this bargaining game is the same division of two pies. The ratio of division as a function of the discount factors of all players is also deduced. The result can be extended to a bargaining game of n-sellers and n-buyers, which reveals the relevance of bargaining equilibrium to the general equilibrium of a market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *NEGOTIATION
*MARKET equilibrium
*EQUILIBRIUM
*GAMES
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 22277390
- Volume :
- 10
- Issue :
- 15
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Mathematics (2227-7390)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 158519420
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3390/math10152705