Conceptual Change and International Change.

The central thesis of this paper is that the classical notion that scientific concepts can be specified in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions does not reflect scientific practice. Instead, an understanding of concepts as being generated by the formation of focal or prototypical ‘core’ members and extended to novel observations or experiences on the basis of perceived similarities is proposed (Rosch 1973, 1975, 1983; Berlin & Kay 1969). This leads to conceptual sets characterized by graded membership and fuzzy borders, with much of the ‘construction’ of social reality, taking place at the borders of fuzzy concepts. Efforts to solve the problem of borderline cases through better definitions and operational specifications have been unsuccessful. Rather than viewing borderline cases as methodological problems to be ‘solved’, this paper argues that we should focus on the deliberative processes whereby an instance is rules ‘in’ or ‘out’ of a given conceptual category. Not only are such processes informative via-à-vis the assumptions, relationships, and theories that both imply and are implied by the concept, but also with regard to the normative, political, or deeper psychological processes that are always present in scientific practice. The understanding of concepts developed here helps make sense of contemporary social scientific practice and renders otherwise puzzling debates over topics such as ‘transitions to democracy’ or the ‘democratic peace’ both more intelligent and intelligible. The paper develops these ideas with specific focus on how we conceptualize and indeed effect international change. The interrelationship between conceptual change and apparent changes in the empirical world is thereby made central. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]