Politics and the Economist-King: Is Rational Choice Theory the Science of Choices?

This paper is another unapologetic contribution to ‘the gentle art of Rational Choice Bashing.’ The debate over Rational Choice Theory (RCT) may appear to have tired out; yet RCT is as dominant in the political sciences as ever. The reason is that criticisms of RCT typically take aim its flawed predictions, while ignoring the theory’s deeper failings. The lack of methodological openness (Hausman 1992), of empirical results (Green and Shapiro, 1995), and the limits of the economic concept of rationality (Sen, 1979, Elster 1983a) have only managed to modify RCT’s ambition in its most superficial aspects. It is assumed that RCT can adapt to any circumstances merely by borrowing new hypotheses from psychology and sociology, refining existing models, adding greater detail to the concept of rationality, and applying the theory in novel ways. In this paper, however, I contend that the problem runs deeper: to the epistemology of RCT and, more specifically, to its ambition of being the ‘science of choice.’ I argue that RCT fails twice, first as a science of choice and then as a science of choice. Both failures suggest that the political sciences need an epistemologic (re)conversion away from the ideal of a deductive and universal science of choice towards a more inductive and pluralist paradigm. While advocates of RCT rightly insist that ‘you can’t beat something with nothing,’ I take their advice, with a grain of salt: in order for alternatives to appear, maybe the frame of references needs to be modified. I draw a few perspectives for the political sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]