Reforming the World Bank: Beyond the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide in Understanding IO Change.

We argue that conventional models of international organization cannot fully explain the patterns of reform at the World Bank from 1997 to 2001. Principal-agent models focus on incentives and information asymmetries and may over-predict change in response to member state demands. Organizational models focus on bureaucratic culture and may under-predict transformation at IOs. Alongside these conventional arguments, we employ a synthetic model of IO change that focuses on how IO principals might transform organizational culture through selecting new personnel and designing mechanisms that can motivate IO staff members to engage in active debate about norms and patterns of interaction at the IO. Any changes to organizational culture should have lasting effects on IO staff behavior and policy outcomes. We evaluate these alternative hypotheses by examining eight different aspects of the World Bank’s Strategic Compact (1997-2001), which included attempts to alter project management, organizational culture and the mission of the institution itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]