The Hum(e)an Face of Kant’s Political Judgment.

In this paper we argue that Kant?s third Critique, Critique of the Power of Judgment, reconciles the tension between Kant?s conceptions of nature and freedom and thereby offers both a conception of politics and political action. By restoring what we call ?the primacy of the ought,? Kant bridges the deep separation between fact and value that Hume had established. One of the implications of Hume?s argument was a conception of politics as concerned solely with resource distribution. We call this the ?political economy conception? of politics. Kant?s solution allows for a richer conception of politics, beyond mere resource distribution. Yet, contra the Romantics, cooperative conflicts do not drop out of politics altogether. What emerges is recognition of the ineluctably dual nature of politics: politics is about finding solutions to cooperative conflicts but it is also, and in the first instance, about human culture. The abstract conception of politics makes room for the actual practice of politics, for contests over what we should do, what we should be, and what types of institutions would facilitate our development. Kant?s conception of our powers of judgment and our use of that power provides the basis upon which we can and ought to seek solutions to those very questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]